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Abstract 
 
 From Occupation to Withdrawal: A Short History of the 
Soviet/Russian Western Group of Forces in Germany 1945-1994  
 
Elliott Carson Nowacky, MA 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2012 
 
Supervisor:  Thomas J. Garza 
 
The body of knowledge in the English language concerning the Soviet/Russian 
Western Group of Forces which occupied Germany from 1945 until the fall of 1994 is 
virtually non-existent. This thesis is an attempt to begin adding to this limited knowledge. 
Having relied primarily on German and Russian sources, as well as previously untapped 
recollections of two former soldiers who served in the Western Group of Forces during 
the late 1980s/early 1990s, the results of my research show that there are significant 
discrepancies and gaps between the official Soviet/Russian history and unofficial 
accounts including the recollections of the two veterans interviewed. In many cases the 
unofficial sources contradict each other as well. Now that many of these discrepancies 
and gaps have been identified opportunities await a historian eager to write the first 
comprehensive history of the Soviet/Russian Western Group of Forces.               
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 1 
Introduction 
At 1003 on the morning of September 9, 1994 at Berlin-Schönefeld airport 
General-Colonel A.V. Terentyev, last Chief of Staff and leader of the trail party of the  
Zapadnaya Gruppa Voisk (ZGV)1 saluted and announced to a small group of gathered 
Bundeswehr officers: “The last Russian soldier has left Germany.” He then boarded the 
aircraft, and waived a final time. Two minutes later at 1005, the IL-76M with tail number 
833 carrying him and 29 other officers climbed into the sky and headed towards Russia, 
and Moscow.2 After almost a half century Soviet/Russian military presence in a now 
reunified Germany ended. 
10 days earlier on August 31st at the official ceremonies marking the completion 
of the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces in Germany held on Gendarmenmarkt 
in central Berlin General-Colonel Burlakov, the last commander of the ZGV, reported to 
Russian president Boris Yeltsin that “the international treaty concerning the conditions of 
the temporary stationing of the ZGV and its associated requirements are complete. 
546,200 soldiers and their equipment have returned home. The international strategic 
mission of the ZGV has been fulfilled. Its leadership and personnel are healthy; its 
personnel have been withdrawn and have resumed training and integration in their new 
locations. I am prepared to execute new assignments on behalf of the country. Report 
ended. General-Colonel Burlakov.”3   
Within a span of less than four years the ZGV, the most powerful grouping of 
Soviet military forces arrayed against NATO and the West since 1945 had been 
                                                 
1 The NATO term for the ZGV was the Western Group of Forces (WGF). I will use the Russian term 
throughout this paper. It is pronounced  “Za-Geh-Veh.”  
2  Mroß, Bernhard, Sie Gingen Als Freunde: Der Abzug der Westgruppe der sowjetisch-russischen Truppen 
1990-1994, Self –Published, Harrislee, 2005,  pg. 290. 
3  Ibid. pg. 273 
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dismantled. Its military units were either dissolved or relocated to Belarus, the Russian 
Federation or to Ukraine. As we shall see it was the last, largest and most complex of the 
four strategic withdrawals of Soviet/Russian military forces from Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland which also occurred from 1989 – 1994. Additionally, the 
withdrawals of military forces from Eastern and Central Europe were themselves a part 
of other withdrawals in Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Mongolia which  
with the exception of Afghanistan occurred during roughly the same time.  
Drawing on primarily German and Russian literature published over the past 
decade well as information gained during interviews I conducted with two former Soviet 
soldiers who served in the ZGV in the early 1990s this thesis is a focused attempt to write 
a short history of the ZGV’s withdrawal from Germany during the tumultuous years 
1990-1994.  Chapter 1 lays out the theoretical framework; chapters 2-9 form the 
backbone of my thesis with each chapter addressing a series of topics I feel are the most 
important in understanding the process of the withdrawal.    
Chapter 2 is an overview of the Soviet military command structure in Eastern 
Europe and how the ZGV and other groups of forces fit into this structure. Chapter 3 is a 
brief discussion of other lesser known withdrawals which occurred within the first decade 
and a half after the end of the Second World War. Chapter 4 gives a short history of 
Soviet forces in Eastern Germany from 1945-1989. Chapter 5 discusses the major factors 
which led to the withdrawals of Soviet/Russian military forces from Eastern Europe. 
Additionally it addresses German reunification and the treaties signed between Germany 
and the Soviet Union in the fall of 1990 which formed the legal framework for the ZGV’s 
withdrawal. Chapter 6 outlines the mechanics of the actual withdrawal of the ZGV and 
the various diplomatic and logistical problems that arose. Chapter 7 discusses Germany’s 
financial and material assistance to the Soviet Union/Russian Federation during the 
 3 
withdrawal. Chapter 8 offers the perspectives of two ZGV veterans I had the opportunity 
to interview in the summer of 2011. Their commentary will clearly show that General-
Colonel Burlakov’s remarks that ZGV’s “leadership and personnel are healthy” could not 
be further from the truth. Chapter 9 highlights the ZGV’s legacy in Germany and Russia. 
I then offer some final comments and observations in my conclusion.   
My personal interest in the ZGV spans almost 25 years. My first encounter with 
Soviet Army soldiers occurred in January of 1986 while I was on a week-long visit to 
then divided Berlin. I was on an escalator going up in the main department store of East 
Berlin when suddenly I saw two Soviet Army soldiers proceeding down on the escalator 
immediately next to me. Here I was face to face with the “enemy”. I wondered to myself 
what their lives were like, where they lived etc. Four years later on October 3, 1990, the 
first official day of German Reunification,  I was in my car in Weimar along with three 
other U.S Army soldiers when we passed by a Soviet army kazarma. The soldiers 
traveling with me became very excited and shouted “Sir, look! It’s Ivan!.” We could not 
believe we were actually driving by a Soviet army base and were within a stone’s throw 
of many Soviet soldiers; just a day earlier this would have been impossibility since travel 
to East Germany by US military personnel was strictly zapresheno (forbidden). Literally 
overnight, the iron curtain dividing East and West Germany ceased to exit. Opportunities 
to travel abounded and I took advantage of this.  
 Two weeks later I traveled to Dresden and again had a similar experience. This 
time I was walking to a military-history museum located a short distance from the city 
center when I realized I was on a sidewalk right next to a Soviet kazarma. From behind 
the walls I could hear Soviet soldiers talking amongst themselves though at the time I 
could not understand what they were saying. Again, I wondered to myself what their life 
was like and how their daily routine was similar/different from my daily routine at 
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O’Brien Barracks near Nuremberg in Bavaria where I had been serving as a field artillery 
officer since the summer of 1989. Before I departed Germany in January 1992 for a new 
assignment at Fort Sill, Oklahoma I had become aware in general terms that the Soviet 
military was withdrawing from Eastern Europe and eastern Germany. Occasionally, a 
story or two would appear in Stars and Stripes, the newspaper for American Forces in 
Europe, in the German publication Der Spiegel or on German television. At some point I 
learned of the housing shortage facing ZGV officers and their families as they returned to 
a now independent Russian Federation. It was hard for me at the time to understand how 
it was possible officers who had served honorably in East Germany along with their 
families could return to Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union and have no 
place to live. The pages that follow are my attempt to provide an answer to this any many 
other questions concerning the withdrawal of the ZGV from eastern Germany.  
 
 
 5 
Chapter 1: Theoretical   
The withdrawal of the ZGV from eastern Germany was half way complete when 
Francis Fukuyama published his highly controversial book The End of History in 1992. 
Fukuyama’s main argument was, in a nutshell, that liberal democracies and the capitalist 
economic model prevailed over Communism and its centralized state command directed 
economy. The principles of Hegelian dialectics, so argued Fukuyama, were dead. Liberal 
democracies and market oriented capitalism were the only viable forms of societies for 
the foreseeable future. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 also unleashed a fierce debate about 
Post-Soviet space and the role the Russian Federation (Russia) would play in managing 
this space. This chapter provides a brief overview this debate and will highlight the most 
important theories developed by Russian politicians and academics as well as those 
developed by academics in the West during the first decade after the Soviet Union’s 
demise. This overview will help us better understand the withdrawal of the ZGV.         
MACKINDER STRIKES BACK  
When the Soviet flag was lowered at the Kremlin for the last time on the evening 
of December 25, 1991 and the flag of the Russian Federation was hoisted to replace it 
monumental political and economic changes were underway not only within Russia but 
also within all of the newly independent countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and 
in Eastern Europe. A month later in January 1992, Russia’s new foreign minister, Andrei 
Kozyrev stated in an interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta that geopolitics would replace 
the communist ideology of Marx/Engels and Lenin.1 Like Fukuyama, Kozyrev’s 
                                                 
1 Sengutpa, Anita. Heartlands of Eurasia: The Geopolitics of Political Space, Plymouth, UK:Lexington 
Books, 2009, pg. xiv. 
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comments, it could be argued, were the opening salvos in a debate that continues to this 
day: What is the role of Russia in Post-Soviet space?  
One of the first and most important names to emerge during this debate was that 
of Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) a British political geographer. In January 1904 he 
presented a paper entitled “The Geographical Pivot of History” at the Royal Geographical 
Society and introduced his “Pivot Theory” which would serve as the theoretical 
foundation for the debate on the future of Russia almost one hundred years later.2 While 
it is not within the scope of this paper to give an in-depth analysis of Mackinder, his 
paper and his subsequent “Heartland Theory” it is important to review Mackinder’s 
theory in general terms.   
When Mackinder presented his paper he was arguing that the age of sea power 
(the Columbian epoch) was coming to an end and that land power would replace it. He 
divided the world into three zones: the geographical pivot of history (the closed heartland 
of Euro-Asia, the inner or marginal crescent of Euro Asia and the outer or insular 
crescent. The first zone: the “geographical pivot of history”/closed heartland according to 
Mackinder is an area of approximately 21 million square miles more than three times the 
size of North America; it is inaccessible to ships though is traversed by a network of 
railways. Austria, Turkey, India and China made up the second zone or inner/marginal 
crescent. These countries had access to the seas but were also open to a land invasion by 
the land power controlling the pivot area.3 The third zone, the outer/insular crescent, as 
its name implies, included islands adjacent to Euro-Asia and the “outer crescent states” of 
Australia, Britain, Canada, Japan, South Africa and the United States.4 Mackinder argued 
                                                 
2  Ibid. pg. 3 
3  Ibid. 
4  Ibid. pg. 5 
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that the potential of the pivot was balanced by the nation states within the inner/marginal 
crescent. He also argued that if Germany and Russia became allies the empire of the 
world would be obtainable. Mackinder also argued that nation- states in the outer crescent 
like Britain, the United States and Japan, all at the time in 1904 sea-based powers, would 
be strategically disadvantaged. Mackinder identified Russia as “the fortunate possessor” 
of most of the pivot area.5  
 
 
Figure 1.Mackinder’s Heartland.  
In 1919 Mackinder revised his pivot area theory in a book entitled Democratic 
Ideals and Reality. He renamed Euro-Asia the “World Island” and the pivot area “the 
heartland.” The “heartland” is expanded to include the entire Tibetan plain and the 
                                                 
5  Ibid. 
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mountainous headwaters region of the great rivers of Southeast Asia. Mackinder went on 
to argue that the control of the “World Island” landmass by one country would be 
detrimental to the rest of the world; eventually the “pivot state” would gain access to the 
seas and with the resources of the “World Island” at hand overrun the rest of the world.6 
His theory is summarized in the famous dictum: 
 
   Who rules Eastern Europe commands the Heartland 
      Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island 
 Who rules the World Island commands the world7 
 
 It is not surprising, therefore, that almost 90 years after the publication of “The 
Geographical Pivot of History” and 50 years after his death Mackinder’s theory “struck 
back” and formed the basis of intense political and academic debate over the future of 
Russia in Post-Soviet space in the decade immediately following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.  
 RUSSIA AND ITS ROLE IN POST-SOVIET SPACE – RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES 
In the decade or so immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union an 
intense debate broke out on what role Russia should play in Post-Soviet space. With the 
ideology of Communism no longer the “driver” of Russian foreign and domestic policies 
Russian academics and politicians alike formulated various theories on how Russia 
should proceed with its relations with the West, Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, the 
newly independent states of Central Asia and the Caucuses and of course, Belorussia and 
Ukraine. Three of the more well-known academics/politicians to write about this topic 
were: Alexandr Dugin, Dmitri Trenin and Gennadii Ziuganov. 
                                                 
6  Ibid. 
7  Ibid. 
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In his 1997 book The Basics of Geopolitics: Russia’s Geopolitical Future Dugin 
further develops Mackinder’s idea of the geopolitical opposition between land powers 
and sea power arguing that the two worlds are not just governed by competing strategic 
imperatives but are fundamentally opposed to each other culturally. The conflict between 
land and sea mirrors the continued East-West conflict. Dugin contends that land based 
societies are attracted to absolute value systems and tradition while maritime societies are 
inherently liberal.8 He identifies Mackinder’s “pivot area” with the political space of 
Russia in its entirety and believes that Russia’s absolute geopolitical centrality has always 
served to make it the dynamic nerve center of world history. Additionally he argues that 
the geopolitical destiny of the Russian heartland cannot be separated from the fate of 
Eurasia as Europe plus Asia. Dugin visualizes the two as existentially interlocked; only a 
single tightly consolidated political unit can protect the “World Island” from the 
aggression of the maritime powers that make up Mackinder’s Outer Crescent.9 Finally, he 
suggests that an anti-West alliance of Russia, Germany, Japan and Iran based on a shared 
rejection of the Western values would be capable of expelling American influence from 
the continent. Interestingly, in the 15 years since Dugin published his book such an 
alliance has yet to materialize though Russia still maintains strong ties with Iran. Other 
constellations however have appeared: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 
the short-lived GUUAM, and Cooperative Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In 2011 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin proposed a Eurasian Union as well.  
If Sengupta’s characterization of Dugin being the ideologue of Russian 
Eurasianism is correct, then Dmitri Trenin is his antithesis. His 2002 book The End of 
Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globalization offers a drastically 
                                                 
8  Ibid. pg. 31 
9  Ibid. pg. 13 
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different assessment of Russia in Post-Soviet space. Trenin’s main argument is that 
Russia is no longer the center of gravity on the Eurasian continent (China has taken its 
place). He argues that Eurasia no longer equals Russia and Eurasianism is, for all 
intensive purposes dead. The Russian language is the only remainder of Russian presence 
in Eurasia; Russia has no choice but to retreat. Trenin contends that Russia is on the 
border of traditional geopolitical thinking and globalization and must make the choice in 
favor of cooperating with the West. Additionally, he believes that Russia is 
fundamentally European and therefore the choice to join the West is a natural one. Lastly, 
he proposes that Russia needs to do away with its obsession with territory.10   
The third and final Russian perspective is that of Gennadii Ziuganov, current 
leader of the Communist Party in Russia. Ziuganov wrote two books in the 1990s 
focusing on Russia and its new geopolitical position in the world. His first book, Za 
Gorizontom, published in 1995, links communism with Russian Eurasian traditions and 
contends that all traditional societies are socialistic. Ziuganov linked Russia’s “national 
idea” to popular traditions and Russian Orthodox Christianity and then rebranded them 
into communism.11 His second book, Geographiya Pobedy: Osnovy Russiiskoi 
Geopolitiki, published in 1998, expands on three lines of Mackinder’s analysis. First, 
Ziuganov believes the geopolitical contours of the heartland as set out in 1904 and 1919 
are in fact geographically identical with those of Russia-Eurasia – the northern and north 
eastern portions of the joined European and Eurasian continents that served for centuries 
as the political-geographical arena of the Russian imperial state. Second, he contends the 
foundations of Russia’s geopolitical identity lies in the pervasive continentality of the 
Russia-Eurasia Heartland. Third, like Dugin above, Ziuganov endorses the juxtaposition 
                                                 
10  Ibid. pg 33 
11  Ibid. pg. 31 
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of land- sea- based powers. This opposition represents the principle catalyst of all 
historical changes since ancient times.12 
Ziuganov draws two conclusions from Mackinder’s work. First, Russia’s 
international position will continue to be determined by Mackinder’s vital geopolitical 
realities; these realities will continue to foster Russophobia and enmity on the part of the 
West. Second, Mackinder’s heartland stands as the geographical confirmation of the 
organic unity of the Eurasian civilization, a unity which must be supported, according to 
Zuiganov through far reaching political integration of the Post Soviet-Space. 13  
RUSSIA AND ITS ROLE IN POST-SOVIET SPACE – WESTERN PERSPECTIVES  
Not surprisingly, Western perspectives on Russia and its role in Post-Soviet Space 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 differ greatly for the most part with those 
of Dugin, Trenin and Ziuganov. This section focuses on the perspectives of two 
academics, one American and one German. 
Perhaps the single most important book on geopolitics to appear in the West after 
1991 was Zbigniew Brzezinki’s 1997 book The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy 
and its Geostrategic Imperatives. In the first three chapters, the former national security 
adviser to President Jimmy Carter retraces the rise and fall of the Roman, Han, Manchu, 
Mongol, Spanish and British empires and makes a compelling case for the rise of the 
United States as the world’s first truly global empire. Brzezinski refers to the United 
States as a “Hegemony of a new Type.” More importantly for our discussion here though 
is Brzezinski’s set-up and placement of the “grand chessboard” where he envisions the 
future game of geopolitical chess to be played. With 75% of the world’s population and 
60% of the world’s GDP (1997 numbers) as well as most of the world’s physical wealth, 
                                                 
12  Ibid, pg. 12 
13  Ibid. 
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it should come as no surprise that Brzezinski chooses Mackinder’s Eurasia as the location 
of the geopolitical chess match for global primacy.14 
His chessboard is divided into four major areas. They are: The West (Eastern and 
Western Europe, The Scandinavian countries), The Middle Space (The vast area of the 
Former Soviet Union, The South (The Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan and parts of 
India) and The East (China, Japan, the Koreas and Southeast Asia).15 Unlike Dugin and 
Ziuganov above, Brzezinski identifies the peripheries of Eurasia not its Russian core as 
the key areas on the Eurasian continent.  
 
Figure 2. The “Heartland” and its vital peripheries. 
The “pieces” on Brzezinski’s Grand Chess board are the countries within each of 
the areas noted above. However, in order to be a geostrategic player, a country must 
possess, the capacity and national will to exercise influence beyond their borders in order 
                                                 
14  Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geopolitical Imperatives, 
New York: Basic Books, 1997, pg. 31 
15  Ibid. pg. 34 
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to alter the existing geopolitical state of affairs.16 Brzezinski identifies the key 
geostrategic players as France, Germany, Russia, China and India.17 Borrowing no doubt 
from the Mackinder model he also identifies five key geopolitical pivots. They are: 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, South Korea, Turkey and Iran.18 Interestingly, Brzezinski does not 
include Great Britain or Japan as key geostrategic players. He argues that Great Britain is 
a retired geostrategic player resting on its splendid laurels, disengaged from mainland 
Europe19 where France and Germany are the primary actors and that Japan, despite its 
economic power exercises self-restraint and is largely overshadowed by the United States 
with respect to security issues in the region.20  
Brzezinski identifies two possible worst case scenarios in which the global 
primacy of the United States could be threatened. The first would be a coalition of China, 
Russia and Iran, what he calls an “antihegemonic” coalition united not by ideology but by 
shared grievances. The second scenario could involve a Sino-Japanese anti-American 
coalition. Other combinations also exist including a German-Russian axis or a French-
Russian entente.21 
THE EURASIAN BLACK HOLE 
Brzezinski argues in Chapter 4 of the Grand Chessboard, that the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union in 1991 left a “black hole” in the center of the largest landmass on 
earth. He asserts that its collapse was the final stage in the progressive fragmentation of 
the Sino-Soviet bloc which lasted roughly from 1950-1960.22 According to Brzezinski, 
                                                 
16  Ibid. pg. 40 
17  Ibid. pg. 41 
18  Ibid.  
19  Ibid. pg. 43 
20  Ibid. pg. 45 
21  Ibid. pg. 55 
22  Ibid. pg. 89 
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however, it was the unraveling of the centuries old Moscow-ruled Great Russian Empire 
that caused the greatest geopolitical upheaval. Literally overnight the Russian Federation, 
consisting of roughly 150 million people, became the de facto successor to the Soviet 
Union while the other former S.S.R’s consisting of another 150 million people began 
exercising their newly gained independence to varying degrees. Russia’s borders 
contracted in the Caucasus to where they had been in the early 1800s, in Central Asia in 
the mid-1800s and most significantly in the West to where they had been in 1600 just 
after the reign of Ivan the Terrible.23   
A dozen newly independent countries now occupied the space which had been 
ruled by the Tsarist Empire for centuries and by the Soviet Union for almost 75 years. 
With the exception of Russia these new nation-states were not prepared for genuine 
sovereignty. Additionally, some 20 million Russians now found themselves living in the 
newly independent states increasingly dominated by nationalistic elites interested in 
asserting their own nationalistic beliefs after decades of Russian/Soviet rule.24   
As the Soviet Union disintegrated Russia’s geopolitical situation was adversely 
affected. As mentioned previously Russia’s borders in the West shrunk the most and as a 
result its sphere of geopolitical influence has been dramatically reduced.25 The loss of the 
ports of Riga and Tallin made Russian access to the Baltic Sea more difficult. The 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact not only meant the loss of satellite states in Central Europe it 
also meant the loss of an important buffer zone against possible future western 
aggression. Brzezinski argues that it was the loss of Ukraine that was the most 
significant. An independent Ukraine challenged all Russians to rethink the nature of their 
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24  Ibid. pg. 89  
25  Ibid. pg. 91 
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own political and ethnic identity; it also deprived Russia of its dominant position on the 
Black Sea. The loss of Ukraine, argues Brzezinski, was geographically pivotal for it 
drastically limited Russia’s geostrategic options. He contends that any attempt by Russia 
to rebuild the Eurasian empire without Ukraine will be extremely difficult.26  
Russia’s geopolitical situation was adversely affected in three additional areas as 
well. The newly independent states of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan enhanced 
according to Brzezinski opportunities for Turkey to reestablish its influence in the region. 
The geopolitical upheaval resulted in significant changes in the Caspian Sea region as 
well. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union the Caspian Sea was considered a Russian 
lake. However, with the emergence of an independent Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan Russia become one of five claimants to the natural resources of the 
Caspian Sea. The emergence of the independent Central Asian states also meant that in 
some places Russia’s south-eastern border had moved north by more than 1000 miles.27 
The third and final area in which Brzezinski contends Russia has lost its geographic 
imperative is the Far East. He argues that although no political or territorial changes took 
place here China’s growing economic power coupled by its 1.3 billion citizens is 
fundamentally altering the historic equation between the two countries.28  
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Figure 3. The collapse of Soviet Influence – Western and Southern Facades. 
In his conclusion to Chapter 4 “The Black Hole” Brzezinski, much like Trenin 
above, contends that Russia has essentially one geostrategic option that will give it a 
realistic international role and provide itself an opportunity transform and socially 
modernize itself – Europe. He contends that this Europe will not just be any Europe but a 
transatlantic Europe with an enlarging European Union (EU) and NATO. Brzezinski 
further contends that only a Russia that is willing to accept the new economic and 
geopolitical realities of Europe will be able to prosper internally from the enlarging scope 
of transcontinental cooperation in commerce, communications, investment and 
education.29 Interestingly, he suggests that Russia emulate the path taken by post-
Ottoman Turkey when it decided to shed its imperial ambitions and embarked very 
deliberately on the road of modernization, Europeanization and democratization.30      
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THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF SPACE AFTER THE COLD WAR 
In an article published in Progress in Human Geography in 2004, the German 
geographer Paul Reuber from the University of Muenster argues that the political 
representations of space developed after the Cold War and in the first few years of the 
new millennium can be divided into three categories. They are: the geopolitics of cultural 
difference, the geopolitics of universalism and hegemonic superpower and the geopolitics 
of new bloc formation.31 
Reuber argues that although Samuel Huntington’s 1998 book The Clash of 
Civilizations had gained notoriety in the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks in the United States 
he was not solely responsible for the development of the discourse of the geopolitics of 
cultural difference.  Reuber contends that the discourse had been going on for at least the 
past two centuries and was influenced significantly by Ritter’s “Gang der Kulturen ueber 
die Erde (The Expansion of Cultures around the Earth) and Kolb’s “Kulturerdteile” 
(Cultural Earth Pieces). Curiously, he makes no mention of the arguments of Dugin and 
Zuiganov outlined earlier in this chapter which surely it could be argued.32 
Reuber defines the second major geopolitical narrative of the post Cold War era 
as the geopolitics of universalism and hegemonic superpower. He places Fukuyama’s The 
End of History cited at the beginning of this chapter and Brzezinski’s The Grand 
Chessboard firmly within this category.33 
Reuber’s third and final category, the geopolitics of new bloc formation is more 
opaque. He defines new blocs as those formations that have not been established since 
the end of the Second World War. While Reuber does suggest the EU showed signs of 
                                                 
31 Reuber, Paul. “The Political Representations of Space after the Cold War and in the New Millenium” 
Progress in Human Geography 28/5, 2004, pg. 632. 
32  Ibid. 
33  Ibid. 
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more autonomous positioning from NATO and the US after the lead up to the war in Iraq 
through discussions of an EU ministry of foreign affairs or a common armed forces34 he 
seems to be Eurocentric in his approach and makes no reference to the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) or the Cooperative Security Treaty Organization 
(SCTO).    
This chapter highlighted the debate about Post-Soviet Space that broke out after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. As we have seen, the end of the bi-polar world 
dominated by the Soviet Union and United States resulted in a rebirth of Mackinder’s 
theories on geopolitics. Academics such as Brzezinski, Dugin, and Trenin along with the 
Russian politician Ziuganov published their theories on how Russia should manage its 
smaller footprint within Post-Soviet Space. All came to very different conclusions on 
how Russia should proceed. Finally, we examined an attempt by the German geographer 
Paul Reuber to place the theories of at least a few of the aforementioned academics into 
three new categories of post Cold War geopolitics.    
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Chapter 2: Soviet Military Structures – On Overview 
In order to better understand the ZGV, its military role in East Germany and  its 
withdrawal from 1990-1994 it will be necessary to briefly review the basic  structures of 
the Soviet military as they existed until 1991 and how the ZGV and the other three groups 
of forces in Eastern Europe “nested” much like matroshki  into these structures.   
THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND GENERAL STAFF   
The Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the General Staff were the two most 
important organs within the Soviet military structure. In peacetime MoD’s primary role 
was to design, equip and staff all five services of the Soviet military. They were: Ground 
Forces (GF), Strategic Air Forces (SAF), Anti-Aircraft Forces (PVO), Strategic Rocket 
Forces (SRF) and the navy. It also was tasked in developing military doctrine in order to 
operationally employ these forces in air, land and sea operations.1 MoD’s General Staff 
oversaw the operations of extant forces deployed for war contingencies. Key tasks 
included designing war plans and training exercises, planning mobilizations, overseeing 
training and combat readiness and developing operational and strategic doctrine to ensure 
that military units of all branches of serviced worked together seamlessly at the 
operational and strategic level.2 
Stalin authorized the formation of the Soviet General Staff in 1935 and during 
World War II it served as his main organ for operational deployment of all military 
forces. After the end of the war it became the center of gravity for all aspects of military 
planning, operations and determination of resource requirements. The minister of defense 
                                                 
1  Odom, William E. The Collapse of the Soviet Military, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998, pg. 23. 
Mr. Odom (1932-2008 ) retired as a lieutenant general from the US Army in 1988. He also served as the 
director of the National Security Agency.   
2  Ibid. pg. 25  
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had a small staff and was dependent on the General Staff. The Soviet General staff was 
distinctive from other Western militaries in that it also exercised operational control of 
naval forces.3   
The MoD and the General Staff were also staffed with the ability to conduct 
research and analysis. In addition to their own staff sections they could request assistance 
from military institutes and academies. In addition to the General Staff Academy each 
military service could complete research and conduct field testing. The MoD had a few 
design bureaus which were staffed with technicians and engineers. All of the work done 
by the aforementioned agencies was classified secret. This meant that all non-military 
academies and institutes had no access to data or the results of studies etc.4 Furthermore, 
the legislative branch, the Supreme Soviet, and the Central Committee Secretariat had no 
analytical capabilities to validate/refute MoD’s data. This left MoD with a virtual 
monopoly on all matters relating to military requirements and operations and as we shall 
see, this fact would have serious political consequences during 1988-91 when military 
policies became of the object of open public debate.5   
MILITARY SERVICES  AND ASSOCIATED  STRUCTURES 
Most Western militaries consist of three military services: air forces, ground 
forces and a navy. The Soviet military consisted of five services. They were: the navy, 
ground forces, air forces, air defense forces and rocket forces. The air defense forces 
(PVO) were formed in 1950 as a result of the threat posed by US strategic bomber 
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forces.6 The PVO consisted of both surface to air missiles and fighter-interceptor aircraft.  
Khrushchev’s ordered the formation of the rocket forces in 1960.7 
 
Figure 4. Soviet Military Structures including Groups of Forces.     
Military commissariats (voennye kommissariaty, or voenkomaty) existed at the 
district (raion) level in the Soviet state territorial structure. A raion was somewhat similar 
to a county here in the United States. Military conscription, monitoring training of 
reservists and managing mobilization were their main responsibilities.8   
Lastly, The Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation and the Fleet 
(Dobrovolnoe obshchestvo sodeistviya armii, aviatsii, i flotu), or DOSAAF, the largest 
                                                 
6  Ibid. pg. 27 
7  Ibid. pg. 28 
8  Ibid. pg. 28 
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mass voluntary organization in the Soviet Union, provided youth with pre-service 
training. Interestingly, the cost of operating DOSAAF was not part of the Soviet military 
budget because its operations were financed by member’s dues and its many small 
business activities.9   
HIGH COMMANDS 
Beginning in the late 1970s through the early 1980 four high commands were 
established; each subordinate to the General Staff (see Figure 4 above). In order of 
importance they were the Western High Command and Southwestern High Command in 
Europe; The Far East High Command and the Southern High Command with its focus on 
the Middle East and Southwest Asia. The primary reason for establishing these 
commands was to improve theater operational capabilities. This was especially true of the 
two commands oriented towards Europe.10 
MILITARY DISTRICTS 
Military districts or voennie okrooga, (See Figure 5 below) were also a unique 
part of Soviet military structure. Each district had its own small “ministries of defense” 
with staffs similar to the General Staff in Moscow. They controlled the voenkomaty, 
supply functions, training functions, some military schools and numerous other peacetime 
functions. The military district headquarters located on the western frontier of the Soviet 
Union needed to be prepared to become front headquarters. “Second generation” or 
follow-on headquarters would replace them in order to manage remaining military district 
functions and to train and mobilize follow-on ground forces divisions.11  
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 23 
 
Figure 5. Military Districts in the Soviet Union, ca 1989. 
TEATR VOENNYKH DEISTVII  (TVDS) 
The last command and control structure which Odom assesses as “rather 
confusing” is the concept of a theater of military operations - teatr voennykh deistvii or 
TVD. These were territorial boundaries and interestingly, as Map 2 and 3 show below, 
were marked by radial lines originating in Moscow. In actuality however, the Soviet 
General Staff divided the entire world into TVDs. North America, Australia, and oceans 
were defined as TVDs. Large, small or no military forces at all might be deployed within 
a TVD. The three TVDs projecting into Europe varied in size ranging from 63 divisions in 
the Western TVD to just 12 in the Northwestern. Additionally, two of them, the Western 
and Southwestern TVDs had high commands  order to control their larger forces. A TVD 
was also a military category; the Soviet General Staff regarded the TVDs in Europe as 
 24 
the most important. The Far East and Southern TVDs as a result were lower in priority of 
manpower and equipment.12   
. 
 
Figure 6. The Western TVD had the highest concentration of military forces.  
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Figure 7. The Western TVD.   
NESTING OF THE GROUPS OF FORCES  
The ZGV and the other three groups of forces, the Sentralnaya Gruppa Voisk 
(CGV) in Czechoslovakia, the Youzhnaya Gruppa Voisk (YGV) in Hungary and the  
Severnaya Gruppa Voisk (SGV) in Poland were all located in the Western Theater of War 
as well as in the Western TVD. Their commanders and staff answered directly to the 
General Staff in Moscow (See Figure 4 above).   
Having highlighted the basic structures of the Soviet military our focus will now 
shift to a short history of less well known withdrawals of Soviet military forces from the 
western façade that took place from 1944 – 1958. This will be the topic of Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3:  Soviet Military Withdrawals from the Western Façade 
1944-1958 
 As Vojtech Mastny, author of the 1989 article “Soviet Military Withdrawal from 
Eastern Europe: Its Political Dimensions”, points out it is a myth that Soviet forces never 
left a territory they had conquered during the later phases of the Second World War.1 
Indeed from December 1944 until July 1958 Soviet military forces withdrew from six 
different locations in Eastern Europe and Scandinavia. This chapter briefly reviews these 
six withdrawals. 
YUGOSLAVIA  
Red Army units reached the borders of Yugoslavia on September 6, 1944 but it 
was not until three weeks later on September 28
th
 that they were arrayed and prepared for 
the final attack on the capital Belgrade. Tito, the leader of the communist partisans in 
Yugoslavia, needed to coordinate with Soviet leadership in order to launch the final 
assault to “liberate” the city. On the evening September 19, Tito, who had been at his 
headquarters on the island of Vis under British protection, flew to Moscow to meet with 
Stalin for the first time. He had two goals during his visit. First, he wanted to get at least 
one Soviet armored division to support his forces during the attack on Belgrade. Second, 
he wanted to come to an agreement with Stalin how much of the rest of Yugoslavia they 
wanted to liberate together, what objectives the Soviet forces would take, what objectives 
his forces would take and how long Soviet forces would remain upon the conclusion of 
hostilities. Stalin responded by promising Tito with an entire armored corps (at least two 
divisions).2 
                                                 
1 Mastny, Vojtech., Soviet Military Withdrawal from Eastern Europe: Its Political Dimensions, Faraday 
Discussion Paper No. 14, The Council for Arms Control, London, 1989, pg. 5 
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Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden Baden, 1993, pp. 37-38. Handzik’s work also includes discussion of Soviet 
 27 
On September 28th,
 
TASS, the official Soviet news agency, released a 
communiqué outlining the agreement reached by Stalin and Tito. Notable points of 
agreement included the Soviet High Command’s request to the communist partisans for 
freedom of movement of Soviet forces in the northern parts of the country; the Soviet 
High Command’s acceptance that responsibility for civilian legal jurisdiction in areas 
occupied by the Soviets would remain in Yugoslavian hands and finally the conditions 
for the withdrawal of Red Army forces. These conditions were based on two factors: a 
successful completion of the liberation of Belgrade and the Soviet High Command’s 
operational requirements to move its forces out of northern Yugoslavia to Hungary where 
German resistance had been stiff.3 Stalin announced his intentions to withdrawal the Red 
Army from Yugoslavia to Churchill during a meeting in the fall of 1944 in Moscow.4 The 
first Soviet units began departing for Hungary on October 20
th
 after the fall of Belgrade. 
The last Soviet unit, the 68
th
 Infantry Corps, left Yugoslavia on December 20
th
 1944.5  
NORWAY      
By the end of 1943 it was becoming more and more likely that Finland would be 
out of the war. If this happened, there was a high probability that the Red Army would be 
the first of the allied forces to reach Norway.6 Indeed, on October 7
th
 1944 about a month 
after Finland’s capitulation the Red Army began its offensive against the German Army’s 
Nordfront. On October 18
th
 the first Soviet units crossed the Norwegian border in the 
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most northern province of Finnmark.7 Foreign Minister Molotov notified the Norwegian 
ambassador in Moscow that the USSR would provide all means of assistance and 
political support.8 By November 7
th
 the Red Army was 100 kilometers west of the 
Finnish-Norwegian border near the Tana river where it had conducted its last skirmishes 
with the Germany army which was now retreating toward the Lyngen fjord another 170 
kilometers to the west. Two days later the Soviet forces reoriented themselves along a 
line Kirkenes-Pikjajarvi-Nootsi parallel to the border. They now occupied an area of 
about 1100 square kilometers, an area about the size of Holland and Belgium, inside 
Norway.9  
 
 
Figure 8. Map of Finnmark in northern Norway.      
                                                 
7  Finnmark is the northernmost province in Norway. It  borders Finland in the south, and Russia in the 
east. The Red Army briefly occupied the town of Kirkenes (within red box)  in late October 1944.      
8  Ibid. pg. 48 
9  Ibid. pg. 49 
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After the unconditional surrender of Germany in May 1945 the Oslo government 
clearly understanding the strategic importance of their country, tried at all costs to avoid 
giving the USSR the impression they wanted the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces 
in Norway. Instead they tried to play the role of “coordinator” for the withdrawal of the 
“liberators” from both east (the Soviets) and west (the Anglo-Americans). In June the 
Norwegian army informed the government in Oslo that the Finnmark region was free 
from German troops and proposed they ask the USSR to leave the areas they occupied. 
After the majority of Anglo-American forces left Norway in August 1945 Foreign 
Minister Trygve Lie, backed by a request from the Norwegian parliament, submitted on 
September 5th a proposal to the USSR to remove its forces from Norway. Moscow’s 
approval followed just nine days later on the 12th. The last Soviet soldiers left Norway on 
the 25
th
 of September.10   
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
On May 9
th
 1945, the day Germany’s unconditionally surrender, Red Army 
soldiers entered Prague. Two days later on the May 11
th
 they made contact with 
American units in Karlsbad who had arrived five days earlier.11 For the next seven 
months liberated Czechoslovakia under the leadership of President Benes sought the 
withdrawal of both American and Soviet forces from its territory. While it is not within 
the scope of this paper to review each American, Czech and Soviet proposal and counter 
proposal considered before an agreeable solution to all sides was found it will be useful 
to highlight a few of them. Suffice to say the circumstances regarding the withdrawal of 
American and Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia were much more complicated than the 
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aforementioned cases of Norway and Yugoslavia. In this case foreign troops from two 
different countries did occupy the entire country.    
President Benes was well aware that the withdrawal of the American and Soviet 
forces was linked to the expulsion of the Sudetendeutschen. He also understood that the 
withdrawal of the Americans and the Soviets had to be synchronized. He shared these 
positions with American representative Alfred W. Klieforth in late May early June of 
1945.12  
In the middle of June in Washington a memorandum prepared by the State 
Department for President Truman argued, much like Benes had, for the principle of a 
simultaneous withdrawal of American and Soviet forces. He and his advisers believed 
they could successfully argue this position because, according to estimates, the Soviets by 
this time had already withdrawn two-thirds of their forces from Czechoslovakia.13 This 
would remain the US position until Truman reached a final agreement on the withdrawal 
of forces with Stalin later that fall.  
President Benes faced opposition to his position from within his own government. 
On the May 14
th
 just a week after the war’s end Klement Gottwald, leader of the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC) proposed the unilateral withdrawal of all US 
forces. His proposal reached Washington on June 21
st
 1945. Gottwald argued that the 
Americans were helping the Sudetendeutschen, preventing their expulsion, had not 
acknowledged the government in Prague and were forming a military government in their 
zone of occupation.14  
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Another interesting proposal which never gained any traction came in a 
diplomatic note sent from the Czech foreign ministry to the United States proposing that 
Czech army assume control of the areas occupied by the Americans.15 It argued that 
allied occupations armies had different perspectives on how to properly administrate 
occupied areas. It also claimed that the American presence was hindering reconstruction 
of the country. Opponents of the proposal in the US government quickly pointed out the 
note’s inconsistencies. How could it be, they argued, that a relatively small contingent of 
US forces occupying a small strip of territory between Karlsbad, Pilsen and the German 
border be such a burden on the Czech reconstruction efforts when the Soviets numbering 
over 300,000 occupied the rest of the country?  
In an attempt to correct what some in the CPC had perceived as too much of a 
pro-Soviet position, Minister President Fierlinger announced on the radio in Prague that 
Stalin intended to relocate in the coming days all Soviet units to the area along the Czech-
German border; within the rest of the country the Soviets would only retain control of 
key railroad junctions.16 His announcement gained little traction and there is no evidence 
that Stalin ever had such intentions.   
Finally, in an attempt to get the US Government to finally make a decision to 
unilaterally withdrawal its forces Czech State Secretary Clementis, faction foreign 
minister and member of the CPC sent a diplomatic note to the American representative in 
Prague which included “new information” that the Soviet Union had informed the Czech 
government that they have the intent to withdrawal “the largest portion” of their forces 
from the territory of Czechoslovakia by July 5
th
. 
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US Secretary of State Bynes replied to the Czechoslovakian proposal, which 
according to his representative in Prague had really been from Moscow, in a pleasant and 
tactful manner. He noted his amazement of the democratic developments in 
Czechoslovakia but acknowledged with deep concern the affects of American/Soviet 
occupation forces would have on the reconstruction of the country and its independence. 
According to Byrnes orders for the immediate reduction of US forces have been issued 
and the US is looking forward to the day when both armies can be completely withdrawn 
from the territory of Czechoslovakia. With Byrnes’s reply the first attempt by the 
communists/Soviets to convince the US to unilaterally withdrawal was rejected.17 
Throughout the summer of 1945 a diplomatic game of chicken continued to be 
played between Moscow, Prague and Washington. Prime Minister Fierlinger under 
pressure from the Soviets issued another false statement of Soviet intensions to reduce 
their forces. A few weeks later the Czech foreign minister Masaryk informed the newly 
arrived American Ambassador Lawrence A. Steinhardt that Stalin was going to add an 
additional 320,000 Soviet troops into the Soviet zone of occupation. General Eisenhower, 
the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe also believed it was possible that the Soviet 
could increase their troop strength to 500,000 by the coming winter.18  
Other factors were also beginning to come into play. President Truman came 
under increasing public pressure to “bring the boys home”; his administration was unable 
to convince the public of the necessity of the troops in Czechoslovakia to help persuade 
the Soviets, who were were still largely viewed as allies, to withdraw.19 
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The end of the deadlock came on November 2, 1945 when President Truman 
informed Stalin that he intended to withdraw all US forces from Czechoslovakia by 
December 1
st.
 Truman proposed the Soviets do the same. Both armies, Truman argued, 
had fulfilled their mission in assisting the people of Czechoslovakia in eliminating the 
remains of Nazi military forces. President Truman continued that the continued presence 
of allied troops is a heavy burden on the Czechoslovakian economy and is delaying the 
reconstruction efforts. He concluded his offer by stating that the simultaneous withdrawal 
of both armies will finally convince the American people the burden on Czechoslovakian 
resources has ended. One week later Stalin informed President Truman of his 
concurrence with the proposal. He welcomed the proposal indicating that it fit well within 
Soviet plans for the continued demobilization of the  the Soviet Army. By December 1
st
 
1945 all American and Soviet troops had left Czechoslovakia.20      
DENMARK 
In the spring of 1945 the soviet newspaper Krasnii Flot stated that there is a good 
possibility that the Red Army will liberate Denmark. Soviet units were advancing rapidly 
along the German Baltic coast and it was not an exaggeration that the Red Army might 
indeed have the opportunity to occupy Denmark.21  
 
 
                                                 
20  Ibid. pg. 70  
21  Ibid. pg. 74  
 34 
 
Figure 9. Map showing the island of Bornholm (within red box). 
Of course, the Americans and British were well aware of Soviet advances along 
the coast and were very concerned about the Soviets reaching Denmark. On April 19
th
 
British Prime Minister Churchill cabled his foreign minister Eden and made clear in no 
uncertain terms how important it would be that Field Marshall Montgomery’s forces 
reach the German city of Luebeck in order to prevent the Soviets from occupying 
Denmark. On May 2
nd
 Montgomery’s forces entered Luebeck just hours ahead of the 
Soviets; their actions cut off the possibility of a  Soviet occupation.22 Unbeknownst to the 
Americans and British however, the Soviet High Command had approved an operation 
on April 23rd for the occupation of the Danish island of Bornholm. On May 9
th
, after the 
initial bombing of port facilities, Soviet troops landed on Bornholm. On the next day, the 
Chief of Staff of the Soviet High Command, General Alexei Antonov declared the island 
as part of the Soviet zone of operations. The deputy commander in Bornholm, Colonel 
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Strebkov gave assurances on May 10
th
 that Soviet forces would not remain once the last 
German soldiers had to be expelled from the island. Three days later the last German 
soldiers were driven from the island. The initial waves of Soviet troops departed only to 
be replaced by 6000-8000 soviet troops who had traveled along with Danish citizens in 
their own boats who had offered their assistance. By the end of May 1945 the Soviet 
High Command justified the occupation because the inland was geographically located 
within their zone of occupation.23  
Nevertheless the final date of the Soviet withdrawal from Bornholm remained 
unclear. At the beginning of 1946 the General Yakushev, Commander of Soviet 
occupation forces, declared Soviet troops would leave the island by the end of the year. 
After a conversation between the Danish Foreign Minister Rasmussen with the Soviet’s 
United Nations representative Vyschiski in January of 1946 Denmark sent a diplomatic 
note to the Soviet government requesting that the Soviets leave. The Soviet response 
followed surprisingly quickly. It indicated the Soviet Union was prepared to withdrawal 
its forces from Bornholm under two conditions. First, Danish troops had to reoccupy the 
island once Soviet troops had departed. Second, administration of the island could in no 
way be tainted by other foreign entities (The Americans and the British).  The Danish 
government provided the Soviet authorities these assurances in another diplomatic note 
sent on March 7
th
.  The withdrawal of Soviet troops began on March 20
th
 1946 and was 
completed by April 5
th
.24    
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BULGARIA 
On September 5
th
 1944 the Soviet Union declared war on Bulgaria despite the fact 
that just a day earlier the new Bulgarian government had declared neutrality. The Soviet 
justified its decision due to the fact Bulgaria, while not participating directly in the war, 
had allowed German troops to use its territory to launch attacks against Greece and 
Yugoslavia and had not broken off ties with Germany after declaring neutrality. They 
would also claim another reason: preventing British and Turkish forces from occupying 
Bulgaria. Attempts by the Bulgarian government to secure an immediate ceasefire in the 
days immediately following its declaration of neutrality fell on deaf ears; The Red Army 
entered Bulgaria on September 8
th
. 25 
There were several important reasons for the Soviet occupation of Bulgaria. 
German troops had not yet been defeated in Greece hence the Soviets needed to occupy 
Bulgaria in order to provide flank protection for their forces advancing into Eastern 
Europe.26 The presence of the Red Army also facilitated the take-over of Bulgaria by the 
pro-Soviet Fatherland Front which began on September 9th. Interestingly, the Soviets 
also placed the Fatherland Front and its military forces under the command of the Red 
Army just days after entering Bulgaria. Soviet advisers were sent to all Bulgarian army 
units. These units subsequently fought in Yugoslavia, Hungary and on the outskirts of 
Vienna.27   
Bulgaria surrendered unconditionally in Moscow on September 28
th
 1944. The 
terms of the surrender foresaw the creation the creation of an Allied Control Commission 
(ACC) similar to what would be established in divided Germany less than a year later. In 
reality, however, the commission was completely dominated by the Soviets with the 
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American and British representatives having little say in its decisions.28 For the next two 
plus years the Americans and British would try in vain to influence events in Bulgaria. 
Finally, on February 10
th
 1947 the final peace treaty with Bulgaria and other former allies 
of Nazi Germany was signed in Paris.29   
The treaty addressed the question of the withdrawal of Soviet Forces from 
Bulgaria as well as the continued presence of Soviet Forces in Hungary and Romania in 
order to secure the supply lines to Soviet Forces stationed in Austria. After initially 
insisting that Soviet troops would also remain in Bulgaria due to the fact the Soviets were 
using the Danube river to also resupply their units in Austria, Moscow changed its 
position but only after insisting the Americans and British agree to withdrawal their 
forces from Italy. This agreement was reached July 20
th
 1946 in Paris at a meeting of the 
allied foreign ministers. It stated that allied forces must leave Bulgaria and Italy within 90 
days of the signing of the final peace treaty. The Soviets completed their withdrawal from 
Bulgaria on 14 December 1947.30  
FINLAND 
The Finnish government signed the terms for its unconditional surrender with the 
Soviet Union on September 14, 1944. The treaty required the Finns to provide the Soviet 
military airfields and ports along their southern and southwest coast. The requirement to 
give up the 380 square kilometer peninsula of Porkkala-Udd just 14 kilometers from 
Helsinki for the Soviets to use as a military base for a period of 50 years was the hardest 
condition for the Finns to accept. Soviet forces occupied the peninsula on October 2, 
1944.31 One Finnish historian and diplomat noted that Helsinki was now under the aim of 
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Soviet cannons and the Soviet presence there would be used to blackmail Finland and 
might even be used as a launching point for the occupation of Helsinki itself.32 The Finns 
would remain under the “aim of Soviet cannons” for the next 11 years.  
 
 
Figure 10. Map of Porkkala-Ud Penninsula, Area of Soviet occupation. 
In the late summer of 1955 six months before the Finnish presidential election the 
Soviet government declared it was ready to withdrawal from Porkkala if the Finns would 
extend the friendship treaty they had signed with the Soviet Union in 1948 by 20 years. 
The Finnish government immediately agreed. On September 19, 1955 in Moscow Finnish 
President Passikivi signed the agreement concerning the extension of the friendship treaty 
and the annulling the Soviets 50 year lease on Porkkala-Udd.33 
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Since the end of the Second World War Porkkala-Udd had lost much of its 
military-strategic value for the Soviets. Leningrad was no longer under threat by an 
invading force and the Soviets now enjoyed numerical advantage in naval power on the 
Baltic Sea. In his memoirs Khrushchev recalled that Zhukov told him in 1955 that the 
stationing of Soviet troops in Finland no longer made sense militarily. Soviet troops 
withdrew from Porkkala-Udd on January 26, 1956.34  
ROMANIA    
On the morning of August 31
st
 1944 Soviet troops under the command of 
Marshall Malinovski marched into Bucharest.35 On September 10th they presented the 
Romanians the terms for their unconditional surrender. The negotiations lasted for more 
than seven hours.36 The Soviets insisted on several military related and non-military 
related conditions. In addition to providing 12 divisions for war against Germany and 
Hungary37, the Romanians had to provide them use of all military bases, buildings, ports, 
airfields and communications facilities. It also required the Romanian government to pay 
reparations in the amount of 300 million dollars over six years and provide the Soviets 
access to its industrial facilities, transportation assets, petroleum based products and 
foodstuffs. The Soviet High Command also seized control of the press, radio, access to 
films and theaters as well as control over the postal and telephone system.38 It is 
interesting to note that the terms of the unconditional surrender did not specifically 
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permit the occupation of Romania by Soviet forces; it provided only for the “free 
movement” of those forces within Romania.39 
The situation changed at the end of October 1944 when Marshall Malinkovski 
directed the Romanian general staff provide suitable locations for the quartering of three 
Soviet divisions.40 When the British Representative of the ACC in Romania, Vice 
Marshall Stevenson, confronted the Soviets about their meddling in Romanian internal 
affairs and the presence of Soviet military on November 30
th
 the Soviets responded that 
the three divisions in question were worn out from combat and were only in Romania to 
rest and refit.41 The period of “building socialism” began in Romania much like in other 
countries where Soviet forces had remained after the war, notably in the Soviet zone of 
occupation in eastern Germany and in Poland. The newly founded People’s Republic of 
Romania even acknowledged the roll the Red Army had played in the founding of their 
new country of workers in the preamble of their 1952 constitution.42  
The military presence of the Soviet Union in Austria also justified the stationing 
of Soviet military forces in Romania and Bulgaria. When the Soviet Union agreed to 
support the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955 and the last Soviet troops 
departed Austria on the September 19
th
 of the same year, the legal and political basis for 
the stationing of troops in Romania and Bulgaria suddenly found itself in question.43 In 
order to solve this problem the Soviets negotiated bi-lateral treaties with Poland (Dec 
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1956), the German Democratic Republic (Mar 57), Romania (Apr 1957) and Hungary 
(May 57).44  
Less than a year after the signing of the Soviet-Romanian bilateral treaty on the 
stationing of Soviet troops in Romania the Soviet news agency TASS announced on May 
24
th
 1958 the political committee of the Warsaw Pact’s intent to withdraw all military 
forces from Romania and one division from Hungary. 45 
Several factors appear to have driven the Warsaw Pact’s decision to make troop 
reductions in Romania and Hungary. On a the political level the announcement appeared 
to indicate a desire on the part of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries to reduce 
tensions with NATO. The Warsaw Pact hoped NATO would follow and make it own 
reductions in forces as well.46 Khrushchev’s memoirs seem to indicate that the main 
reason for the announcement was his belief that recent advances in nuclear and rocket 
technology made by the Soviets allowed for dramatic reductions in conventional forces.47 
The numbers of troops was no longer as important as the quality and quantity of our 
nuclear arsenal.  Other reasons included the improved mobility and firepower of the 
Soviet Army and Soviet desires to reduce operational costs especially in the occupied 
countries like Romania where they were twice as much as in the Soviet Union.48  
In June 1958 almost 14 years after Romania has signed its unconditional 
surrender with the Soviet Union all remaining Soviet forces, approximately two 
divisions, withdrew. These units were relocated to the Odessa Military District where in 
conjunction with tactical missile units they provided coastal defense against an invasion 
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of Romania and the Ukrainian S.S.R.. The departure of Soviet troops from Romania 
would be the last major withdrawal of Soviet forces from a country in Eastern Europe 
until some 31 years later in 1989 when at the end of the Cold War the four Groups of 
Soviet Forces in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and reunified Germany began their 
withdrawals.  
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Chapter 4: The GSOVG & GSVG: Forerunners to the ZGV 
 Prior to 1989 the Soviet forces in Germany had been known as the Gruppa 
Sovetskix Okkupatsionnix Voisk Germanii (GSOVG) and subsequently the Gruppa 
Sovetskix Voisk Germanii (GSVG). This chapter offers a brief history of these earlier 
groupings of forces as well as a short discussion of the Soviet administration in eastern 
Germany until the founding of the DDR in 1949.      
GSOVG – SUMMER 1945 
Less than one month after Nazi Germany’s unconditional surrender on May 8th, 
1945 STAVKA1 directed the formation of the GSOVG. The First Belorussian Front, 
commanded by Zhukov, formed the core of the GSOVG. The 1
st
 Ukrainian Front, 
commanded by Konev and the 2
nd
 Belorussian Front, commanded by Rossokovski also 
provided Red Army units. During the summer of 1945, the GSOVG consisted of the 1
st
, 
2
nd
, 3
rd
 and 4
th
 Guards Tank Armies, the 2
nd
, 3
rd
 and 5
th
 Shock Armies, the 8
th
 Guards 
Army, the 47
th
 Army, the 16
th
 Air Army, the 3
rd
, 4
th
 and 6
th
 Artillery Corps, the 2
nd
 
Independent Guards Cavalry, nine anti-aircraft divisions and an assortment of other 
smaller independent units including ten NKVD regiments and elements of the Dnepr-
Fleet totaling approximately 450,000 men.2     
In accordance with the agreements signed by Great Britain, the Soviet Union and 
the United States at Yalta in February 1945, Nazi Germany was divided into four zones 
of occupation (American, British, French and Soviet). Its capital, Berlin, was also divided 
into four sectors. The Soviet zone of occupation included the German states of Sachsen, 
Thüringen, Anhalt, Mecklenburg, Brandenburg, Prussian Sachsen, and parts of West 
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Pomerania.3 When combined these areas amounted to approximately 108,000 square 
kilometers and a population of 18,560,000. The Soviet sector in Berlin had an area of 403 
square kilometers, about 46% of the total area of the city and a population of just over 
one million, or about 38% of the total population. Within the city the Soviets occupied 
eight Bezirke or city districts. They were: Berlin-Mitte, Prenzlauer Berg, Friedrichshain, 
Treptov, Köpenick, Lichtenberg, Weissensee and Pankow.4 Immediately after the end of 
the war, GSOVG units occupied strategic locations in eastern Germany and in the 
aforementioned districts of Berlin. The GSOVG’s initial headquarters was located in 
Potsdam, southwest of Berlin. In 1946 it moved to Wünsdorf, 30km south of Berlin near 
Zossen where it would remain until the fall of 1994. 
In the immediate months following Nazi Germany’s capitulation GSOVG units’ 
key tasks included maintaining order, the handing of prisoners of war, disarming  Nazi 
officers and soldiers who refused to surrender and in assisting Soviet citizens who had 
been slave laborers in Nazi Germany return to the Soviet Union. The GSOVG also had 
responsibility for securing the borders between the Soviet zone of occupation with Poland 
and Czechoslovakia in the east and the demarcation line between the Americans and 
British in the west. Ten independent infantry regiments were utilized to complete this 
task.5   
On June 15th, 1945 Zhukov issued Order No. 4 which outlined combat training 
requirements for GSOVG units from July 1
st
 through October 1
st
.  A normal training day 
was set at eight hours; for cavalry and artillery units seven hours. Sundays were declared 
as days of rest. Order No. 4 served as the basis for the combat training of Soviet units in 
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eastern Germany for the next 45 years. A week later on June 23, 1945 STAVKA issued a 
demobilization order in which directed the demobilization of the 13 oldest year groups of 
military service members. This directive in conjunction with the redeploying of Soviet 
military forces in Europe to fight in Asia against the Japanese resulted in more than 50 
GSOVG divisions being disbanded by 1948.6   
SVAG /SKKG        
The agreements reached at Yalta also called for an Allied Control Commission 
(ACC) to oversee occupied Germany as a whole. On June 5
th
 in Berlin the allies signed a 
declaration establishing the ACC. The following day, on June 6
th
 , the council of People’s 
Commissars in the Soviet Union decreed the formation the Soviet Military 
Administration of Germany or SVAG which would oversee the  administration of the 
Soviet zone of occupation and Soviet-controlled sections of Berlin.  SVAG’s main role 
was to ensure the terms of Nazi Germany’s unconditional surrender were fulfilled. In 
addition to military related issues, SVAG was also responsible for solving political and 
economic problems. Interestingly, Marshall Zhukov, commander of the GSOVG, also 
served as the first chief of SVAG.7  
On June 9
th
 1945, Zhukov issued SVAG Order No. 1 which outlined the structure 
and functions of the SVAG itself. On the same day he also issued SVAG Order No. 5 
which directed the establishment of military administrations in the previously mentioned 
Soviet-occupied German states. These provincial administrations were led by other 
Soviet generals including General-Colonel Chuikov, one of the commanders at Stalingrad 
who would later become commander of the GSOVG from 1949-1953.8 In addition to a 
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staff and political department under Zhukov’s immediate control there were 20 
departments. Examples included: military, industrial, agricultural, finance, employment, 
trade, health and education. Each of these had the daunting task of overseeing the 
reconstruction Germany’s destroyed economy and infrastructure.9  SVAG continued its 
operational functions until October 10th, 1949 when, just three days after the founding of 
the GDR, it was officially disbanded. The ceremony in which General Chuikov, now like 
Zhukov the commander of both the GSOVG and SVAG officially handed over 
responsibility for the administration of the GDR to new the East German government 
took place in the same building in Berlin-Karlshorst where Nazi Germany had signed its 
unconditional surrender four years earlier.10  
SVAG was replaced by the Soviet Control Commission Germany (SKKG). 
General Chuikov also led this organization. Its primary mission was to continue the de-
nazification process. The legal authority of the SKKG was more limited in scope than the 
SVAG. Its staff was significantly reduced both at its headquarters in Karlshorst and in 
subordinate staff locations across the GDR.     
GSOVG  - 1946 –1953 – REORGANIZATION, CONSOLIDATION, MODERNIZATION,  
ISOLATION  & CONFRONTATION11 
In early 1946 the GSOVG underwent significant reorganization and 
modernization. In 1946 the 2
nd
 Shock Army was redeployed to the Soviet Union to the 
Archangelsk Military Oblast. Additionally, numerous units were consolidated and 
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renamed. The 3
rd
 and 4
th
 Guards Tank Armies were renamed the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 Mechanized 
Armies and were later renamed again to the 18
th
 and 20
th
 Guards Armies. The 2nd, 5
th
, 
13
th
, 33
rd
, 61
st
 and 69
th
 Armies were relocated. Armored and mechanized corps were 
reorganized into divisions. As a result of this reorganization four new Guards Tank 
Divisions, four new Guards Mechanized Divisions, three Mechanized Divisions and two 
new tank Divisions were formed.12 
The renaming and reorganization of GSOVG units also involved a deliberate 
process of consolidation which began in 1947. The process involved relocating GSVOG 
units from small villages and under-utilized smaller former Wehrmacht garrisons into 
what would become known as military cities. By the end of the 1940s there were 77 such 
“cities.” In addition to structures normally associated with military garrisons such as 
command and staff offices, barracks, dining facilities and motor pools each city also 
eventually had its own grocery stores, schools, libraries, hospitals, movie theaters and 
music halls.13 Hundreds of these structures had to be built from the ground up during the 
Soviet occupation over the next 45 years. As we shall see in chapter 7 the market value of 
these structures would become a very contentious issue during the ZGV’s withdrawal in 
the early 1990s. The consolidation of the GSOVG into these military cities also isolated 
its military personnel, family members and civilian personnel such as teachers etc. from 
association with the local German population. A decree prohibiting the sale of German 
newspapers and magazines licensed and printed in the western allies zones of occupation 
issued in January 1948 as well as a degree forbidding Soviet military personnel as well as 
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Soviet civilians from keeping journals, possessing pornographic material and being 
photographed with German women further isolated these military cities.14             
1947 also marked the first of several weapons modernizations and upgrades. This 
modernization included the conversion of infantry divisions to motorized rifle divisions, 
the upgrading of tanks and self-propelled anti-tank vehicles, improved mobility for 
artillery units, upgraded air-defense systems, transition to a new generation of jeeps and 
trucks which provided greater hauling capacity and all-terrain mobility, the fielding of jet 
aircraft and the repositioning of Soviet reserve forces in Poland closer to the Oder-Neisse 
river. Additionally, all units improved their initial defensive positions (locations outside 
of the garrisons in the countryside) in order to improve their survivability in the event of 
an attack by the Western Allies.15  
GSOVG units participated in the first Berlin Crisis in 1948, better known to most 
Westerners as the Berlin Airlift. After General Sokolovski, chief of SVAG, issued Order 
No. 3 on March 27, 1948 directing the strengthening of the guarding and control of the 
entire outer border of Berlin, four GSVOG infantry battalions deployed in support of this 
action. Soviet units in both Brandenburg and Sachsen-Anhalt were placed on full alert 
and deployed to the western borders of each state. Additionally, four armored divisions 
from Austria were deployed to the Soviet zone of occupation and positioned just east of 
Berlin as a strategic reserve.16  
GSOVG units also participated in the suppression of demonstrations against the 
government of the GDR during the second half of June 1953. According to the official 
Soviet account an infantry company deployed along the border between East and West 
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Berlin. Elements of the 12
th
 Armored Division as well as 1
st
 Motorized Rifle Division 
deployed to East Berlin. The commander of the Soviet zone in Berlin, General-Major 
Dibrova, declared Marshall Law. GSOVG armored and motorized infantry units also 
deployed to Halle, Dresden, Frankfurt an der Oder, Gera, Halle, Leipzig and Potsdam.17 
In all protests and demonstrations occurred in more than 350 locations across the GDR. 
Approximately 96,000 Soviet troops or about 17% of GSVOG forces took part in the 
crack-down.18     
GSVG: 1954 – 1989 – THE COLD WAR YEARS 
On March 25, 1954 nine years after the end of the Second World War the Soviet 
government granted the GDR full sovereignty, lifted its status as an occupied country and 
disbanded the SKKD. Three days later on March 28
th
, the GSOVG was renamed the 
GSVG (Gruppa Sovetskix Voisk Germanii).19 A new period of “cooperation” between 
both countries had begun.    
During the period 1955-57 additional treaties were signed between the Soviet 
Union and the GDR. Several directly addressed the status of the GSVG in the GDR. On 
June 4, 1955 the Soviet Union the GDR and six other countries in eastern Europe signed 
the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual support in Warsaw, Poland. It is better 
known by its shorter name the Warsaw Treaty or Pact. For our discussion the treaty is 
important as it provided mechanisms in which member nations could assist other member 
nations in a time of crisis. These mechanisms were implemented to their full extent 
during the Soviet/Warsaw Pact intervention in Hungary just a year later and during 
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invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. GSVG units did not deploy to former but did 
to the latter. Its role in the invasion will be discussed later in this chapter. 
On September 20, 1955 the Soviet Union and the GDR signed the Treaty of 
Relations between the GDR and USSR. Key provisions of the treaty included the 
strengthening of the legal status of the GDR, the GDR’s assumption for guarding and 
patrolling all of its borders including the border and transit points with West Berlin. 
GSVG forces continued to control the land, rail and air corridors of the Western Allies in 
Berlin as well as the air traffic control over the skies of East Berlin.  Most importantly 
one of the treaties protocols called for the negotiation of a separate treaty concerning the 
terms for the temporary stationing of the GSVG in the GDR. 20    
Less than two years later on March 12, 1957 the Stationing Agreement between 
the GDR and Soviet Union was signed. Notable terms of the agreement included: the 
temporary stationing of Soviet forces for the foreseeable on the territory of the GDR, and 
the establishment of a joint East German – Soviet Commission which would serve to 
work out future disagreements/disputes regarding the implementation of the agreement.21 
Three other complimentary agreements were signed as well. They were: an agreement on 
the procedures and controls of the requisition of objects and services signed on July 25, 
1957, agreement on the mutual assistance of legal matters signed on August 2, 1957 and 
an agreement between the GDR minister of Finance and the Supreme Command of the 
Soviet Forces in the GDR on claims procedures signed on December 27, 1957. Of the 
three, the most important was the agreement on the procedures and controls of the 
requisition of objects and services which required the GDR to pay for the maintenance 
and repair of existing buildings and structures on GSVG installations, the building of new 
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apartment buildings, rents, decay, payments for the use of local resources and in 
providing matching funds for maneuver damages caused by GSVG forces. These costs 
alone were on average about 200 million East German Marks annually.  Additionally, 
GSVG forces had unrestricted use of all of their property on the territory of the GDR 
(garrisons, military housing, all streets located on the property in question, airfields, 
training areas, storage facilities, depots and equipment repair facilities; received 
electricity, raw materials, fuels, industrial goods, agricultural goods and consumer goods 
at GDR wholesale prices; had transmission rights for radio and television and priority for 
rail, road and water transport of military equipment at favorable tariffs.  Stationing costs 
for the GDR in 1949 were 2.18 billion East German Marks. By 1957 these costs had 
decreased to 800 million East German Marks. This “Stationing Agreement” remained in 
effect until October 2, 1990 one day before German Reunification.22   
Two major withdrawals of GSVG forces from the GDR took place between 1956 
and 1958. The first withdrawal occurred during the spring and summer months of 1956.23 
Tank, artillery and infantry units from Brandenburg, Magdeburg, Potsdam and Weimar 
made up the majority of the forces. Command and staff elements of four infantry corps of 
the 3
rd
 Shock Army, 8
th
 Guards Army, 11
th
 Armored Division, 15
th
 Mechanized Division 
of the 3
rd
 Shock Army, the 200
th
 Fighter Division and the 136
th
 Armored Regiment were 
also withdrawn. In all approximately 33,500 soldiers returned to the Soviet Union. The 
second withdrawal took place during the winter of 1957/58. These GSVG units included: 
an anti-aircraft division from Brandenburg, an artillery regiment from Cottbus, a 
motorized rifle regiment quartered in Fürstenwaelde, and both 82
nd
 Motorized Rifle 
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Division and the 11
th
 Guards Motorized Rifle Division of the 3
rd
 Guards Tank Army. 
Upon completion of this withdrawal more than 42,000 soldiers returned to the Soviet 
Union.  
During the late 1950s and early 1960s divided Berlin became the epicenter for the 
Cold War. Between 1945 and 1961 more than three million people had fled to the West. 
During the first six months of 1961 more than 207,000 had also departed. In the eyes of 
the East German government this continued “bloodletting” of manpower could not 
continue indefinitely. In early August 1961 Warsaw Pact leaders at a meeting in Moscow 
decided to close all access to West Berlin from East Berlin by East Berliners and to 
improve the security along the GDR’s 1500 km border with the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG).24 Early on the morning of August 13, 1961 East German Police along 
with units of the East German National Volks Army (NVA) sealed off East Berlin from 
West Berlin. Eventually, concrete walls would be erected around the entire city of West 
Berlin. The city would remain divided for another 28 years until November 1989. 
Units of the GSGV played a supporting role during the events of August 1961. 
Although GSGV units were placed on high alert during the night of 12/13 August they 
remained in their garrisons and did not deploy to major urban areas like they had in June 
1953. The GSGV did, however, receive reinforcements. 30,000 soldiers from the 5
th
 
Guards Tank Army stationed in Belarus deployed to the GDR and established their 
headquarters in Hohenlychen. Its subordinate unit, the 5
th
 Heavy Tank Division deployed 
to Güstrow. These units remained in the GDR until 1964. Additionally, the Soviets 
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positioned 100,000 soldiers as a strategic reserve in Poland and Hungary.25 The venerable 
Marshall Konev commanded the GSVG during the August Crisis.26   
The most well-known incident involving units from both the GSVG and American 
forces in Berlin occurred a few months later in late October. A group of American 
soldiers in civilian clothes tried to cross into East Berlin at an East German control point 
not designated as an authorized crossing point for American, British and French 
servicemen and women. They were refused entry. After a second attempt to cross into 
East Berlin failed ten American tanks appeared at Checkpoint Charlie on Friedrichstrasse 
on October 22, 1961. Shortly thereafter Soviet tanks appeared on the East Berlin side of 
the checkpoint.27 They were from the 7
th
 Company, 3
rd
 Battalion of the 68
th
 Guards Tank 
Regiment commanded by Captain Voitschenko. Sergeant Sutchev, also assigned to 
Captain Voitschenko’s unit recalled the events: “And now we are on Friedrichstrasse…in 
front of us are American M-48 tanks…Left of the tanks up in the windows and behind the 
sandbags are armed policemen…and to the right a group of whistling and yelling fascist 
blokes!”28  Pictures of this confrontation made headlines around the world. On October 
23rd, the following day the Soviet tanks withdrew. The American tanks responded in 
kind a short time later. It would be the first and last confrontation of this kind in Berlin 
for the remainder of the Cold War. 
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Illustration 1. Standoff between US and Soviet tanks, Berlin, October 1961 
Numerous GSGV units participated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, known as 
Operation Danube, in August of 1968. It was the largest military operation in Europe 
since the end of the Second World War. Beginning on August 21
st
 seven divisions of the 
1
st
 Guards Tank Army, the 20
th
 Guards Army of and elements of the 16
th
 Air Army 
consisting of 4000 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles entered Czechoslovakia on a 200 
kilometer wide front utilizing a network of 20 different highways. The 20
th
 Guards Army 
reached Prague in just under six hours. GSGV units in conjunction with the 7
th
 Airborne 
Division from the Soviet Union and 22
nd
 Motorized Rifle Division from the Bulgarian 
People’s Army were able to secure all governmental, political and other key 
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communications nodes such as TV and radio stations within seven hours.29 If one takes 
into account other Warsaw Pact forces more than 200,000 soldiers entered 
Czechoslovakia in less than 12 hours. The occupation of the entire country was 
completed in less than two days.  
 
 
Figure 11. Areas in Czechoslovakia occupied by GSVG forces Aug-Nov 68.  
GSVG units began redeploying to the GDR in November 1968. The GDR 
provided 240 trains and twelve designated highways to facilitate the GSVG’s 
redeployment to East Germany.30 
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The GSVG continued to modernize its equipment from the 1960s through the 
1980s. This modernization included:  
 The upgrading of tank units with new models, increasing the numbers of 
these new tanks within tank units, increasing the number of tank divisions 
in the GSVG.    
 The conversion of mechanized infantry divisions to motorized rifle 
divisions with the complete introduction of self-propelled vehicles, 
strengthening of artillery regiments and the restructuring of anti-aircraft 
regiments. 
 The upgrading of weapons and equipment for artillery troops especially 
through the introduction of self-propelled vehicles and improved delivery 
systems. 
 Formation of rocket units with operational and tactical missiles as well as 
the deployment of rockets and missiles to other branches of the Soviet 
military.  
 The introduction of new fighter aircraft with upgrades weapons and 
increased reliability to forward deployed units. 
 The fielding of attack helicopters.  
 Increased unit capabilities to conduct river crossing operations and cross 
nuclear contaminated areas. 
 Formation of units to conduct combat operations in the rear areas potential 
enemies. 
 The formation of electronic warfare units. 
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 Improving intelligence, leadership and weapons employment procedures.31 
       During the period 1955 – 1989 no fewer than 19 major training exercises involving 
the GSVG and other Warsaw Pact member armies took place on the territory of the 
GDR.32 The first of these took place from August 17-23, 1955 and involved units from 
the GSGV and the NVA.  The largest of these exercises appears to have taken place from 
March 23-30, 1987. More than 25,000 soldiers from the GSVG and NVA with 500 tanks, 
artillery, attack and transport helicopters participated. This exercise was also significant 
for another reason. It marked the first time that observers from 20 CSCE signatory 
nations viewed the training. From April 8-15 1988  “Friendship ’88,” the final joint 
Warsaw Pact exercise, took place. Some 20,000 soldiers from GSVG, NVA as well as 
units from the Polish Peoples’ Army participated. 44 observers from 23 CSCE countries 
participated as well. 
       In June of 1979, 20 years after the last major Soviet troops reduction in the GDR the 
Soviet Union announced it would unilaterally withdrawal more than 20,000 soldiers, 
1000 tanks and other weapons systems. This process began on in early December 1979 
and was completed in late July 1980.33 Further unilateral withdrawals would not be 
announced until nine years later. Little did anyone know at the time that this would mark 
the beginning of the end of the GSVG and the other groups of forces in Eastern Europe. 
    
                                                 
31  Lohmann, GSSD, pg. 57 
32  I arrived at this number by compiling exercises listed in Lohmann’s GSSD pp 235-250. These numbers 
do not include training exercises held in other Warsaw Pact countries.    
33  Lohmann,  pg. 250 
 58 
Chapter 5: Internal and External Factors 
 
     In order to understand how the Soviet Union and a reunited Germany  agreed to a 
treaty in October of 1990 requiring the ZGV to withdraw completely from eastern 
Germany by the end of 1994 it is necessary to review three critical issues/events. They 
are: Gorbachev’s key domestic and foreign policy initiatives, the 1989 revolutions in 
Eastern Europe, and the reunification of Germany on October 3, 1990.    
 PERESTROIKA AND GLASNOST  
       The rationale for a change in Soviet policy domestically and internationally, arose 
from Gorbachev’s “new thinking,” perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness).1 
When he came to power in March 1985 it was clear to him, and like-minded of the 
Central Committee that major policy changes were needed. The corruption, acrimony and 
gerontocracy of the Brezhnev era of zastoi or “stagnation” disturbed many younger 
members. Most importantly, they clearly understood that the Soviet economy was in 
serious trouble and the country faced significant environmental, social and health issues.2  
Gorbachev and his advisers clearly understood that if his policies were going to be 
successful significant  reductions in military spending would be required.  What set 
Gorbachev’s “new thinking” apart from others within the Soviet system arguing for 
reform was his insistence on placing Soviet domestic requirements and priorities above  
                                                 
1 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World, Harper & Row: New 
York, 1987. Author’s Note: Mr. Gorbachev spoke at the LBJ here at the University of Texas in October of 
2011. I was fortunate enough to attend the event. Unfortunately, Mr. Gorbachev did not discuss the details 
of his role in the German Reunification process or make any mention of the withdrawal of the ZGV.  
2 Odom, Collapse of the Soviet Military, pg. 89 
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those of the  Soviet military, which at the time accounted for between one quarter and 
one fifth of the Soviet economy.  
     Restructuring began with the replacement of key figures. Gorbachev made  personnel 
changes in the party and in the military during the years 1985-88. His appointment of 
Eduard Shevardnadze to the Politburo, and, more importantly, as foreign minister was 
probably the most important appointment he made. Not only did Shevardnadze replace 
the aging Andrei Gromyko, who would have certainly opposed radical military and 
economic reform, he also brought with him an aggressive understanding of Gorbachev’s 
“new thinking” and recognized that reducing the military burden was the sin qua non for 
domestic reform. Interestingly, Shevardnadze had no previous experience in either 
foreign or military policy making.  
     Gorbachev’s other three main supporters were Anatolii Chernayev, Georgii 
Shakhnazarov and Alexandr Yakovlev. Chernaev, who had extensive experience in the 
Central Committee’s International Department, was Gorbachev’s special assistant on 
foreign affairs.3 Shakhnazarov, who also had worked in the International Department, and 
spent two years in the KGB under Yuri Andropov, was Gorbachev’s special assistant.4 
The most influential of the three, however, was Yakovlev. Yakovlev has served as 
ambassador to Canada, director of the Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations (IMEMO) and was the party secretary. Yakovlev provided Gorbachev with 
                                                 
3  Ibid. pg. 414 
4  Ibid. pg. 417 
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many of his ideas for perestroika and glasnost polices.5 He would also later become 
Gorbachev’s staunchest allies against Yegor Ligachev,6 initially also one of his 
supporters, who later led the conservative opposition against him and his reform policies. 
     An unexpected event also led to personnel changes within the Soviet military. On May 
28, 1987 a West German named Mathias Rust landed his small Cessna in Moscow near 
Red Square. The event occurred while Gorbachev was in East Berlin attending a meeting 
of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee (PCC).7 The incident generated 
significant controversy within the Politburo, and, of course, within the military. It 
cemented Gorbachev’s already deep distrust of his generals as none of them were able to 
adequately explain to him how Rust was able to penetrate the Soviet Union’s 
sophisticated anti-aircraft defense system. The event ultimately resulted in Gorbachev 
firing Marshall Sergei Sokolov8 and replacing him with General Dmitri Yazov, who had 
been a military district commander in the Far East.9 150 other officers, mostly from the 
air-defense branch of the Soviet military were court-martialed, removed from their posts 
or retired. By 1988, the minister of defense, all but two deputy ministers, all of the first 
deputy chiefs of the General Staff, the commander and the chief of staff of the Warsaw 
                                                 
5  Ibid. pg. 419 
6  Ibid. pg. 415  Note: Ligachev served as Communist Party Secretary 83-90, Politburo Member 85-90. 
7  Ibid. pg. 107 
8  Ibd. pg. 418  Note: Marshall Sokolov was minister of defense from 1984-87.   
9  Ibid. pg. 420 Note: Marshall Yazov increasingly found himself caught between the conservatives in the 
Ministry of Defense and the radical military reformers in parliament and the media. He joined the plot to 
overthrow Gorbachev in August 1991. He was dismissed from office on August 21,1991.   
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Pact forces, all of the commanders of the groups of forces10  and fleets and all of the 
military district commanders had been replaced. This one year purge of the military was, 
in terms of percentage of change, higher than Stalin’s purge of the Red Army in 1937-
38.11               
          In order for Gorbachev to justify the need for a reduction in the military forces of 
the Soviet Union he also needed to fundamentally change his country’s thinking which 
had been steeped in Marxist-Leninism ideology for 70 years. Beginning in 1985 
Gorbachev made several public statements which give us a sense of his willingness to 
change this ideology. On July 29, 1985 he announced the Soviet Union’s unilateral 
suspension of nuclear testing.12 Later that year at another Warsaw Pact PCC Meeting, 
Gorbachev called for more autonomy for the communist parties within the alliance.13 
This signaling to the leaders of Eastern Europe would later become known as the “Sinatra 
Doctrine” and would be a catalyst for the events of 1989.14 In January 15, 1986 he made 
a speech proposing the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000.15 These were 
not initiatives normally proposed by previous Soviet leaders. Gorbachev became 
convinced that if the Soviet Union disarmed unilaterally it would not be at risk of 
                                                 
10  General Snetkov was appointed as the GSVG commander on November 26, 1987. He would serve in 
this position until December 13, 1990 when he was replaced by General Colonel Burlakov. The 
circumstances revolving around Snetkov’s departure will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
11  Ibid. pg. 110 
12  Ibid. pg. 405  
13  Ibid. pg. 96 
14  The “Sinatra Doctrine” implied countries of Eastern Europe doing it “their own way”;a reference to the 
famous Frank Sinatra Song “My Way”.    
15  Ibid. pg. 405 
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invasion by the West. Hence, he believed military parity with the West was not essential 
if it stood in the way of the domestic goals of perestroika.16    
     On February 22, 1986 Gorbachev held a meeting in preparation of the upcoming 
Twenty-seventh Party Congress in which he would present his conceptions on foreign 
policy.17 He commented on the great diversity in the world and made a key reference to 
Lenin who had said that “society’s interests are higher than class interests.” He declared 
that “peaceful coexistence” with the West needed reevaluation. Gorbachev believed that 
“society’s interests” or as he would call them later “humankind interests” overrode and 
called into question traditional class interests of Marxist-Leninism. Although it would be 
sometime before these beliefs were made public and debated openly this was the essence 
of the ideological perestroika that Gorbachev had in mind.   
     As has already been mentioned, Gorbachev’s appointment of Shevardnadze to foreign 
minister was one of the most important actions he took after becoming General Secretary. 
After initially taking a hard line with United States negotiators in Helsinki and winning 
the Politburo’s confidence Shevardnadze began to take more initiative.18 At critical 
junctions he asked for approvals of new positions from Moscow, with the proviso that in 
the absence of a reply within a given time, he would implement the changes anyway. 19 
This technique permitted Shevardnadze to make concessions to the U.S. that Gorbachev 
could not get the Politburo to make in advance. He also kept a steady stream of laudatory 
                                                 
16  Ibid.  
17  Ibid. pg. 97 
18  Ibid. pg. 101 
19  Ibid. 
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reports coming into the Kremlin about Gorbachev’s growing status in the West. These 
laudatory reports caused Gorbachev to be more susceptible to basic change in Soviet 
foreign policy.  Shevardnadze was able to articulate to Gorbachev how fairness was on 
the U.S. side in many of the disputed areas. He cited NATO countries’ control over U.S. 
forces on their soil. This contrasted sharply with the conspicuous lack of such control by 
Warsaw Pact states over Soviet troops stationed there.20  
     The first real change in military policy was his decision to change course in 
Afghanistan. As soon as Gorbachev became secretary general various departments of the 
government including the Central Committee of the CPSU, the central press and the 
International Department of the Central Committee were flooded with letters mostly 
written by soldiers and their families demanding an end to the war.21 Gorbachev took 
what one could argue was a contradictory approach to the war. He appointed General 
Zaitsev22 to run the war in Afghanistan giving him two years to win.23 Simultaneously, he 
formed a secret Politburo Commission to review Soviet policy in Afghanistan. In June 
1985 the Central Committee Secretariat issued a secret directive ordering the reduction of 
Soviet forces in Afghanistan. 24 Less than four years later in February 1989 all Soviet 
troops withdrew from Afghanistan. Gorbachev’s decision to begin the withdrawl  was a 
relatively easy one. The political consequences for the military establishment were 
                                                 
20  Ibid. pg. 100. Note:  Each  NATO country with US troops stationed on their territory had agreements 
known as Status of Forces Agreements or SOFAs. They are still in effect today.    
21  Ibid.  
22  General Zaitsev commanded the GSVG from October 10, 1980 until July 6, 1985. 
23  Ibid. pg. 103 
24  Ibid.  
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marginal. This would not be the case when he tried to reform the structures of the Soviet 
military itself.     
          What were the sum effects of Gorbachev’s rationale for military reform, personnel 
changes within the Party and military,  changes in official party ideology and foreign 
policy initiatives for the prospect of military reform from 1985-1988?  Gorbachev and his 
supporters, as could be expected, encountered stiff resistance to his reform agenda from 
the senior military leadership. The majority of them, as has been noted, had been deeply 
indoctrinated with Marxist-Leninist ideology. The concept of reducing Soviet military 
forces, the vanguard of the Party since 1917, caused deep consternation and resistance.  It 
called into question the very existence of the Communist Party and its goal of world-wide 
dominance. Academician Yurii Ryzhov’s comment that “this country [the Soviet Union] 
is not simply a military-industrial complex, but a military-ideological complex”25 
encapsulates well the difficulties Gorbachev faced from the military leadership. Several 
senior military officers ultimately could not accept Gorbachev’s perestroika and were 
involved in the plot to overthrow him in August 1991. 
      Changes in personnel within the Party and to some extent the military helped 
Gorbachev undertake his change in direction. The unexpected Rust incident certainly 
gained the appearance of change within the military but not all of the newly appointed 
officers were avid Gorbachev supporters eager to adopt his policies.  
     Gorbachev’s biggest successes during this time came in the foreign policy arena. 
Foreign minister Shevardnadze contributed significantly in changing the West’s 
                                                 
25  Ibid. pg. 223 
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perceptions of the Soviet Union’s intentions and paved the way for the historic December 
1987 signing of the INF treaty. Gorbachev’s unilateral conventional arms reduction 
announcement in December 1988 that proved once and for all that he was serious about 
implementing his “new thinking” and reducing East-West tensions. In his speech he 
outlined a series of unilateral reductions of conventional weapons in Eastern Europe, the 
Soviet Union and the Far East. In all, these reductions totaled about 500,000 personnel, 
10,000 tanks, 8500 artillery systems and 800 aircraft.26  His announcement stunned the 
world and marked a major shift in the decade’s long arms race between the Soviet Union 
and the United States.    
THE EASTERN EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS OF 1989 
During the second half of the 1980s East European leaders had been closely 
following Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union. They 
also understood that they would be on their own and Moscow would not intervene with 
force if they decided to undertake their own polices of restructuring and openness.  
The first country to act was Hungary. In the late 1980s Hungary had one of the 
most advanced economies in Eastern Europe and was experimenting with political 
liberalization. In 1988 Miklos Nemeth replaced Janos Kadar as Hungary’s prime 
minister. One of his first orders of business was to travel to Moscow and meet with 
Gorbachev. Nemeth told him that each country develops in its own “idiosyncratic way.” 
He also reminded Gorbachev of the brutal repression of the popular uprising  of 1956 by 
the Soviet army and that a government must be accountable to its people. The Hungarians 
had also established an official commission which investigated the events of 1956 and 
                                                 
26  Lohmann, GSSD, pg. 255. 
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concluded the uprising was against a monolithic system of power and a humiliation to the 
nation. Gorbachev did not object to these findings. As a result, the Hungarian government 
approved a formal ceremony in which Imre Nagy, the leader of the 1956 uprising who 
was executed on Khrushchev’s orders, would be reburied. At least 200,000 people 
attended the event on June 16, 1989. While the reburying of Nagy was largely symbolic 
in nature, Nemeth took another step which would have more far reaching implications.  
He refused to fund the continued maintenance of the barbed wire fence between Hungary 
and Austria and subsequently declared it unsafe and had it removed. Unlike in 1956, the 
Soviets  did not intervene.27  
In 1989 the economy in Poland was in crisis again. General Jaruzelski, Poland’s 
leader at the time, decided to re-recognize the Solidarity movement and allow it to 
participate in elections on June 4th for a new bicameral legislature. Most observers, 
including Solidarity’s leader Lech Walesa thought this was just a gimmick and that the 
election results would be rigged as they had been in the past. To everyone’s amazement 
however, the Solidarity candidates won all of the seats they had contested in the Sejm, the 
lower house and all but one in the the senate, the upper house. Here too, the Soviets, 
unlike in 1980, chose not to intervene. Two months later on August 24, 1989, the first 
non-communist government in post war Eastern Europe began governing. Overwhelmed 
by the significance of the events, the new prime minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, fainted 
during his inauguration.28  
In May 1989, Erich Honecker, the long-time hardline leader of the GDR was re-
elected with 98.95% of the vote. He had no intentions of introducing reforms and 
opposed Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost. During the summer of 1989 
                                                 
27 Gaddis, John Lewis., The Cold War: A New History, New York: Penguin Press, 2005, pg. 240. 
28  Ibid. pg. 242 
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Honecker become increasingly worried about Moscow’s refusal to crack down on the 
events in Hungary and Poland. He and other GDR leaders considered the “Chinese 
Option” as a possible means of response if protests were to develop in the GDR.29 
While Honecker was considering repressive methods individual East German 
citizens took matters into their own hands. Thousands of them made their way to 
Hungary via Czechoslovakia. Once in Hungary, they proceeded to the recently opened 
border with Austria where they abandoned their cars, walked into Austria and then made 
their way to West Germany. By the early fall of 1989 there were more than 130,000 East 
Germans in Hungary. Thousands had also fled to the West German embassies in Prague 
and Budapest. Citing humanitarian reasons the Hungarian government refused to stop the 
exodus of East German citizens to the West.30  
As might be expected Honecker and his associates were not at all pleased with the 
events transpiring in Hungary and Poland especially since the GDR was about to 
celebrate its 40
th
 anniversary in early October. They had another worry as well. 
Gorbachev would be attending the commemoration ceremonies in East Berlin. During the 
official parade on East Berlin’s main thoroughfare, Unter den Linden, East German 
citizens discarding their official signs of East German propaganda began shouting 
“Gorby, help us! Gorby, stay here!” General Jaruzelski, who was also in attendance, 
asked Gorbachev if he could understand German. Gorbachev replied that he did. 
Jaruzelski asked him if he understood what the East Germans were shouting. Gorbachev 
replied that he did. Jaruzelski replied “This is the end.”31   
                                                 
29  Cox, David., Retreating from  Cold War:Germany, Russia and the Withdrawal of the Western Group of 
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Beginning in the fall of 1989 large scale protests had began across most of East 
Germany. Some of the largest of these demonstrations took place on Monday evenings in 
Leipzig. The numbers of protesters continued to grow. Over 100,000 East Germans 
protested there on Monday, October 9th.  Largely due to the efforts of Kurt Masur, the 
conductor of the Gewandhaus Orchestra in Leipzig, who convinced the authorities not to 
violently intervene, there would not be a repeat of the events of June 1953 or like in 
Beijing a few months earlier.32 NVA and ZGV units remained in their barracks across the 
country. Honecker was forced to resign on October 18
th
. Less than a month later on 
November 9
th
 the Berlin Wall fell.  
The events in Poland, Hungary and East Germany also led to the rapid implosion 
of three other East European communist governments. On November 10
th
, Todor 
Zhivkov who had been Bulgaria’s leader since 1954 announced his resignation.  On 
November 17
th
 demonstrations took place in Prague and quickly spread across 
Czechoslovakia. Within a few weeks the communists were ousted; Alexander Dubcek 
who had been the leader of the “Prague Spring” in 1968 became the chairman of the 
national assembly and Vaclav Havel was sworn in as Czechoslovakia’s new president. 
The final revolution of 1989 would not be so peaceful. On December 17
th
, forces loyal 
the Romanian dictator Nicolai Ceausescu opened fire on demonstrators in Timisorara 
killing ninety-seven. Ceausescu, in an attempt to calm the unrest, called for a mass rally 
of loyal supporters in Bucharest on December 21
st
. Much to his surprise he was unable to 
pacify the crowd and they quickly turned against him. He and his wife fled the city but 
were quickly captured. They were tried and executed on December 25
th
.33 Within six 
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33  Gaddis, The Cold War, pg. 247 
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short months communist control over Eastern Europe which had lasted for almost a half a 
century evaporated. 
REUNIFICATION MODELS: AN OVERVIEW         
The single biggest issue facing leaders in Berlin, Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, 
and Washington DC at the end of 1989/beginning of 1990 was the possibility of German 
reunification. If the FRG and GDR did reunify what would a new unified Germany look 
like and what mechanisms would allow for German reunification? Historian Mary Elise 
Sarotte argues in her book: 1989: the Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe that four 
models dominated the discussion.34 They were: the restoration model, the revivalist 
model, heroic model, and the prefab model. The restoration model was proposed by the 
Soviet Union. It sought to restore the quadripartite mechanism of four power (France, 
Great Britain, the Soviet Union & United States) control as had been executed in 
occupied Germany at the end of the Second World War. It called for the recreation of the 
Allied Control Commission (ACC) in which each of the four powers exercised their own 
socio political order. The revivalist model represented an adaptive use of a confederation 
of German states. Each of the two Germanies would retain its own political and social 
order under a shared confederative, national roof. In early 1990, Gorbachev dropped his 
idea of a restorative model altogether and proposed the heroic model.35 This model 
proposed vast new political and economic structures from the Atlantic to the Urals, a 
“common European home with many rooms.” Nation states under this order, including a 
reunified Germany, would keep their own political orders but cooperate via international 
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economic and military institutions. Finally, the Western Allies and in particular, Helmut 
Kohl, the chancellor of West Germany, proposed later in 1990 with what would be the 
winning model: the prefab model. The prefab model simply expanded the FRG’s and the 
West’s preexisting domestic, international and military institutions eastward into the 
GDR.  The expansion of both the European Community (EC) and NATO prior to 1990 in 
other countries in Western Europe supported this model as well. This model also 
supported Kohl’s determination to reunify Germany as quickly as possible. Its biggest 
disadvantage was that it would insert the West’s and FRG’s institutions and values into a 
political space shaped for more than 45 years by an antithetical system.36 As we shall see 
the ZGV would be directly affected by these new institutions and values after unification 
occurred in October 1990.  
 2 + 4  = GERMAN REUNIFICATION  
Beginning in early 1990 both the Soviets and the Western Allies more or less 
independently formulated a mechanism for German reunification. It would eventually 
become known as the “2 + 4” mechanism. The “2” stood for the FRG and GDR; the “4” 
for the allied powers France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. 
Chernayev first suggested the schestyorki or the “six” should come together to decide 
matters at a meeting with Gorbachev and other advisers in Moscow at the end of the 
January. Bonn and Washington were also contemplating such an arrangement as well.37 
Formal announcement of the “2 + 4” mechanism occurred at a NATO/Warsaw Pact 
Conference in Ottawa, Canada on February 13
th
.38             
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Between February and September 1990 numerous multi-lateral and bi-lateral 
negotiations and meetings took place in Canada, Europe, the Soviet Union and the United 
States with regards to the “German question.” This included four meetings of the “2 + 4” 
parties. For our purposes, the most important negotiations occurred in mid-July when 
Kohl traveled to Moscow and then to Gorbachev’s home town Archys near Stavropol in 
the southwestern Soviet Union.  
At the end of the negotiations in Archys Gorbachev and Kohl held a joint press 
conference at the Zheleznovodsk sanatorium on July 16th. Kohl began by stating that a 
reunified Germany would maintain its current borders and would include all of Berlin; 
the four occupying powers would retire their remaining rights and a reunified Germany 
would have full sovereignty. Kohl further stated that according to the Helsinki Principles 
a reunified Germany would be able to “define and conduct as it wishes relations with 
other states”39; France, Great Britain and the US would maintain their forces in Berlin 
during the Soviet withdraw but most importantly Soviet forces remaining in eastern 
Germany after reunification would have a transitional period of three to four years to 
withdraw. A reunified Germany would not pursue nuclear, biological or chemical 
weapons and not deploy NATO troops to former East Germany while Soviet troops were 
still there; Bundeswehr and territorial defense forces that were not part of NATO could 
deploy there; A reunified Germany agreed to limit the size of the Bundeswehr to 370,000 
soldiers. Kohl pledged to ensure that East Germany would agree to these terms. Finally, 
Kohl announced there would be bilateral talks about economic cooperation in the 
future.40 
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Kohl’s announcement sent shock waves across the Soviet Union and certainly 
must have caused a great deal of concern in the upper echelons of the ZGV leadership in 
East Germany. Gorbachev had agreed to these terms without consulting anyone in the 
ministry of defense or the Warsaw Pact and, as we shall see, they would have a direct 
impact on thousands of soldiers and families returning from Germany once the process of 
the withdraw of the ZGV had begun. Gorbachev’s decisions also galvanized domestic 
opposition against by several of his colleagues and opponents and contributed directly to 
the attempts to overthrow him in the failed putsch of August 1991.  
What was not specifically announced at the end of the summit between 
Gorbachev and Kohl was the amount of monetary compensation the Soviet Union would 
receive for agreeing with the terms of German reunification. In January the FRG had 
already agreed to provide the Soviet Union subsidies for the purchase of 220 million 
marks worth of food.41 Additionally, on June 25th it also agreed to pay 1.25 billion marks 
in stationing costs.42 This also included a provision which would allow ZGV soldiers and 
their dependents to exchange their money in their savings accounts located in East 
Germany at a rate of 2:1.43 Two days after summit Moscow sent Bonn a bill for 
Gorbachev’s concessions in the amount of over 20 billion marks. This amount would be 
used to fund the ZGV’s operating costs during the four year withdrawal period; to pay the 
transportation costs for returning personnel and equipment, to build new housing units for 
soldiers and their families, to provide retraining for the return to civilian life and the new 
market economy and to pay for the loss of Soviet property in East Germany.44 Kohl did 
not respond to respond to Moscow’s “proposal” until over a month later. His position was 
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that 20 billion was simply too much. He made a counter offer of 6 billion marks to 
Gorbachev on September 7
th
 which Gorbachev rejected outright and called it “a dead 
end.”45  On September 10th just two days before the “2 + 4” Agreement was to be signed 
Kohl made another offer of 12 billion marks which included funding for 36,000 housing 
units to be built in the Soviet Union for returning soldiers. Gorbachev countered by 
saying that 15-16 billion would be the minimum he could accept. Kohl’s counter offer 
this time was 12 billion marks plus an interest free line of credit for another three billion 
marks. This time Gorbachev accepted.46 The details of how these monies were used will 
be discussed in chapter seven.  
On September 12th 1990 less than one year since the fall of the Berlin Wall the 
Final Settlement or “2 + 4” agreement was signed by the foreign ministers of the FRG, 
GDR and the Four Powers in a ceremony at the communist party’s Oktyabrskaya Hotel in 
Moscow.47 The Four Powers gave up their rights their armies had won 45 years earlier at 
the end of the Second World War. At midnight on October 2nd, 1990 the GDR ceased to 
exist as a nation and Germany was reunified. Article 4 of the Final Settlement stipulated 
that the FRG  negotiate a bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union addressing the conditions 
and duration of the presence of Soviet forces on the former territory of the GDR and 
Berlin.48 This treaty, known as “The Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics concerning the Terms for the Temporary 
Presence and Modalities for the planned Withdrawal of Soviet Forces from the Federal 
Republic of Germany,” was signed one month later in Bonn. Its signing officially 
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48 This was required because the treaty between the GDR and USSR signed in 1957 discussed in Chapter 4 
expired at midnight on October 2, 1990. An English translation of this treaty can be found in Foertsch, The 
Great Withdrawal, pp 164-180.         
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initiated the beginning of the withdrawal of the ZGV which will be the topic of the 
remaining chapters.        
 
 
 75 
 Chapter 6: The Withdrawal of the ZGV: Overview, Oversight, 
Requirements/Restrictions, Problems/Obstacles and Logistics  
The withdrawal of the ZGV from a newly reunified Germany was an enormous 
undertaking. This chapter begins with a general overview of the ZGV at the beginning of 
1991. It is intended to give the reader an awareness that the withdrawal not only included 
military personnel and equipment but a large number of civil servants and family 
members as well. I will then continue with a discussion of the establishment of German 
Bundeswehr liaison elements and the Joint German-Soviet Commission which provided 
mechanisms for the ZGV and German government to work out problems, issues and 
concerns which arose during the withdrawal. Additionally, I will discuss new 
requirements and restrictions placed on the ZGV, and provide an overview of the 
withdrawal itself. Finally, I will highlight some of the operational problems obstacles 
faced by the ZGV  leadership during the withdrawal. 
THE ZGV IN EARLY 1991     
According to its official history the ZGV consisted of 545,200 personnel on 
January 1, 1991. 337,800 were military service members and 208,400 were civilian 
personnel including family members. This number also included 90,000 children, 51,288 
of which were school age and attended one of the 97 schools.1 Military personnel 
consisted of the following nationalities: Russians – 65%, Ukrainians - 25%, other 
nationalities mostly from Central Asia and the Caucasus – 10% and Byelorussians – 5%.2 
For comparison’s sake the total number of personnel in the ZGV was slightly less than the 
current population of Washington DC and slightly smaller than the current size of the 
entire United States Army! 
                                                 
1  Burlakov, Sovietskie Voiska v Germanii 1945-1994, pp. 285-286.     
2  Kowalczuk, Roter Stern über Deutschland, pg. 223 
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The ZGV’s headquarters was located in Wünsdorf approximately 20 miles south 
of Berlin.3 The major military formations were arrayed in the west-central and southwest 
territory of the former East Germany4. They were:  
 1st Guards Tank Army (Dresden)  
 2nd Guards Tank Army (Fürstenberg)  
 3rd Red-Banner Shock Army (Magdeburg)  
 8th Guards Red-Banner Shock Army (Weimar-Nohra)  
 20th Guards Red-Banner Shock Army (Eberwalde-Finnow) 
 16th Red-Banner Air Army (Wünsdorf)5   
       These five armies had a total of 22 divisions. 17 belonged to the ground forces. The 
remaining five to the army air forces. There were also 49 independent brigades and 42 
independent regiments. Associated with these units were 123,668 major weapons 
systems. They were:  
 180 rocket launchers 
 4, 209 tanks 
 8,209 armored personnel carriers 
 3,682 artillery pieces  
 106,094 trucks, trailers etc. 
 691 aircraft  
 683 Helicopters  
                                                 
3  Wünsdorf  has a long military history going back to 1871. A good general history is Gerhard Kaiser’s 
Speergebiet: Die geheimen Kommandozentralen in Wünsdorf seit 1871. For the Soviet period see: 
Wünsdorf: Sowjetischer Alltag in einer Garnison (2004) and Hans-Georg Kampe’s Das Oberkommando 
der GSSD in Zossen-Wünsdorf (2008).        
4  For a complete listing of these units see Burlakov, Sovetskie Voiska v Germannii 1990-1994, pp 15-22. 
The list is in German and Russian.     
5  For those interested in learning more about the history 16
th
 Air Army see Lutz Freundt’s exhaustive 
study: Rote Plätze: Russische Militärflugplätze in Deutschland 1945-1994, Berlin:Aerolit Verlag, 2007   
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The remaining equipment and materials added up to be 2,754,530 tons, which included 
677,032 tons ammunition.6   
As one would expect a massive infrastructure existed in order to support the ZGV. 
Since 1945 Soviet forces had not only occupied former Wehrmacht garrisons they also 
built 21,111 of their own structures including apartment buildings, stores, motor pools, 
ammunition storage bunkers, communication towers, airfields, hangars, training areas, 
depots etc. In all the ZGV maintained 777 tracts of land totaling approximately 2.7% of 
the territory of the former GDR and 36,290 buildings.7   
Mass media was also an important part of the ZGV’s infrastructure.  Soldiers, 
family members and civilian personnel had access to 97 regional and state newspapers 
from the Soviet Union with more than more than 500,000 copies printed each day. The 
ZGV had its own daily newspaper Naslednik Pobedi. Additionally, 20 divisional 
newspapers were published as well.8 Radio Volga, established in 1945, broadcasted 
regular programming from the Soviet Union 17 hours each day. Beginning in 1979, the 
Soviet Union’s most popular television channel, pervi kanal, began televising its 
programming is most ZGV locations. The ZGV had six of its own radio and television 
broadcast studios which provided its listeners and viewers coverage of local news and 
events as well.9       
                                                 
6  Mroß, Berhard, Sie Gehen als Freunde: Der Abzug der Westgruppe  der sowjetische-russischen Truppen 
1990-1994, Harrislee: Self-Published, 2005, pg. 34.  
7  Kowalczuk, Roter Stern über Deutschland, pg. 221. 
8  The only divisional newspaper I was able to identify during the course of my research was Vozduschni 
Strazh the 16
th
 Air Army’s newspaper. Cited by Burlakov in his introduction to Sovetskie Voiska v 
Germanii 1945-1994 , pg. 12   
9  Ibid. pp. 228-29 
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 ZGV personnel also had numerous opportunities to engage in recreational and 
cultural activities in 42 dom offizierov, 261 garrison officers clubs and 534 enlisted clubs. 
There was also a large network of approximately 2000 independent network of cultural 
and art clubs with more than 45,000 members. Examples included ten drama theaters and 
puppet theaters, 300 choirs, 41 dance ensembles, 92 men’s and women’s singing clubs, 
112 vocal and instrument ensembles, and 62 art studios. Alone in the air army units there 
were 148 performing arts clubs, 17 plastic model building clubs, 12 photography clubs, 
16 art clubs, four puppet theaters and an amateur film studio.10     
GERMAN BUNDESWEHR LIAISON ELEMENTS 
In accordance with the Temporary Stationing and Withdrawal Treaty (TSWT) 
signed on October 12, 1990 the German Bundeswehr was required to establish a liaison 
element in order to facilitate the implementation of all aspects of the treaty. On February 
14, 1991 the German Ministry of Defense formally issued Order No. 2/91 which directed 
the establishment of the liaison element. In German its official name was das Deutsche 
Verbindungskommando zu den Sowjetischen Streitkräften in Deutschland or 
DtVKdoSowK. The German liaison element’s headquarters was initially located in 
Strausberg, east of Berlin. In June 1991 it moved to Berlin-Treptow where it would 
remain until disbanded in the fall of 1994 after all of the Soviet forces had departed. The 
chief of the liaison element was General-Major Foertsch. His staff included a deputy, a 
chief of staff and approximately 60 officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers and 
civilians 70% of whom had served in the now defunct East German Army, the NVA. This 
was necessary because many of these personnel had an excellent command of the 
Russian language, had attended formal military schooling the Soviet Union and 
                                                 
10  Ibid.  pg. 229-30 
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understood the mentality of Soviet officers and soldiers. General-Major Foertsch and his 
staff interfaced with the ZGV’s leadership and staff in Wünsdorf.11 In addition to the 
liaison element in Berlin liaison elements were also assigned to each ZGV army (military 
district commands), division (military region commands) and regimental/garrison 
headquarters (military sub-region commands).12       
THE JOINT GERMAN-SOVIET COMMISSION    
Article 25 of the TSWT directed the establishment of the Joint German-Soviet 
Commission (JGSC). The JGSC was a mechanism which facilitated official inter-
governmental contact between the FRG and Soviet Union regarding the implementation 
of the TSWT. In particular the JGSC addressed the following:13 
 The management and possible modifications of the withdrawal timeline 
 The support to be provided by the FRG especially with respect to matters 
concerning transportation and the support by Bundeswehr units 
 The selection of modes of transportation, transportation routes, collection 
points, border crossing locations as well as the return of these areas upon 
completion of their use 
 The handling of hazardous materials including all safety measures 
implemented to affect such handling   
 Security measures for the temporary stationing and withdrawal of Soviet 
forces 
                                                 
11 Mroß, Bernhard., Sie Gingen Als Freunde, pp 25-31. Author’s note: Mroß is a retired Captain-Lieutenant 
from the German Navy and served as General Foertsch’s translator. His book offers a unique insight into 
the withdrawal of the ZGV.     
12 Foertsch, Harmut, The Great Withdrawal: The Withdrawal of Soviet Military Forces from Eastern 
Europe 1990-1994, Bratislava: Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovakia, 2007, pg.137  
13 Lohmann, GSSD, pp. 343-44 
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 The documentation and proper disposal of all trash and other no longer 
needed materials including the removal of all trash and debris from 
property in accordance with German environmental protection laws 
 Problems encountered in postal and long distance communications as well 
as radio frequency bandwidth management 
 The management of damages including those involving accidents or 
catastrophes  
 All services 
 Questions in regard to employment statuses according to Article 21 of this 
treaty 
 Access to all properties and their transfer 
 Military exercise and training activities  
 The addressing of other questions that are deemed necessary to address  
 
       The first meeting of the JGSC took place on November 27
th
. Its members agreed that 
all future meetings would not be open to the public, any publication of the commission’s 
work needed the approval of both sides, the working languages of the commission would 
be both German and Russian and that any decisions made by the commission would be 
written in both languages and signed by the senior representative of each side. 
Interestingly, General-Major Foertsch as a result of  Article 4, paragraph 4 of the TSWT 
became the authorized representative of the German government as well as the authorized 
representative of the German Ministry of Defense.14 The senior Soviet representative was 
ZGV commander General Snetkov.15 The JGSC had ten working groups. They were: 
                                                 
14  Mroß, Sie Gingen Als Freunde, pg. 35 
15  Ibid. pg. 36 
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training of Soviet troops, withdrawal planning, real estates, services, customs and taxes, 
environmental, legal and administrative support, communications and radio frequency 
management, transportation, and arms control/confidence building measures.16 In June 
1991 an eleventh working group was added which dealt specifically with the temporary 
stationing and withdrawal of the 6
th
 Berlin Guards Motorized-Infantry Brigade.17  
       The first meeting of the JGSC also marked the second frosty encounter between 
General Snetkov and General-Major Foertsch.  Snetkov refused to receive Foertsch 
during his first visit to the ZGV headquarters in Wünsdorf. In an interview some years 
later Snetkov recalled: “I met General Foertsch one time in my office…he wanted to talk 
to me about the details of the withdrawal…or some other kind of discussions about the 
colossal task that stood before us…I wanted nothing to do with him.” Foertsch, also in an 
interview years later stated “With Snetkov I had absolutely no relationship…that’s the 
way he wanted it…he was a real hardliner.” As it turns out, Snetkov believed that 
Foertsch’s father, who was the Chief of Staff of Army Group North on the Eastern Front 
during World War II and was later captured, gave the order for the bombardment of 
Leningrad which resulted in the death of his father.18 This kind of resentment, as one 
could imagine, made Foertsch’s work difficult. Fortunately for him, General-Colonel 
Burlakov replaced General Snetkov less than two weeks later on December 12th. 
Foertsch recalled “It was for the best that he [Snetkov] was removed and Burlakov…the 
one who took care of everything in Hungary, replaced him. With Burlakov I got my first 
taste of the ZGV.”19          
                                                 
16  Ibid. 
17  Ibid. pg. 37 
18  Ibid. General Snetkov himself was a veteran of the Great Patriotic War. He died in 2006.  
19  Klemke, Christian & Lorenzen Jan N., Roter Stern Über Deutschland, VHS Tape, Berlin: Ostdeutschen 
Rundfunks Brandenburg, Part III, viewed July 2012. All quotations from the above paragraph are from this 
documentary film.     
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      The JGSC met 13 times between November 1990 and July 1994. The commission 
addressed numerous problems and issues that arose during the course of the withdrawal. I 
will be addressing some of these later in this chapter. The locations of the meetings 
rotated between Berlin and Bonn. The last meeting on July 28, 1994 took place at Teupitz 
castle near Berlin.20 Interestingly, the JGSC never convened at the ZGV’s headquarters in 
Wünsdorf.    
NEW RESTRICTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS  
The TSWT spelled out a number of new restrictions and requirements covering 
virtually all aspects of the daily operations of the ZGV. Broadly speaking they addressed 
three categories: military training, civil and administrative law and withdrawal 
operations. While it is not possible to cover each and every new restriction and 
requirement placed on the ZGV by the treaty here, a review of several from each category 
will be  useful.21   
The treaty’s restrictions and new requirements with respect to military operations 
affected the ZGV immediately after the treaty’s signing on October 12, 1990. Article 6 of 
the treaty addressed restrictions and requirements for ground forces. ZGV forces were 
immediately prohibited from conducting any large scale exercise involving more than 
13,000 soldiers. Additionally, any exercise, regardless of size, had to be conducted within 
the confines of designated ZGV training areas. No live ammunition could be transported 
in tanks, infantry fighting vehicles etc. outside of these training areas.22 Beginning in 
1945 the Soviets and later in conjunction with the NVA built an elaborate 12,000 km long 
system of system of routes for military convoys. These routes allowed military vehicles 
                                                 
20 Mroß, Sie Gingen als Freunde, pg. 42 
21 For a full text of the treaty in German see Lohmann, GSSD, pp 326-344. 
22  Ibid. pg. 329. 
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to rapidly deploy from their garrisons especially in the area around Magdeburg. After 
October 12, 1990 the movement of any convoy of vehicles was supposed to be 
announced to the local German authorities at least two weeks in advance. If the 
movement was brigade size or larger it required one month’s notice. In accordance with a 
subsequent agreement signed by the FRG’s Ministry of Transportation and the ZGV on 
April 24, 1991 the network of roads was drastically reduced to 1420 kms.23    
Article 7 of the treaty addressed measures impacting flight operations. Literally 
overnight the ZGV’s air army lost air superiority over the territory of the former GDR 
which it had enjoyed for 45 years. The FRG’s Ministry of Transportation in conjunction 
with the German Bundeswehr now managed this airspace.  Several airspace coordination 
centers were set up across the former GDR.24 A “line of control” was established between 
the former borders of East and West Germany. ZGV aircraft and helicopters were 
prohibited from crossing this line at any time. The times that ZGV aircraft could fly was 
also now strictly regulated. From October 3, 1990 to December 31, 1990 ZGV aircraft 
could fly from 7am – 3pm Monday through Thursdays. From 1 January 1990 until the 
last aircraft left Germany in the fall of 1994 the flying hours were Monday – Thursday 
from 7am – 6pm and Friday’s from 7am – 3pm. Flights on weekends or on German 
holidays were prohibited. Pilots cold fly their aircraft no lower than 2000 feet about 
ground and could only accelerate to supersonic speed at 36,000’ or above. Flights could 
take place at night but required three days notice and had to be end by 10pm. Any 
accidents involving aircraft or helicopters would be mutually investigated.25  
                                                 
23  Foertsch, The Great Withdrawal, pg. 139  
24  The official term in German was: Luftraum-Koorindierungsstellen or LUKO. 
25  Lohmann, GSSD, pg. 330-332. 
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Article 8 addressed real estate. The ZGV was prohibited from undertaking any 
new construction. Germans living near ZGV garrisons wishing to undertake construction 
projects were required to notify the garrison leadership. The ZGV had to relinquish 
control of individual buildings located within the confines of the garrisons as soon as they 
were no longer needed. Ideally, two months notice was required for this. The ZGV was 
also required to provide the FRG a list of all buildings located on each garrison including 
those built by the Soviets themselves. The list of buildings also required a detailed 
description of electric, gas, heating, water and sewer services for each building. They also 
had to provide details of all communication systems (telephone, radio etc.) and railroad 
lines located in each garrison.26 
Several articles of the treaty addressed legal and administrative requirements. 
Article 18 marked the biggest change as it prohibited the ZGV’s tribunal system from 
imposing the death penalty on any soldier/civilian on German territory. It also provided 
soldiers and citizens the same rights as German citizens including legal counsel if they 
were tried for a criminal offense in a German court of law.27 According to Article 9 the 
Soviets had legal jurisdiction in all of their garrisons but German police had the right to 
enter any garrison if German property already turned over to them by the Soviets had 
been vandalized or damaged. Article 10 gave the ZGV and family members the right to 
sign business contracts with local German companies and individuals. It also specifically 
prohibited the sale of any weapons or other lethal military equipment. Other articles of 
the treaty addressed the procedures for registering privately owned automobiles (Article 
11), regulation of long distance communications including frequency management 
                                                 
26  Ibid. pg. 332-33 
27  V. Falin, one of Gorbachev’s former advisers, stated that no ZGV soldier/civilian accused of violating 
GDR or FRG law was ever turned over to them for prosecution. For his comments see: Klemke & 
Lorenzen, Roter Stern über Deutschland, Part III. 
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(Article 12),  the establishment of an environmental workgroup in the JGSC (Article 13), 
the requirement to protect against and report all communicable diseases (Article 14), the 
establishment of jointly manned border crossing points (Article 15), regulation of 
customs and taxes (Article 16), claims for damages (Article 23), and procedures for 
paying for maneuver damages incurred by ZGV military vehicles (Article 24). The treaty 
also included four annexes.28  
THE WITHDRAWAL  
On November 7, 1990, less than a month after the TSWT was signed in Bonn, the 
Soviet General Staff in Moscow sent a directive to the ZGV Commander in Wünsdorf 
instructing him and his staff to begin planning for the withdrawal.29 On December 31, 
1990, the new ZGV Commander General-Colonel Burlakov presented his proposed plan 
to the German side.30  In addition to drawing up a detailed plan for the withdrawal 
Burlakov had to create a new deputy commanding general position and three new staff 
sections in order to properly address the requirements of the TSWT. The new deputy 
commanding general position was called “Deputy Commanding General for the 
Withdrawal.” As its name suggests this general and his staff were responsible for all 
matters relating to the execution of the the withdrawal. The three new staff sections 
which fell under the supervision of the deputy for the withdrawal were: a staff section for 
the valuation of all property and real estate belonging to the ZGV; a staff section for arms 
control which ensured the ZGV adhered to the terms of the Conventional Forces – Europe 
                                                 
28 Article 26 addressed the four. They were: Traffic Rules, Regulations and Restrictions; postal, long 
distance communication and frequency management; detailed information on the terms for tariffs/taxes and 
customs procedures; and procedures for mutual support, legal/administrative assistance.  
29  Burlakov, Sovetskie Voiska v Germanii, pg. 285   
30  The initial plan also included units/personnel to be withdrawn for all of 1991 and Jan – Mar 91.  
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Agreement (CFE) signed in November 1990 and finally a public affairs office (PAO).31 
The PAO provided Burlakov a means to inform the German general public and 
international press on the status of the withdrawal etc.32  Table 1. on the next page is an 
overview of the totals of ZGV personnel, equipment and material withdrawn through 
December 31, 1993. 
 
 
Illustration 2. General Burlakov (center) and his staff  in Wünsdorf. 
                                                 
31 According to General Burlakov, his PAO office held 37 press conferences, coordinated for 95 interviews 
and had 48 meetings with the German press during the withdrawal. See Burlakov, Wir Verabschieden Uns 
Als Freunde, pg. 160.   
32 Ibid.  
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Table 1: Summary of personnel and equipment withdrawn 91-94.   
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The two modes of transportation used to transport the ZGV’s personnel, military 
vehicles and other equipment was via ship and rail. Just 1% of the ZGV returned to the 
Soviet Union/Russian Federation via aircraft (See Figure 12 below).   
 
      
Figure 12. ZGV Withdraw Routes.    
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The main seaports used were the north German ports of Rostock, Mukran and  
Wismar.33 Personnel, military vehicles and equipment were loaded on to two kinds of 
ships at these ports. The first was a railroad ferry, that is, a ferry with railroad tracks built 
into their hulls which allowed up to 100 train fully-loaded cars to be transported at one 
time. Five ferries of this type were used during the ZGV’s withdrawal. Under Lithuanian 
flag were the Klaipede, Vilnius and Kaunas. The other two vessels under German flag 
were the Mukran and Greifswald.34  See Illus 3 below. The other vessel was known as a 
“Ro-Ro” (Roll on, Roll off) ship. See Illus 4 below. These differed from the railroad 
ferries in that vehicles were driven directly into its cargo hold and equipment such as 
containers, trailers etc. was loaded by crane. The cost per ton of vehicles and equipment 
shipped on a “Ro-Ro” was 39,2 DM. During the winter months there was an additional 
15% charge.35  
 
                                                 
33  Burlakov, Sovetskie Voiska v Germanii, pg. 286 
34  Kowalczuk & Wolle, Roter Stern über Deutschland, pg. 224 
35  Burlakov, Sovetskie Voiska v Germanii, pg. 286  
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Illustration 3. A railroad ferry at the port of Mukran, 1992.      
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Illustration 4. A “Ro-Ro” ship “Magnitogorsk” in Rostock, 1992.    
On July 30, 1994 the last ferry from Mukran departed Germany for the Russian 
Federation. From 1991-1994, 1,582 ferries sailed for the Soviet Union/Russian 
Federation from Mukran, 272 from Rostock and 17 from Wismar.36 
The second and what turned out ultimately to be the primary means of 
transportation for the ZGV’s return to the Soviet Union/Russian were trains. Between 
1991-1994 144,998 railcars loaded with ZGV vehicles, equipment and personnel departed 
Germany. The majority, 63,891 or 44.06% of the total traveled through Poland.37 The 
                                                 
36 Lohmann, GSSD, pg. 231 
37 See Appendix D for a map of Poland showing the four routes,  
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fewest, just over 6000 (4.15%) went through Czechoslovakia. The remainder was split 
between the sea ports mentioned above. For the four year period an average of 110 rail 
cars departed Germany each day (See Table 2 below).   The cost per car in Germany was 
1440 DM (720 USD). The FRG in accordance with the TSWT absorbed these charges.       
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Year Poland Czechoslovakia Mukran Rostock/Wismar Total Railcars/day 
1991 13,502 205 23,370 8,037 45,114 123.6 
1992 19,636 2,170 16,816 3,308 41,930 114.88 
1993 19,872 1,956 14,895 880 37,603 103.02 
1994 10,881 1,678 7,476 316 20,351 91,26 
Total 63,891 6,009 62,557 12,541 144,998 110,01 
Percent of 
Total 
44.06% 4.15% 43.14% 8.65% 100% 
 
 
Table 2: Number of railcars used to withdrawal ZGV Equipment 91-94.  
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Illustration 5.  A German railway official overseeing rail car loading.   
 
 
Illustration 6. A train loaded with ZGV tanks prepares to depart Gera.   
         
OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS  
General Burlakov and his staff encountered several operational problems during 
the course of the withdrawal.  The first issue was transit fees for ZGV loaded trains 
crossing Poland. The fees were significantly higher than what the ZGV was willing to 
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pay.1 As a result, the trains were redirected to the three ports discussed above during 
1991. As one can see from Table 2 above, the port of Mukran received the highest one 
year total of rail cars (23,370) for the entire withdrawal. This issue was the main topic of 
discussion during the 2
nd
 meeting of the JGSC in February 1991.2 According to General 
Burlakov the issue was finally resolved through the efforts of the general staff in 
Moscow.3 Poland agreed to reduce its tariffs by 41%. In 1992 the trains began rolling 
across the Polish country side. 
A similar problem developed in the port of Rostock when port management 
decided to raise its loading fees by 10%. In a surprising move Burlakov and his staff 
queried other ports and were able to arrange an agreement with the port of Wismar. This 
agreement remained in effect until port officials in Rostock, seeing that they were 
obviously going to lose out on a lot of business, decided to lower their fees back to their 
original rates.4   
The third and final major operational problem facing the ZGV during the 
withdrawal was the management of trucks for hauling a unit’s equipment and personnel 
to the train stations. A withdrawing unit could not accomplish this task on its own since 
all of its own trucks at some point needed to be loaded on to rail cars. In order to solve 
this problem the commanders and staffs at the army, division and regimental levels 
created “pusher units” consisting of trucks from other units that were not scheduled to 
redeploy unit a later date. These units provided trucks and other services in order to 
“push” the withdrawing unit out of its garrison and to the local train station. Of course, 
                                                 
1  The price per railcar more than doubled from 60 DM to 130 DM; 11,000 railcars were affected.   See 
Mroß, Sie Gingen Als Freunde, pg. 83 
2  Burlakov, Wir Verabschieden Uns Als Freunde, pg. 194 
3  Burlakov, Sovetskie Voiska v Germanii, pg. 286 
4  Kowalczuk & Wolle, Roter Stern über Deutcshland, pg. 224. 
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the real problem came at the end of the withdrawal when the “pusher” unit itself needs to 
be loaded on to trains. Normally, the local host nation, in this case, local German 
transportation companies would provide trucks and other assets to move the pusher unit 
out. This will have to remain an unanswered question as I found no evidence that German 
transport companies or the German Bundeshwehr provided such assistance.    
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Chapter 7: Real Estate, Housing, Retraining and Charitable Aid 
     The two most contentious issues involving the withdrawal of the ZGV were the 
disposition of the real estate they owned and the construction of housing units in the 
Soviet Union and later in the newly independent states of Belorussia, Russia and Ukraine. 
This chapter examines each of these issues. Additionally, I will briefly discuss the officer 
retraining program and two ZGV humanitarian aid initiatives.   
REAL ESTATE 
If we recall from Chapter 6 the ZGV technically “owned” over 21,000 of the over 
36,000 buildings and structures located on 777 tracts of land in five states of newly 
reunified Germany. The majority, 28.8% of the property/buildings were located in 
Brandenburg; Saxony, 24.7%, Saxon-Anhalt, 20.3%, Thüringen, 17.4% and 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 8%.1  The appraised value of this real estate varied. The 
German side believed the Soviets estimates to be far too high. The Soviets believed the 
German estimates to be, as expected, too low. Eventually, a generally agreed value of 
between 10 and 11 billion DM (ca 5-5.5 billion USD) was accepted.   
The sale of ZGV owned real estate would prove to be a lot easier said than done.  
Before any real estate could be sold, the German side had to do its own appraisal of the 
real estate as well. According to General Burlakov, the Germans deliberately delayed the 
appraisals. One case involved a piece of ZGV real estate in Potsdam. His real estate staff 
section valued it at 3.5 million DM (1.75 million USD). A potential buyer was found and 
offered the ZGV 5 million (2.5 million USD) for the property but when they tried to 
complete the sale German representatives claimed this particular piece of property had 
                                                 
1  Kowalczuk & Wolle, Roter Stern über Deutschland, pg. 230 
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“special value” and the sale was dissaproved.2 The topic of real estate was addressed at 
least three times in the JGSC in 1991-92.  
Looking at this issue from an objective point of view there are a number of 
reasons why it was difficult for the ZGV to sell this real estate. It is hard to imagine that 
the ZGV real estate staff section had the proper level of expertise and experience as 
“realtors” to operate in the new free market of unified Germany. It was probably also 
undermanned and simply could not deal with the enormity of task.3  By the end of 1992 
the ZGV had managed to sell only 2.5 million DM (1.25 million USD) worth of real 
estate.4 The Germans believed that a vast majority of the buildings built by the Soviets 
were not up to their building standards and that much of the ZGV real estate, especially 
training areas, fuel storage depots etc., were ecologically damaged and would require 
millions of DMs to properly recover.5 Burlakov claims in his memoirs that a formal offer 
of 6-8 billion DM (3-4 billion USD) for ZGV real estate and 2-4 billion (1-2 billion USD) 
for compensation for ecological damages was made to the Germans but they never 
responded to the offer.6  The “battle lines” between what the ZGV was demanding for its 
real estate and what the Germans wanted for ecological damages had been drawn. The 
JGSC was unable to resolve this issue. In the end politicians, not men in uniform would 
“resolve” the matter.   
On December 16, 1992 German Chancellor Helmut Kohl met with Russian 
Federation President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow where they signed an agreement 
                                                 
2  Burlakov, Wir Verabschieden Uns Als Freunde, pg. 150. 
3  Other than providing the names of officers who led various staff sections  neither the official history of 
the ZGV or Burlakov’s memoirs provide any clarity with respect to the manning of each staff section.   
4  Foertsch, The Great Withdrawal, pg. 148 
5  See Walter Kratz’s: Konversion in Ostdeutschland, Berlin:Trafoverlg, 2003 for a detailed discussion of 
ecological damages caused by the ZGV and German federal and state efforts to clean them up.    
6  Burlakov, Wir Verabschieden Uns Als Freunde, pg. 151 
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addressing the real estate problem and other issues.7 Both men agreed that the demands 
for compensation of ZGV real estate would be canceled out by Kohl’s demands for 
compensation for ecological damage. This became known as the “zero sum” solution. 
Kohl also agreed to provide Yeltsin with 550 million DM (225 million USD) for 
additional housing units (to be discussed in the next section). Both men also agreed that 
the date for the withdrawal of the final withdrawal of all ZGV troops would be moved up 
by more than three months to September 1st, 1994.   
As one would expect, Burlakov, along with many others within the defense 
establishment, was not at all pleased. To them it appeared that Yeltsin had sold Russian 
military interests down the river much like Gorbachev had done two and half years earlier 
in Archsy. Burlakov contended that the ministry of defense had been counting on the sale 
of the real estate in order to finance an additional 40,000 housing units to solve the 
housing shortage which faced thousands of returning service members returning from 
Germany and the Baltic States. He believed the deal struck between Kohl and Yeltsin 
gave all advantages to the German side with Russia receiving only a small compensatory 
amount of 550 million DM (225 million USD) to address the housing shortage.8   
THE MILITARY HOUSING SHORTAGE      
Of all of the issues and problems faced by the ZGV during the withdrawal none 
was more controversial than that of the shortage of military housing its personnel faced 
when they returned to the Soviet Union. Prior to the signing of the TSWT on October 12, 
1990 another agreement, “The Agreement between the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Government of the Soviet Union on Certain Transitional 
Matters,” was signed on October 9th in Bonn. Part of this agreement spelled out the 
                                                 
7  See Foertsch, The Great Withdrawal, pp 181-84 for a complete copy of the agreement in German. 
8  Burlakov, Wir Verabschieden Uns Als Freunde, pg. 151 
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financial compensation the FRG would provide to the Soviet Union for the construction 
of military housing units. The FRG agreed to pay 8.35 billion DM (4.175 billion USD) to 
build 34,411 housing units in the Soviet Union. This amount included the 550 million 
additional DMs the FRG provided as part of the Kohl-Yeltsin agreement in December 
1991. The problem, however, was from the time the ZGV’s withdrawal began in early 
1991 until it ended in September 1994 more personnel and their family members were 
returning to the Soviet Union than were housing units being built. Exact numbers are 
difficult to ascertain and probably will never be known for sure but it appears that 
somewhere between 50,000 – 60,000 ZGV families including some 80,000 children did 
not have a place to live when they returned to the Soviet Union. In 1991, 16,695 families 
returned without a place to live. In 1992, the number was 14,958. In contrast, during 
same two years only 3,537 housing units had been built.9  
 
Illustration 7. ZGV officers visit a German modular housing company.   
                                                 
9   Ibid. pp. 146-47 
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The housing units were constructed in a total of twelve locations which included 
four in Belorussia (Baranovitschi, Borisov, Marjina Gorka and Slonim), six in Russia 
(Alla-Kurti, Kassimov, Shaikovka, Tver, Vladikavkaz and Vyazma) and two in Ukraine 
(Krivoy Rog and Starokonstantinov).10 The number of units to be built in each country 
was agreed to by each government through a series of negotiations. The final breakdown 
was as follows: Belorussia, 5,935 units, Russian Federation, 34,924 units and Ukraine, 
5170 units.11 The German construction companies Holzman and Züblin built twelve of 
the units while the Turkish, Finnish12, South Korean13 and Bulgarian14 firms built the 
remainder.  
 
 
Illustration 8. Gen. Burlakov inspects windows at German modular home company. 
                                                 
10   Ibid. pg. 147 
11  Foertsch, The Great Withdrawal, pg. 148 
12  Burlakov, Wir Verabschieden Uns Als Freunde, pg. 147 
13  Boltunov, Michael., Gorkaya Doroga Domoi,St. Petersburg:Schanz, 1995, pg. 205 
14  A German documentary filmed in May 1994 traces the withdrawal of a Russian aviation unit from 
Germany to Kamenka, located north of Moscow. A representative of the Bulgarian building company 
discusses the project. The mayor of Kamenka as well as the Deputy Minister of Defense, Boris Gromov are 
also featured. The film is available at: http://www.gsvg.ru/film/film17.html.  
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In January 1993 Burlakov addressed the JGSC about the continued discrepancy 
between the number of homeless families returning home and the lethargic pace of the 
housing construction. He asked for more funding in order that more units would be 
completed in 1993. His requests fell on deaf ears. The German side of the joint 
commission argued that the FRG’s funding agreement signed on October 9th had no 
connection with the TSWT signed three days later on the 12
th
 of October. According to 
German accounts Burlakov would complain incessantly about this issue. So much so it 
led to several of the German staff officers giving him the nickname “Bungalov.”15  
Interestingly, Burlakov makes no mention in his memoirs or in the ZGV’s official history 
of any appeals to Russia’s Ministry of Defense or to president Yeltsin.  
A number of other issues caused Burlakov a great deal of consternation. Housing 
units in Russia were being assigned to families who were not part of the ZGV. Local 
officials delayed the approval of building permits and the allocation of land for the units. 
In Volgograd and Ulyanovsk local administrators refused altogether to receive returning 
ZGV units. The case of Volgograd was especially hard for Burlakov to accept considering 
that many of returning ZGV units had fought in the Battle of Stalingrad (Volgograd), 
arguably the decisive battle on the eastern front, during the Second World War.16       
Much like they had in the tariff dispute with the port of Rostock, Burlakov and his 
staff came up with “creative workarounds” in order to secure additional housing units in 
Russia. Select officers agreed to pool their own monies together as well as monies 
collected by the sale of scrap metal, used tires17 etc. to the Germans in order to purchase 
                                                 
15  Foertsch, The Great Withdrawal, pg. 142 
16  Burlakov, Wir Verabschieden Uns Als Freunde, pg 148 
17  Ibid. pg. 151. Burlakov claims the ZGV had more than 190,000 tons of scrap metal, engineering 
equipment, tools etc. It also included 10,000 tons of used tires and building materials. He gives no 
indication on how much of these items were sold to the Germans. One could easily see the potential for 
corruption in the selling of these items as well.       
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the units. Burlakov claims this initiative was successful and that they were able to buy 
1000 apartment buildings in the Stravropol region.18 One has to wonder if he and other 
officers were aware of the irony of purchasing apartments in the same area where 
Gorbachev and Kohl met in July 1990.  
Despite the additional 550 million DM (225 million USD) Russia received from 
the FRG in the agreement of December 1992 the amount of housing units being built 
would never equal the number of families returning from Germany. As a result, it would 
not be until October 9
th
, 1996, 25 months after the last ZGV soldier had left Germany, 
that the last 1037 housing units would be turned over to their new owners just outside of 
Moscow.19        
 THE RETRAINING PROGRAM – THE ZGV EMBRACES CAPITALISM 
“We do not have any other choice. We need to get used to the free market. In a 
common European home we need to find our place,”20 These were the words of Colonel 
Strelnikov, chief of the ZGV staff section for withdrawal treaty implementation as he 
spoke about the ZGV’s retraining program for officers leaving the military as part of the 
Soviet military’s troop reductions. The FRG funded this program as part of the agreement 
signed on October 9
th
, 1990 mentioned earlier in this chapter. In it they agreed to provide 
about 223 million DM (112.5 million USD) for the retraining of these officers. 22 million 
(11 million USD) would be used in Germany to retrain them before they returned to the 
Soviet Union. The first retraining center in Germany was opened on April 7, 1992 in 
Wünsdorf by General Burlakov. Another 31 would be established in other ZGV garrisons 
across eastern Germany. In all over 13,000 officers, including  spouses and older 
                                                 
18  Ibid. pg. 149 
19  Kowalczuk & Wolle, Roter Stern über Deutschland, pg. 225  
20  Mroß, Sie Gingen Als Freunde, pg. 64  
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children, received training from German instructors in courses such as marketing, 
principles of the market economy and how to start and run a small business.21   
 
 
Illustration 9. Soviet officers and spouses in a retraining classroom.  
The other 200 million (100 million USD) was allocated to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) in the following increments: Russia: 129. 3 million DM (114.5 
million USD), Ukraine: 22,9 million DM (11.45 million USD), Belorussia: 8,2 million 
DM (4.1 million USD), and Kazakhstan 3.6 million (1.8 million USD). The remainder, 
some 13.2 million DM (6.6 million USD) went to other CIS countries.22 CIS members  
could then use the monies as they deemed appropriate. For example, in Russia, eight 
                                                 
21  Ibid.  
22  Lohmann, GSSD, pg. 232 
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retraining centers were established in eight different locations across the country. Each 
center offered certification courses lasting anywhere from 6-9 months. By the end of 
1996 8000 former officers had completed this training; 75% of them were able to find 
employment. Many also became self-employed.  Three similar retraining centers were 
established in Belorussia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as well. The program officially ended 
in October of 1996. 23   
CHARITABLE AID INITIATIVES 
Up until this point I have focused on the major problems the ZGV faced during its 
withdrawal. Despite these difficulties coupled with the deteriorating economic situation 
in Belorussia, Russia and Ukraine, officers and soldiers of the ZGV displayed compassion 
for their fellow countrymen in a number of unexpected ways.  
In 1991 the Russian-Orthodox church in Berlin in conjunction with General-
Major Lyutov,24 chief of ZGV medical services set up a special unit at the ZGV’s main 
hospital in Beelitz25 for the treatment of children affected radiation as a result of the 
nuclear catastrophe at Chernobyl in 1986. (See Illus. 10 below). German authorities 
assisted as well setting up the charitable fund “Children of Chernobyl.” Within just a few 
months  German citizens contributed more than 515,000 DM (207,500 USD). Prominent 
German contributers included Friede Springer, widow of the late newspaper publisher 
Axel Springer, who donated an additional 500,000 DM (250,000 USD).26 
 
 
                                                 
23  Mroß, Sie Gingen Als Freunde, pg. 64. 
24  For General Lyutov’s perspective as a physician on the withdrawal of the ZGV see: Lyutov, V.V, 
“Zapadnaya Gruppa Voisk Ostaiyotsya v Istorii,” Voenno-Medisinskii Zhurnal, 8’94, pp 65-68  
25  Beelitz is located approximately 40 miles southwest of Berlin. 
26  Burlakov, Wir Verabschieden Uns Als Freunde, pg. 179  
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Illustration 10. A ZGV medical assistant plays with children.    
One of the most inspirational stories I came across during the course of my 
research  was that of Seryoscha Vlasyuk, a young toddler suffering from acute leukemia 
from radiation exposure in Chernobyl. Unable to get medical attention for his son in 
Russia, his father, an officer in the Soviet army, transferred to the ZGV hoping to save his 
son. Once he arrived he took his son to the university of Leipzig medical clinic where he 
received a full examination. The doctors told his father that they could treat his son but 
the costs would be around 200,000 DM (100,000 USD). The question of course was: 
where would his father get this kind of money? Fellow officers in Seryoscha’s father’s 
unit took action and made an appeal through the ZGV newspaper Naslednik Pobedi to 
raise money for his treatment. The news of this initiative also caught the attention of 
major German newspapers like Bild, Bild der Frauen, Express and others which 
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published their own appeals for help. The response was overwhelming. Entire school 
classes, for example the Carl-Gauss School in Frankfurt an der Oder, collected money. 
Due to the efforts of countless schools and individuals doctors were able to save his life.  
Between Jan 1991 and August 1993 German hospitals and clinics treated more than 700 
ZGV military and family members.27  
During the course of 1991 General-Major Foertsch, who we recall, was the chief 
of the German liaison element to the ZGV in Berlin, contemplated other ways to assist 
ZGV soldiers and their families. Using the Bundeswehr model of Soldatenhilfswerk, a 
fund established to help Bundeswehr soldiers and their families, Foertsch approached the 
Soviet Ambassador in Berlin as well as General Burlakov in October of the same year 
about establishing something similar in the ZGV. His proposal was positively received. A 
few months later on February 19, 1992 the joint Bundeswehr-ZGV support fund was 
established. It was designed to collect monies for ZGV soldiers and families residing in 
Germany who were in need of financial assistance. Foertsch’s liaison element in 
conjunction with designated ZGV officers jointly managed the fund. Collected monies 
were distributed for the payment of overnight stays in local hospitals and for the purchase 
of items such as wheelchairs, prosthetics, medicines, implants and other medical related 
items. Any Bundeswehr or ZGV solider, regardless of rank, could contribute to the fund; 
ZGV soldiers were encouraged to contribute 1 DM (.50 US Cents) to the fund before they 
departed Germany. Most of the monies donated came from German charitable 
organizations, privately owned German companies and from Bundeswehr/ZGV soldiers. 
Additionally funds were raised during performances of the ZGV’s military orchestra at 
various locations across Germany. From February 1991 until the fund’s closure at the end 
                                                 
27  Ibid. pp. 178-9 
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of August 1994 officials distributed more than one million DM (500,000 USD) of items 
and services.28 Interestingly, this fund is not mentioned in the official ZGV history or by 
General Burlakov in his memoirs.     
As is well known the economic situation in the newly independent states of the 
Former Soviet Union (FSU) in the early 1990s was extremely bleak. Many charitable 
organizations from Western Europe and abroad sent hundreds of truck loads of much 
needed medical supplies and other aid to the FSU during this time. On three occasions in  
1992 and 1993 an unlikely constellation of former enemies: British soldiers from the 
British Berlin Brigade, German soldiers from the German liaison element and Russian 
soldiers from the Russian Berlin Brigade joined forces and together sent three convoys of 
humanitarian aid to Smolensk and select villages in the surrounding area. Making these 
convoys even more interesting was the fact that spouses of senior officers from each 
country also participated. They included: Antje Foertsch, wife of General-Major 
Foertsch, Malvine Sayle, wife of the commander of the British Brigade and Vera 
Makrova, wife of the commander of the Russian Brigade.29  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28  Mroß, Sie Gingen Als Freunde, pp 122-123. For detailed cases of how this fund helped individual ZGV 
soldiers including a general officer see pages 124-29     
29  Burlakov, Wir Verabschieden Uns Als Freunde, pg 178 
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Illustration 11. Members of one of the multi-national convoys to Smolensk. 
Deliveries of the humanitarian aid took place in late February/early March and 
early December 1992 and again in November 1993. During those three trips, the multi-
national convoys from Berlin delivered more than 150 tons of food, medicine, medical 
equipment, winter clothing, former NVA boots or valenki, toys and even a farming tractor 
to schools, senior citizen homes, kindergartens, orphanages and Russian-Orthodox 
churches. The living conditions at one of the locations they delivered to were so poor that 
Vera Makrova broke down in tears.30 Some of the local citizens in Smolensk and the 
other areas, especially the older ones, viewed their visitors, with deep suspicion. 50 years 
earlier Smolensk and the surrounding areas had been the scene of bitter fighting as the 
Wehrmacht marched towards Moscow in the fall of 1941. The Soviets lost some 70,000 
soldiers; the Germans, 40,000.  
Members of the convoys also encountered former ZGV soldiers their units having 
been relocated from Germany to the Smolensk area. In November 1993, as the last 
convoy was making deliveries, the former commander of the 8
th
 Guards Army, which had 
                                                 
30  Mroß, Sie Gingen Als Freunde, pg. 145 
 110 
been located in Nohra near Weimar, General-Lieutenant Zosedov and his wife invited the 
senior officers and spouses to his apartment for dinner in Smolensk (Illus. 12 below). 
During their conversations he indicated that under his command he had 1700 officers and 
soldiers who did not have a place to live. 300 of them had recently served in the ZGV.31      
 
 
Illustration 12. General Sosedov (seated right) at his home with guests November 1993. 
There, of course, were some difficulties during each trip. Vehicles broke down, 
there were issues at the three border crossings with customs officials and on at least one 
occasion items were stolen from one of the trucks despite the fact that their vehicles were 
parked within the confines of a military installation and were guarded. Colonel 
Strelnikov, who we remember from the retraining program section above, once again had 
some very interesting comments with regards to the multi-national convoys. “All 
invaders passing through Brest and Smolensk always came during the summer and 
suffered defeat in the winter. I would like to think that these little ‘invasions’ of 
                                                 
31  Ibid. pg. 158 
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humanitarian aid undertaken to invade Russia during the winter months will lead to peace 
and stability.” 32     
 
                                                 
32  Ibid. pg. 163 
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Chapter 8: Individual Recollections of Service in the ZGV 
       This chapter explores the experiences of two ZGV soldiers during the late 80s 
and early 90s. I had the honor of meeting and interviewing both of them while taking a 
one month Russian refresher course at the NovaMova language institute in Kiev in June 
and July of 2011. Andriy K. was a draftee in the ZGV from November 1988 until his 
discharge two years later in the fall of 1990. Colonel P., a career artillery officer, served 
in the ZGV from 1987 until early 1991 when his unit returned to Ukraine. I conducted the 
interviews in Russian using 14 prepared questions though I did ask additional ones as 
well. Each lasted approximately 90 minutes.1 My intent in the pages that follow is to 
highlight some of the more interesting experiences both Andriy K. and Colonel P. had in 
the ZGV at a time of great uncertainly and unrest not only in the Soviet Union but in the 
ZGV itself. Their stories differ drastically from the official ZGV history and the memoirs 
of General Burlakov which I have discussed and cited in previous chapters.  My hope is 
that by the time the reader gets to the end of this chapter he/she will have a better 
understanding of the atmosphere within a typical ZGV combat unit.      
ANDRIY K. – A SOLDIER’S PERSPECTIVE 
In the fall of 1988 Andriy K. was drafted into the Soviet Army in his hometown 
of Skadovsk not far from the Crimea in southern Ukraine. After reporting for duty in 
Kherson he traveled to Simferopol where he and his fellow draftees were issued 
uniforms. After a week there they flew directly to the GDR and landed in Falkenberg one 
of the many ZGV airfields.2 After spending a few nights at the airbase he traveled to 
Frankfurt an der Oder when he spent another few days before getting on a German train 
                                                 
1  Complete translations of both interviews are available in Appendix E.  
2  For a detailed description of the Falkenberg airfield see Freundt, Rote Plätze, pp 150-54 
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headed to Weimar. The journey from Frankfurt to Weimar was extremely stressful for 
Andriy K. and his fellow soldiers. He recalled, “They put us on the German trains which 
had very small cars; there were too many people in those cars. There were 14 people for a 
compartment that normally seats six…can you imagine that? Four to five people sat on 
one side and four to five others sat across from them. One person would be lying on their 
laps. It took us 24 hours to get to Weimar. Toilets were not available. It was very hard…I 
cannot tell you all the details.”  
Andriy K. spent a week in Weimar before being sent to Potsdam where he 
attended an artillery training school or oochebka located on the grounds of a former 
Wehrmacht garrison for six months.3 During his time there he studied principles of 
automotive mechanics and eventually became a driver and mechanic for a 2S-1 medium 
howitzer. According to Andriy K., the order was fantastic; it was very clean. We kept 
things clean and we cleaned all the time; that is where we underwent training and the 
discipline was very severe…but that was needed. He and other soldiers had to perform 
taskings of various kinds on the garrison while attending the artillery school. Examples 
included nayad which was a task for a 24 hour period beginning at 5pm in the afternoon 
and ending at 5pm the next day. “The worst for me was to serve in the kitchen because 
you had to clean it and peel potatoes. Very hard work for 24 hours,” Andriy K. recalled. 
Other taskings included dnevalni, or guard duty at the gates of the garrison and working 
in the garrison pig sty which some soldiers preferred since the rules were not as strict as 
the rest of the garrison.  
                                                 
3 The former garrison was located in Potdam-Nedlitz. The artillery training school’s official name was the 
214
th
 Artillery Training Regiment, (Unit Number 95826 ). See Kersten, Olaf., Garnisonen der NVA und 
GSTD: Zur Nutzung der militärischen Standorte von 1871 bis 2010, Berlin: Dr. Köstler Verlag, 2011, pg. 
298.      
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Andriy K. and other soldiers attended artillery training classes six days a week. 
They had Sundays off and were provided extra rations at the garrison dining facility. 
“They gave us one boiled egg and even butter…two pieces of butter…one in the morning 
and the other in the evening. Sometimes if we were lucky we got some white bread,” he 
told me.   
After completing artillery training school Andriy K. traveled to Plauen in 
southwestern Saxony where he reported to the 29
th
 Motorized Rifle Regiment and was 
assigned to the regiment’s artillery battalion. His life in his new unit became even worse 
than it had been in Potsdam. “It was a very unlucky regiment for me…we called it the 
“Chinese Regiment” because there were so many soldiers from Central Asia and 
Azerbaijan. We had a lot of ethnic conflicts in that unit. There is such a phenomena…we 
called zemlyatschestvo. It is like…nepotism. When people come from one place they 
support each other. When you have a concentration of Uzbek soldiers, Armenians, Azeris 
etc. they start forming like…a mafia group. At those times…it was the end of the 
1980s…the ethnic conflicts that took place in the country [the Soviet Union] also 
reflected themselves in the army. It was not a fair way of life,” he recalled.4 
Andriy K. was and still is today musically inclined. My interview with him 
included his description of an incident he had with one of the Armenian soldiers who 
worked in the regiment’s bath house or bannya. “So one evening he [the Armenian 
soldier] comes in a says…and I was already singing a song…’you…sit here next to my 
bed because I cannot hear you quite well.’” Andriy K. continued, “So, I took my guitar 
and I took a stool and I went towards him, put my guitar down and struck his head with 
that stool with such force that the stool actually broke. I was beaten severely after that. 
                                                 
4  A good analysis of these ethnic conflicts can be found in: Szayna, Thomas., The Ethnic Factor in the 
Soviet Armed Forces: The Muslim Dimension, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1991.  
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But after this incident no one touched me and no one came up to me and said ‘you do this 
for me and you do that for me.’ “    
Andriy K. also described for me the relationship between the officers and the 
enlisted soldiers in his unit. “Let us say there was no love lost. There was no peace and 
understanding. Let us say no one would go and try to save Private Ryan here. The 
situation was…I actually felt quite bad because the officers who were Slavic…Russians 
and Ukrainians…never reproached Armenians or Azeris as if they were afraid to do 
something wrong. So one had to ah…defend his rights constantly. The officers would 
rarely reprimand Uzbeks or Armenians…hardly ever. And to the Slavic soldiers they [the 
officers] always knew they could say ‘need to do that’ and they knew we would fulfill the 
tasks,” he explained.  
Officers would also mistreat soldiers in the most inhumane ways. Andriy K. 
observed once such incident when he was a sentry at the Hauptwache or military prison 
located on his garrison in Plauen. “In that prison were soldiers who had been caught 
drunk. And the way that they were treated was awful. There was this one officer who I 
knew well; he was a miserable human being. He really humiliated and tortured them. 
What he would do…he would get excrement from the sewer…not himself…he would 
make soldiers do that…and then he would make them pour it on the soldiers…this was an 
outside kind of prison cell with bars and we called it the monkey cage…and 
here…imagine all of those soldiers standing there outside absolutely not protected and he 
[the officer] did it all night long and in the morning they [the soldiers] had to clean it all 
up. I had my weapon with me and I was tempted to end this.”    
The 29
th
 Motorized Rifle Regiment trained for its wartime mission against NATO 
forces at various training areas in the GDR several times per year. Andriy K. participated 
in several of these month-long exercises. His unit deployed from Plauen to the Lieberose 
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training area not far from Cottbus, southeast of Berlin.5 Andriy K. recalled, “It is a big, 
enormous training area and it belonged to the Soviet Union so that is where we conducted 
artillery gunnery three times. That is where I had some serious practice and worked 
closely with Major P.” Here Andriy K. is referring to the fact that he was Major P.’s 
driver and mechanic and responsible for his vehicle which was a tracked command post 
with radios and a ballistic computer to perform computations for artillery firing. 
Interestingly, he told me that in the spring of 1990 they went to Lieberose but in the fall 
of the same year they did not go. This corresponds exactly with the new training 
restrictions on the ZGV which I discussed in Chapter 6. He also stated that due to the fact 
he was a driver he had special status with other officers as well. “I, as a driver, had an 
elevated status and so once in a while I would drive the officers into the woods and they 
would shoot a deer and make shish kebab” he recalled. Andriy K. must have performed 
his duties in an exception manner because he was only one of two soldiers in the entire 
regiment of approximately 3000 who were allowed to go back to the Soviet Union for ten 
days of leave. Draftees normally did not get to take leave during their entire two years of 
service.   
According to Andriy K. the morale in his unit in 1990 was already pretty low. 
Various tentacles of corruption, especially among many of the officers, were starting to 
reach into the unit and cause havoc. “Yes, some people like [Major] P worked hard and 
honestly…some junior soldiers…but all of the commanders would just engage in their 
own business.” He continued, “The Germans began to get rid of their Socialist cars like 
Trabant and Moskvichi and began to buy West German cards like Mercedes Benz and 
Audi…used ones. But anyways…in order to get rid of Soviet car like Moskvich you had 
                                                 
5  See Appendix F for a map of the Lieberose Training Area. Further details can be found in, Kersten, Olaf., 
Garnisonen der NVA und GSTD, pg. 385.   
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to pay some money so it could be processed as scrap metal. So…what they [the Germans] 
did…they just put them near our unit…abandoned them near our unit and then you could 
repair and paint it. And who do you think was doing all of this work? The soldiers! We 
did not do our military jobs but we were working for those commanders trying to fix their 
used Opel Kadetts or Zhigulis. And then…they ah…took those cars home and they sold 
them and came back…so they began this little business. And then mafia like activity 
began to emerge.” He further elaborated, “For instance in the military workshops where 
the 2S-1s and the BMPs were supposed to be repaired and painted we had Volgas, 
Moskvichi, Zhiguli, Zaparozhets, some western cars…if the officer had more money. The 
commander of the regiment bought himself a BMW 3 Series. The soldiers looking at the 
officers began to behave in a similar way. They began to sell their badges and their 
uniforms to the Germans.” 
Andriy K. also told me that not only were the officers buying and selling cars they 
were collecting money from work that their soldiers were doing for local Germans. “So 
what happened was the officers went to the Germans…to their businesses and they 
“rented” soldiers for instance to work in the meat packaging factory or local brewery and, 
of course, the officers got the money for that,” he said.   
During the course of the withdrawal Western media, especially the German press, 
published numerous articles about ZGV activities similar to the ones mentioned above.    
General Burlakov vehemently denied his officers and soldiers were engaged in any mafia 
like activities.  
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AN OFFICER’S PERSPECTIVE 
Like Andriy K. Colonel P. served in the same artillery battalion. He arrived in 
1987 and remained with the unit until it was eventually disbanded in 1992 after it 
returned to Ukraine. While there Colonel P., then a major, held three important leadership 
positions within his unit. He commanded a battery of 6 2S-1 self-propelled howitzers, 
served as chief of staff and became the battalion commander responsible for about 250 
soldiers including 35 officers.6 While serving in Plauen, Colonel P. lived in three 
different apartments with his wife and children. As his responsibilities increased so did 
the quality of his living quarters. The apartments were not too far from the unit’s garrison 
and according to Colonel P. were very nice compared to standards in the Soviet Union at 
the time. Despite his responsibilities as a commanding officer, his monthly salary was 
less than that of an enlisted soldier in the NVA.    
When I asked Colonel P. about what the relationship between the officers and the 
soldiers was like during the late 80s/early 90s his response was quite different than the 
one Andriy K. provided. “The relationship between officers and soldiers was better than 
it is here now even. Because we were far from our homeland, we tried to cultivate 
friendship. Andriy is a typical example of this generation of soldiers. He and his age 
group served for two years. There were others. In my division [battalion] there were 250 
people. There were 35 officers who were my subordinates. The soldiers came from every 
corner of the USSR. 25 different nationalities and all of the union republics were 
represented plus smaller ethnic minorities including soldiers from Chechnya, 
Abkhazians, Ingushi and Avarsi (Dagistan). There was a lot of comradery. I had to 
                                                 
6  A battery is used to designate a company size field artillery unit. Maj. P’s battery had approximately 60 
soldiers. There were three 2S-1 batteries in his battalion.         
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explain to them…well…perhaps it was called something different for you…we used to 
have political seminars. We would get together and I would explain why the soldiers 
would have to hide from each other if they were not good to each other. I would say if 
you treat your fellow soldier badly when you go back to Russia you will have to hide 
from him because he will seek revenge for the mistreatment. But, if you are nice to him, 
he will greet you as relative and will greet you as a relative and will treat you with food 
and drink and will do everything for you. So…to sum up our relationship was very 
good…even excellent,” he told me.  
I also asked Colonel P. about the nature of the relationship between the Soviet 
forces stationed in Plauen and the local German citizens. He said he had noticed a change 
in their behavior after German reunification and indicated that several anti-Soviet 
organizations “popped up” and that he had a run in with the leader of one of these 
organizations as his unit was driving its vehicles on the roads in Plauen. Colonel P. 
recalled, “The organization’s official name was: ‘Organization at Aiming for Worsening 
the Conditions of Soviet Troops in Germany.’ As I mentioned before we trained at the 
local training area near Plauen. I was given the task by my superior commander of 
bringing our howitzers to the training area. Our location [garrison] was still within the 
city limits so my convoy had to drive through the city. The streets are cobblestoned like 
here in L’viv; they are not wide. At one of the road intersections a German driving a 
Trabant blocks the intersection and shouts that we cannot proceed. Well, it would have 
been very easy to drive over this plastic car and smash it but I did not want to do it so I 
told my soldiers just to pick up his car and put it aside away from our route. You see, it 
[the Trabant] was very light. We proceeded and completed our training following orders 
correctly. We did have a verbal exchange with the German; I responded in my broken 
German as well. Well, a few days after that there were rumors in Wünsdorf of a 
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scandalous situation. A tank officer, a major, had threatened to shoot a German citizen 
because he was blocking his way. This was the conflict. All of the tankers7 had already 
withdrawn to the USSR. We were artillery troops. It did not take long for them [his 
superiors] to figure out it was my unit moving about in the city. My boss confronted me 
about the incident. I told him, yes it was me. He asked me what happened. I explained to 
them what had happened. ‘We moved the car and then proceeded further.’ My superiors 
told me to go to the military police and take care of the situation with the German citizen. 
It turned out he was the leader of the organization I mentioned earlier! He said that in the 
bi-lateral treaty [from November 12, 1990 discussed in Chapters 6 & 7] the hours in 
which tanks could use the roads were restricted.8 I told him that self-propelled howitzers 
are not tanks; they are very lightweight. The pressure on the ground caused by the tracks 
is less than that of the Soviet made truck URAL. And the German said he was not aware 
of that. Later he tried to befriend me and even invited me to his butcher shop. In general, 
the German people did treat us well.”  
After German reunification groups of 30-40 American soldiers began visiting the 
29
th
 Motorized Rifle Regiment’s garrison in Plauen. The Americans, a mix of soldiers, 
Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and officers were from units US VII Corps located 
in Hof and Nürnberg. Colonel P. indicated that he and his soldiers would give them a tour 
of the garrison, show them their equipment etc. One of the units that visited his unit was 
the 1
st
 Armored Division Artillery located in Pinder Barracks in Nürnberg. According to 
Colonel P. the senior American officer from this unit asked where the artillery 
commander was. Colonel P. was the duty officer that day and could attend the event. 
                                                 
7   Soldiers who man  tanks. In Russian the word is tankisti.  
8   The 27 articles of the bi-lateral treaty make no mention of any driving restrictions for tanks or other 
vehicles. Annex 1 of the treaty addresses general transportation requirements and restrictions but like the 
base treaty there is no specific mention of driving restrictions for tanks etc. For an English translation of the 
Annex see Foertsch, The Great Withdrawal, pp. 171-2.          
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Nevertheless, Colonel P. told me the American officer pulled-out a very nice Bavarian 
beer stein and told the Soviet officers to present it to him which they later did. He still has 
this stein to this day. Unfortunately, Colonel P. and his soldiers were never permitted to 
pay reciprocal visits to American units in either city in Bavaria.    
The 29
th
 Motorized Rifle Regiment was one of the first units to be withdrawn 
back to the Soviet Union under the terms of the bi-lateral treaty signed between the FRG 
and the USSR in October of 1990. Initially, however, the unit was not supposed to be 
withdrawn until 1992 or 1993. “They planned and told us that we would withdrawal in 
’92 or ’93 but the Germans who had more information than us told us that you will not be  
here by the end of ’90. Our bosses used to scold us saying ‘why do you listen to them? 
They are lying through their teeth.’  But in reality we were out of East Germany by the 
end of 1990,” he recalled.  
According to Colonel P. it took approximately three months to withdrawal all of 
the regiment’s personnel (ca 3000 soldiers), and equipment. Vehicles, heavy equipment, 
containers etc. went by rail first to Rostock; some went by rail through Poland as well. 
Colonel P., his soldiers and family members redeployed to the Soviet Union by aircraft. 
Their destination was Shiroki Lan a training area not far from Nikolaev in southern 
Ukraine.    
Colonel P. was very surprised to learn that I was curious in learning about what 
happened to unit when they arrived at Shiroki Lan. “You are truly interested in that? It is 
really interesting for you? It is really really disconcerting even just to recollect that 
experience. It was pure despair,” he told me. Since his unit had been withdrawn so early 
there was no time for any new barracks or housing units to be built for them in Shiroki 
Lan. Colonel P. recollected, “It is sad. Let us say we went to the training area and there 
was nothing there. But we were a self-sufficient unit so we put up our tents and started 
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cooking…preparing food. And so everything seemed to be alright. Of course, it does not 
mean that you can live like this as a unit all of the time.” He then went into more detail 
on how the unit received its equipment at a railway station nearby. “We came to the 
railway station…near a small town. We unloaded all of our equipment. Three days 
passed and no one came to meet us. But, as a commander, I kind of thought this might 
happen so I made sure that I had mechanics and drivers with me. So after no one came to 
meet us we began to relocate our equipment to our assigned location. I had to do 
this…because the locals had begun to steal from our equipment. Once we got to the 
training area we actually dug a trench around the unit because we did not have enough 
personnel for providing security. We would not shoot the looters. We lived in that open 
field until the fall,” he recalled. When I asked Colonel P. how many months his unit lived 
in the open field it was clear to me that this was a very difficult question for him to 
answer. After telling me that his unit spent five months living in an open field he 
continued with more detail on what it was like for the family members as well. “When it 
became cold we had to relocate to unfinished barracks. We had to use plastic sheeting on 
the windows. Then the families came. Some of the families lived in the military town in a 
building that was not well equipped for living. Some officers’ wives and families took 
one look at that building and just went to live with their parents because the conditions 
were so bad. Within a year they built a small fabricated type of barracks. We lived there 
for a while and then, of course, they inactivated9 the unit,” he explained. This scene was 
repeated was repeated in multiple locations across the Soviet Union between 1991-94. 
The journalist and ZGV veteran Michael Boltunov in his book Gorkaya Doroga Domoi 
(The Bitter Road Home) characterized the situation families faced when returning from 
                                                 
9 When a unit is inactivated its personnel and equipment are redistributed to other units. The unit colors, 
battle streamers etc. and other important  documents are stored in a designated  military archive as well. 
Colonel P. believes the 29
th
 Motorized Rifle Regiment’s documents are in an archive in Kiev.  
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Germany as a disgrace for the head of the family unable to put a roof over the heads of 
his loved ones; unpleasant for mothers, homemakers, one’s own kin and a 
psychologically unforgettable experience for children.10       
Interestingly, at the end of my interview when I was telling Colonel P. about the 
various books I was reading for this project I mentioned I was reading the memoirs of 
General Burlakov. This caught his attention. “Who? Who? He is a very sly person…a 
very interesting person,” he replied. When I asked him if he had met the general he 
responded: “I have seen him…He is the one who lied to us about our withdrawal 
schedule. He told us repeatedly it would be two years and then they withdrew us just one 
month later…He is not a good man. And what he writes…sometimes you have to change 
plus to minus and vice versa. And you have to understand that not all of it is true,” he told 
me.          
 
                                                 
10  Boltunov, Michael, Gorkaya Doroga Domoi, pg. 192 
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Chapter 9: Legacy 
 Between 1945 and 1994 when the last Russian soldiers left German soil more 
than eight million military personnel served in the ZGV. Even before the final parades in 
Berlin in the summer of 1994, General Burlakov and his staff were already taking steps to 
ensure the legacy of Soviet/Russian presence would not be forgotten. This chapter 
addresses their initiatives, the opening of the ZGV museum in Wünsdorf in 2009, and 
concludes with a detailed review of one of the numerous unofficial ZGV websites. 
THE UNION OF VETERANS - ZGV/GSVG  
On February 19, 1994, as a result of an initiative by senior ZGV officers in 
Wünsdorf, The Union of Veterans of the ZGV/GSVG was formed. The Union became the 
legal successor of the ZGV once the withdrawal was completed. Its founding members 
agreed on a set of by-laws and leadership structure. General Burlakov was elected the its 
first president and General-Major Ivanushkin as first vice president. The Union’s 
leadership also included six other flag officers, 13 staff officers, one captain and one civil 
servant. The Russian Federation’s Ministry of Justice officially recognized the Union on 
March 25, 1994. It is considered an open international, non-governmental organization 
and has its headquarters in Moscow.1 The Union’s mission is to maintain the history and 
traditions of the ZGV, provide patriotic-military education for young people, continue to 
build on the friendship, good neighborly relations and trust between the citizens and 
military personnel in Russia, the FRG and CIS countries and expand contacts with other 
veterans’ organizations. Members are issued an individual membership card and small 
bronze pin. It collects membership dues but relies mostly on donations for its operating 
                                                 
1 The Union’s address is: 127055, Moscow, Ul. Novoslobodskaya 62/20.  It does not have an official 
website.    
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costs. In addition to a bank account in Moscow, the Union as of 2005 had a Deutsche 
Bank account in Zossen near Wünsdorf for German citizens interested in becoming 
members or making charitable contributions. In 2004 it had between 15,000-17,000 
members and has its own information flyer. It is also possible to be named an honorary 
member of the union. For example, on June 17, 1994 the former secretary of the German 
Ministry of Defense, Schönbohm was made an honorary member.2     
From August 21 – 26, 2004 a series of special events and commemorations 
marking the 10
th
 anniversary of the completion of the withdrawal were held in Potsdam, 
the capital of the German state of Brandenburg. Invited guests included General Burlakov 
and other former senior officers from the ZGV.  A formal reception was held in the 
Brandenburg Senate building. During the course of the evening several guests from both 
the German and Russian side spoke but it was General Burlakov’s remarks that received 
the most attention. During his speech he thanked his German hosts for the fond memories 
he had of serving in Germany including the fact that his daughter was born in Schwerin 
during his first tour of duty in the ZGV many years earlier. He also thanked 
representatives of the Bundeswehr who were in attendance including General Foertsch. 
His remarks then turned more serious and direct. He said that the politicians in Moscow 
[Gorbachev] and Bonn [Kohl] had no real understanding of the immense problems they 
created when agreeing on the time frame for the withdrawal. Burlakov also stated that 
40% of the returning soldiers and families did not have a place to live when they 
returned, every third marriage ended in divorce and many young people who were 
released from military service had a difficult time adjusting to civilian life.  Surprisingly, 
he also apologized for the inconveniencies (damages to roads and noise from low-flying 
                                                 
2  Mroß, Sie Gingen Als Freunde, pp. 192-3.  
 126 
aircraft) the ZGV had caused for German citizens during the 49 years of years of their 
presence. Towards the end of his remarks Burlakov once again returned to the topic of 
the withdrawal noting that the biggest problem was the discrepancy between the number 
of soldiers and families returning and the number of housing units being built to 
accommodate them. He also remarked that adequate military housing was still a problem 
in Russia 10 years after the withdrawal. Burlakov concluded his remarks by telling the 
audience that all ZGV/GSVG veterans send their warm greetings. 3   
 
 
Illustration 13. General Burlakov (center-left) in Potsdam, August 2004.   
 
 
 
                                                 
3  Ibid. pg. 194.  
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The Union of Veterans ZGV-GSVG holds occasional meeting in Moscow and in 
other regions of Russia. Since it does not have an official website it is difficult to know 
how often they meet, what they discuss. membership numbers etc.. I was, however, able 
to find an article published in the June 26, 2009 edition of Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 
the official newspaper of the Russian military which reported on a recent meeting of the 
union. The article was co-written by the first vice-president of the union, Sergei Volgin 
and Vitali Denisov from Red Star.4 The union had held a meeting the previous day. It was 
called to mark the 64
th
 anniversary of the formation of the forerunner to the ZGV the 
GSOVG in June 1945 (See Chapter 4). General Burlakov, who was still the union’s 
president at the time summarized its history. “During the ZGV’s time in Europe we 
threatened no one and were afraid of no one,” he said. The meeting also addressed the 
planned opening of the new ZGV museum in Wünsdorf and the publication of a new 
book on the Russian-Orthodox Church in Germany and the role it played in supporting 
ZGV soldiers and families. 
THE ZGV MUSEUM IN WÜNSDORF  
70 years after the Second World War began and 15 years after the withdrawal of 
the last unit from Germany the ZGV museum officially opened in Wünsdorf on 
September 1, 2009. General Burlakov, other retired ZGV officers, retired NVA officers, 
local officials and citizens attended the commemoration ceremony. The Russian 
ambassador to Germany, Vladimir V. Kotenev, and Brandenburg’s retired Minister 
President, Manfred Stolpe, presided over the ceremonies.5 Ambassador Kotenev 
concluded his remarks stating: “The opening of this museum is an important addition in 
                                                 
4 The article can be found at:  www.old.redstar.ru/2009/06/26_06/2_02.html, accessed August 5, 2012. 
5 Their abbreviated comments (in German) can be viewed in two videos at: www.grhn.eu. Click the link 
“Roter Stern Wünsdorf”. Accessed August 5, 2012.  
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the continued strengthening of the Russian-German relationship and an important step 
along the path of understanding between our peoples.”6   The Arch Bishop of the Russian 
Orthodox Church in Germany, Feotan, blessed the museum before it was officially 
opened to several hundred attending guests.7    
 
 
Illustration 14. Gen. Burlakov (with cane) at the ZGV Museum, Sept 1, 2009.    
Construction of the new museum was made possible by a charitable donation of 
10,000 Euros by the Russian energy company, Gazprom, as well as support received by 
one of the local German newspapers, Die Markischen Oderzeitung. The museum was a 
welcome addition to the long running exhibition “Daily Life of a Soldier in Wünsdorf” 
                                                 
6 The complete text of  Ambassador Kotenev’s remarks (in German) can be viewed at: www.russische-
botschaft.de. Accessed August 5, 2012. 
7 A summary of the opening ceremony can be found at www.grhn.eu. Click the link “Roter Stern 
Wünsdorf”. Accessed August 5, 2012.  
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which I had the opportunity to visit several times between 2001-2007 while stationed in 
Germany.    
 
 
Illustration 15. “Daily Life of a Soldier in Wünsdorf” Display.  
 
ZGV WEBSITES: A CASE STUDY    
If one does an internet search with the Russian acronym ЗГВ the results return 
more than 260,000 “hits”. If one uses the other Russian acronym designating the ZGV,  
ГСВГ, the results are even more impressive 483,000 “hits”. These include 629 on 
YOUTUBE for ЗГВ and 1900 for ГСВГ.  Obviously, it would be impossible to view each 
and every one of these sites and provide analysis of the kind of content they have etc. 
What I would like to do, however, is take a closer look at what I believe to be one of the 
more informative sites about the ZGV on the internet. The site is www.gsvg.ru. To make 
things a little easier I will refer to this site as “gsvg.ru” for the remainder of the chapter. I 
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have also included a “screen shot” of the site below. My goal here is to provide the reader 
with an overview of the site’s extensive content.   
 
Figure 13: Screen shot of an unofficial ZGV website www.gsvg.ru.  
The site gsvg.ru was founded at the end of 2001 and is managed by a ZGV veteran 
who served in Germany from 1987 – 1992. It  currently averages about 18,000 “hits” per 
month. It is a non-profit site. Visitors can post comments but there is not a format for 
blogging about a specific topic or unit. The site allows the viewer to click on seven 
different categories to access more detailed information. The categories are: “About Me”, 
“Search for Friends of the ZGV”, “Photo Gallery”, “Materials concerning the ZGV”, 
“Articles related to Germany and the ZGV”, “Articles related to Allies during WWII” and 
finally “Services, additional materials and links”. 
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“About Me” as one would expect is the website’s owner’s biography which 
includes an extensive narrative of his service in the ZGV as well as several photos. 
“Search for Friends of the ZGV” is divided into three sections. The first section allows a 
viewer to post a message for other visitors to the site to see. Most of the posts I reviewed 
are statements from other ZGV veterans on when and where they served. The second 
section is dedicated to the recollections of veterans of the Great Patriotic War and the 
ZGV. While there are many recollections from the former there are currently only three 
from the latter. The last section is for guests from Germany who, in one way or another, 
had a connection to the ZGV between 1945-1994. As of early August 2012 one German 
has posted an entry there. According to his “post” he is currently working on a new book 
on the ZGV and was is involved in the opening of the Red Star Museum which I 
discussed in the previous section above. “Photo Gallery” contains, as one would also 
expect, numerous photographs. Topics include: ZGV garrisons, ZGV military equipment, 
Soviet and Nazi propaganda posters and a complete list of all former ZGV commanders. 
“Materials concerning the ZGV” contains a brief history of the group, numerous 
directives the GSOVG and SMAG issued in the summer of 1945 (covered in Chapter 4), a 
full text of the withdrawal treaty signed in October 1990, and a detailed listing of ZGV 
units. “Articles related to Germany and the ZGV” contains information about Soviet 
GULAG’s in eastern Germany at the end of World War II, the NVA, The Berlin Wall, the 
East German Railway system and the East German State Security Service better known 
as STASI. “Articles related to Allies during WWII” includes accounts of the British 
“Rhein Army” in West Germany, a 3D map showing the locations of American military 
forces during the Cold War, information about the German-Russian Museum in Berlin-
Karlshort and details on the numerous Soviet monuments and cemeteries located in 
Berlin. This section includes what I believe to be one of the more interesting documents 
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posted on the site. It is a scanned copy of an invitation signed by Stalin to the 
commemoration of the Soviet War Memorial in Treptow Park on May 8, 1949 (See 
Figure 14 below). “Services, additional materials and links” provides the viewer with an 
extensive list of recommended books on the ZGV  as well a number of documentary films 
including a few that were produced by the ZGV’s television station in Wünsdorf 
discussed in Chapter 5. Also of note is a section on songs and music of the ZGV. Lyrics 
and audio versions of the “Hymn of the ZGV” are provided and well as several other 
songs such as “Tanker’s March” and “We, The Army of the People.” There are links to 
more than 130 other sites including Russian military units and blogs for veterans of 
individual ZGV units. Lastly, there are several links to many but not all of the almost 100 
schools which the children of ZGV servicemen and women attended.   
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Figure 14: Invitation to the Commemoration of Soviet War Memorial, 1949.  
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Conclusion 
            The withdrawal of the ZGV from Germany between 1990-1994 was the largest 
peacetime withdraw of military forces since the end of the Second World War. In the 
course of less than four years more than 550,000 soldiers, NCOs, officers, their family 
members and civil servants returned to their homelands across the Soviet Union. If one 
also includes the withdrawals of the others groups of forces from Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland, which occurred during the same period, the total number of people 
who returned to the Soviet Union and after 1991 to the newly independent states of the 
Former Soviet Union (FSU) was over 750,000. Demographically, it was one of the 
largest migrations in Europe since 1945.1 One should also remember the withdrawals 
from the western façade of the Soviet Empire were occurring at the same time Soviet 
military forces and associated personnel were leaving Cuba, the Baltic States and 
Mongolia. For the first time since the beginning of Operation Barbarossa in the summer 
of 1941, the Soviet military was in full-scale “retreat.”  
      Having reflected on the topics that I have discussed in this thesis I believe three 
important areas deserve final comment. They are: Gorbachev’s decision to agree with 
Helmut Kohl to a three-four year withdrawal of the ZGV during their summit in July of 
1990, discrepancies between the official history of the ZGV’s withdrawal and what really 
happened on the ground and finally, the current historiography of the ZGV. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The largest peaceful migration since 1945 occurred in Bulgaria beginning in 1989 when the Bulgarian 
government passed a law requiring more than 800,000 Turks to leave the country. I am  grateful to Dr. 
Jordan for pointing this out to me. 
 135 
      Without question Gorbachev’s decision to agreeing to a three-four withdrawal of the 
ZGV with Helmut Kohl during their summit near Stravropol in July 1990 was the most 
controversial and consequential. From the available historical record that I used to 
examine his decision I can find no evidence that Gorbachev consulted with senior Soviet 
military officials about the feasibility of a three-four year withdrawal prior to or during  
the summit. While Gorbachev was aware that thousands of housing units would be 
needed to accommodate returning serviceman and their families it appears that either he 
ignored or did not fully consider the fact that these units needed to be built prior to the 
initiation of the withdrawal. Instead, as we have seen from the recollections of Colonel P. 
in Chapter 8, the exact opposite happened. Units’ personnel, equipment and family 
members arrived to their “new” locations and found nothing but an open fields. Soviet 
military districts, regions and their supporting infrastructures across the Soviet Union 
discussed in Chapter 2 were designed to “push” men and material to the Western Military 
Theater of Operation not to receive them. They were utterly unprepared to accept such 
large numbers of personnel and equipment once the withdrawal began. Gorbachev’s 
decision also disenfranchised many senior military officers and was a contributing factor 
in the attempted putsch against him in August 1991. General Burlakov, in an interview 
some years after the withdrawal, reflected on Gorbachev’s decision in the following way: 
“A squadron [of aircraft] was supposed to return to the homeland…wives of the pilots ran 
out on the tarmac and refused to let the aircraft take off and fly to an area in northern 
Russia where there was nothing other than an airstrip…there was nothing. There is 
always a sense of pain in me…real pain over this…the withdrawal was planned in such a 
way that made the Germans happy. For our own people nobody gave a damn. I can only 
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say that our political leaders…Gorbachev and Yeltsin…used the same old Russian 
tradition of creating problems for other people to see how they react.2 Another senior 
officer, General Gribkov, the last Warsaw Pact Commander was even more direct in his 
hostility towards Gorbachev. “Already in 1989 when he [Gorbachev] was in the GDR it 
was clear that he had already sold the GDR down the river. Kohl did not expect such a 
gift and now he [Kohl] goes around saying ‘Germany is number one’…that 
Gorbachev…If I would see him now I would spit in his face.”3 During my time as a staff 
officer in the military we were constantly being reminded when planning a military 
operation that one needed to think through the third and fourth order effects a particular 
decision would have as a result of our military actions. Determining these effects often 
requires a great deal of time and analysis. Gorbachev and his advisers chose to do neither 
in July 1990 and as a result ZGV personnel and their family members experienced 
enormous stress and, in countless cases, as Colonel P. recalled, sheer despair. 
       The official history of the ZGV’s withdrawal which I have cited numerous times in 
this thesis often conflicted with other sources I used in my research. For example, the 
official history makes no mention of the ethnic tensions within ZGV units Andriy K.  
described in Chapter 8. He was correct when he told me during my interview with him 
that officers would never talk about. Indeed, Colonel P., the officer I interviewed made 
no mention of these conflicts. Also missing in the official history is any 
acknowledgement of the tragic shooting of two German children by a ZGV soldier in 
Fürstenberg on June 11, 1987. According to the father, Horst B. the Soviet soldier was 
never prosecuted nor was he given a proper explanation of the events surrounding the 
                                                 
2  Klemke & Lorenzen,  Roter Stern über Deutschland, VHS tape, Part III viewed July 2012.  
3  Ibid. 
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shootings.4 Finally, while the official history acknowledged the fact that the pace of the 
withdrawal of personnel exceeded the number of housing units being built in Belorussia, 
Russia and Ukraine, there is no mention of the hardships encountered by units and family 
members as they arrived to their new locations. It simply states that returning units were 
integrated with other existing military forces in Russia and continued their “fighting 
tradition with the holy obligation of the defense of the fatherland.”5       
       The discrepancies between the “official history” of the withdrawal of ZGV and other 
accounts including the recollections of individuals like Andriy K. and Colonel P.,  leads 
me to my final concluding remarks which are about the current historiography of the 
ZGV. In historical terms the ZGV’s withdrawal is a relatively recent event. Therefore, it is 
not a surprising that there have been only a handful of few books written in the past 20 
years which address its history. Other than the official history, Sovetskie Voiska v 
Germanii 1990-1994, I was only able to find two other books in Russian that deal with 
the topic. They are: Boltunov’s The Bitter Road Home (1995) and Basistov’s Under The 
Red Star (2005). German scholarship on the topic is more robust. Since 2004 at least nine  
books have appeared on various aspects of the ZGV the most recent being published in 
December 2011.6 Scholarship in the English language is virtually non-existent. The only 
two books I was able to find were the late professor David Cox’s Retreating from the 
Cold War (1996) and the poorly translated English version of a Slovak Ministry of 
Defenses publication The Great Withdrawal (2005).  
 
 
                                                 
4  Ibid. 
5  Burlakov, Sovetskie Voiska v Germanii, pg. 290.  
6  A complete listing of these books can be found in the bibliography.    
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       On August 23, 2004 just a few days before the official ceremonies in Potsdam 
marking the 10th anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet Forces from Germany, the late 
General Burlakov7 penned a noteworthy comment at the beginning of Lutz Freundt’s 
Rote Plätze: Russische Militärflugplätze in Deutschland 1945-1994: “We were in 
Germany for 49 years. The history of the GSVG/ ZGV needs to be written. We were a 
part of it.”8 The definitive history of the withdrawal of the ZGV let alone a complete 
history of its 49 years in divided and then reunited Germany has yet to be written. My 
hope is that my efforts to synthesize currently available English, German and Russian 
sources have at least scratched the surface of what I what I believe to be a promising 
topic of historical inquiry by future historians.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7  General Burlakov died in February 2011 at the age of 76. 
8  Freundt, Rote Plätze: Russische Militärflugplätze in Deutschland 1945-1994. Pg. 3. 
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Appendix A: Disposition of GSVG Forces 19561  
  
                                                 
1 This map is from a recently declassified 1957 US Army report on the Soviet forces in East Germany. See 
USAREUR G2, Soviet Order of Battle Handbook, GSFG, and Installations List, Soviet Zone, Germany, 
Carlisle, PA: US Army Military History Institute.   
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Appendix B: Treaty on the Final Settlement 
The Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, the French 
Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, 
 
Conscious of the fact that their peoples have been living together in peace since 1945; 
 
Mindful of the recent historic changes in Europe which make it possible to overcome the 
division of the continent; 
 
Having regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers relating to Berlin and 
to Germany as a whole, and the corresponding wartime and post-war agreements and 
decisions of the Four Powers; 
 
Resolved, in accordance with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to 
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace; 
 
Recalling the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe, signed in Helsinki; 
 
Recognizing that those principles have laid firm foundations for the establishment of a 
just and lasting peaceful order in Europe; 
 
Determined to take account of everyone's security interests; 
 
Convinced of the need finally to overcome antagonism and to develop cooperation in 
Europe; 
 
Confirming their readiness to reinforce security, in particular by adopting effective arms 
control, disarmament and confidence-building measures; their willingness not to regard 
each other as adversaries but to work for a relationship of trust and cooperation; and 
accordingly their readiness to consider positively setting up appropriate institutional 
arrangements within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe; 
 141 
 
Welcoming the fact that the German people, freely exercising their right of self-
determination, have expressed their will to bring about the unity of Germany as a state so 
that they will be able to serve the peace of the world as an equal and sovereign partner in 
a united Europe; 
 
Convinced that the unification of Germany as a state with definitive borders is a 
significant contribution to peace and stability in Europe; 
 
Intending to conclude the final settlement with respect to Germany; 
 
Recognizing that thereby, and with the unification of Germany as a democratic and 
peaceful state, the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers relating to Berlin and to 
Germany as a whole lose their function; 
 
Represented by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs who, in accordance with the Ottawa 
Declaration of 13 February 1990, met in Bonn on 5 May 1990, in Berlin on 22 June 
1990, in Paris on 17 July 1990 with the participation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Poland, and in Moscow on 12 September 1990; 
 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
ARTICLE 1 
 
(1) The united Germany shall comprise the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the German Democratic Republic and the whole of Berlin. Its external borders shall be 
the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic 
and shall be definitive from the date on which the present Treaty comes into force. The 
confirmation of the definitive nature of the borders of the united Germany is an essential 
element of the peaceful order in Europe. 
 
(2) The united Germany and the Republic of Poland shall confirm the existing border 
between them in a treaty that is binding under international law. 
 
(3) The united Germany has no territorial claims whatsoever against other states and 
shall not assert any in the future. 
 
(4) The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic shall ensure that the constitution of the united Germany does not contain any 
provision incompatible with these principles. This applies accordingly to the provisions 
laid down in the preamble, the second sentence of Article 23, and Article 146 of the 
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. 
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(5) The Governments of the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of 
America take formal note of the corresponding commitments and declarations by the 
Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic 
and declare that their implementation will confirm the definitive nature of the united 
Germany's borders. 
 
ARTICLE 2 
 
The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic reaffirm their declarations that only peace will emanate from German soil. 
According to the constitution of the united Germany, acts tending to and undertaken with 
the intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for 
aggressive war, are unconstitutional and a punishable offence. The Governments of the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic declare that the 
united Germany will never employ any of its weapons except in accordance with its 
constitution and the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
ARTICLE 3 
 
(1) The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic reaffirm their renunciation of the manufacture and possession of and control 
over nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. They declare that the united Germany, 
too, will abide by these commitments. In particular, rights and obligations arising from 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968 will continue to 
apply to the united Germany. 
 
(2) The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, acting in full agreement with 
the Government of the German Democratic Republic, made the following statement on 
30 August 1990 in Vienna at the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: 
 
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes to reduce the personnel 
strength of the armed forces of the united Germany to 370,000 (ground, air and naval 
forces) within three to four years. This reduction will commence on the entry into force 
of the first CFE agreement. Within the scope of this overall ceiling no more than 345,000 
will belong to the ground and air forces which, pursuant to the agreed mandate, alone are 
the subject to the Negotations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The Federal 
Government regards its commitment to reduce ground and air forces as a signficant 
German contribution to the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe. It assumes 
that in follow-on negotiations the other participants in the negotiations, too, will render 
their contribution to enhancing security and stability in Europe, including measures to 
limit personnel strengths. 
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The Government of the German Democratic Republic has expressly associated itself with 
this statement. 
 
(3) The Governments of the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of 
America take note of these statements by the Governments of the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the German Democratic Republic. 
 
ARTICLE 4 
 
(1) The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic 
Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics state that the united Germany and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will settle by treaty the conditions for and the 
duration of the presence of Soviet armed forces on the territory of the present German 
Democratic Republic and of Berlin, as well as the conduct of the withdrawal of these 
armed forces which will be completed by the end of 1994, in connection with the 
implementation of the undertaking of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German 
Democratic Republic referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the present Treaty. 
 
(2) The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the United States of America take note of this statement. 
 
ARTICLE 5 
 
(1) Until the completion of the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces for the territory of 
the present German Democratic Republic and of Berlin in accordance with Article 4 of 
the present Treaty, only German territorial defence units which are not integrated into the 
alliance structures to which German armed forces in the rest of German territory are 
assigned will be stationed in that territory as armed forces of the united Germany. During 
that period and subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article, armed forces of 
other states will not be stationed in that territory or carry out any other military activity 
there. 
 
(2) For the duration of the presence of Soviet armed forces in the territory of the present 
German Democratic Republic and of Berlin, armed forces of the French Republic, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America 
will, upon German request, remain stationed in Berlin by agreement to this effect 
between the Government of the united Germany and the Govenments of the states 
concerned. The number of troops and the amount of equipment of all non-German armed 
forces stationed in Berlin will not be greater than at the time of signature of the present 
Treaty. New categories of weapons will not be introduced there by non-German armed 
forces. The Government of the united Germany will conclude with the Governments of 
those states which have armed forces stationed in Berlin treaties with conditions which 
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are fair taking account of the relations existing with the states concerned. 
 
(3) Following the completion of the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces from the 
territory of the present German Democratic Republic and of Berlin, units of German 
armed forces assigned to military alliance structures in the same way as those in the rest 
of German territory may also be stationed in that part of Germany, but without nuclear 
weapon carriers. This does not apply to conventional weapon systems which may have 
other capabilities in addition to conventional ones but which in that part of Germany are 
equipped for a conventional role and designated only for such. Foreign armed forces and 
nuclear weapons or their carriers will not be stationed in that part of Germany or 
deployed there. 
 
ARTICLE 6 
 
The right of the united Germany to belong to alliances, with all the rights and 
responsibilities arising therefrom, shall not be affected by the present Treaty. 
 
ARTICLE 7 
 
(1) The French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America hereby terminate 
their rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole. As a result, 
the corresponding, related quadripartite agreements, decisions and practices are 
terminated and all related Four Power institutions are dissolved. 
 
(2) The United Germany shall have accordingly full sovereignty over its internal and 
external affairs. 
 
ARTICLE 8 
 
(1) The present Treaty is subject to ratification or acceptance as soon as possible. On the 
German side it will be ratified by the united Germany. The Treaty will therefore apply to 
the united Germany. 
 
(2) The instruments of ratification or acceptance shall be deposited with the Government 
of the united Germany. That Government shall inform the Governments of the other 
Contracting Parties of the deposit of each instrument of ratification or acceptance. 
 
ARTICLE 9 
 
The present Treaty shall enter into force for the united Germany, the French Republic, 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the United States of America on the date of deposit of the last 
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instrument of ratification or acceptance by these states. 
 
ARTICLE 10 
 
The original of the present Treaty, of which the English, French, German and Russian 
texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, which shall transmit certified true copies to the Governments of 
the other Contracting Parties. 
Source: American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1990. Department of State, 
Washington, 1991.  
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Appendix C: Disposition of ZGV Forces2 
 
 
                                                 
2 Burlakov, Sovetskie Voiska v Germanii, pg. 14. Modified by the author. 
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Appendix D: Transit Routes through Poland3 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Krogulski, Mariusz. Okupacja w Imie Sojuszu: Armia Radiecka w Polsce 1956-1993, 
Warsawa:Wydawnictwo von borowiecky, 2001, pg. 179. Modified by the author. Special thanks 
to Slawomir Lotysz from the University of Zielona Gora in Poland for sending me a copy of the 
map.   
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Appendix E:  Interviews with former ZGV Soldiers4 
 
Interview with Andriy K, Kiev, July 2011 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  As you know I would like to interview you about your service in the 
ZGV. I have 14 prepared questions for you and there will be some additional questions as 
well. The first question: What years did you serve in the ZGV, in what city, in what 
branch of the armed forces, in which units and, if possible, please give the specific names 
of the units? 
 
Andriy K:  Number of my unit...[contemplating] well…hmm…I served in two different 
units. In the fall of 1988 I was drafted. It was the fall draft in November. They drafted me 
from the city of Kherson. First from Skadovsk to Kherson and then to Simferopol where 
we were issued military uniforms. Within a week of arriving there we were then loaded 
on to a civilian airliner. The aircraft was borrowed from a regular service to deliver us to 
East Germany; they even had sexy flight attendants and they gave us food and drinks! 
We flew to Falkenberg, first I think, and stayed in leaking and poorly heated tents for two 
nights. It was a very cold year and all we had were summer uniforms because in 
Simferopol they gave us only light clothes; they gave us an overcoat but still it was very 
cold.   
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Was it Frankfurt an der Oder where they sent you?  
 
Andriy K:   Yes, of course an der Oder…We could not go to the other Frankfurt 
[laughter]. There we spent several days and were always very cold. The logistics were 
very poor. The food was very bad especially in comparison to home-cooked food and  
Army standards. We ate boiled grains of wheat and drank hot water. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  How long did you spend there?  
 
Andriy K:   Three nights and we spent most of our time out in the open. There was only 
one hangar there so most of the unit was in the open waiting to get into the hangar in a 
line. So once you got into the hangar you obviously wanted to go to the toilet but the 
                                                 
4  Special thanks to Dr. Jordan for translating these interviews into English for me.     
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toilets were in the street. So one went out again and after the toilet you get at the end of 
the line and it was very cold and snowing. They gave us these big barrels in which they 
usually sell kvas…you know those yellow ones; they are all over here in Kiev and they 
usually sold kvas from it. Well…in those barrels they brought us hot water so we would 
warm ourselves by drinking it and eating the porridge. We had five minutes to get into 
the cafeteria and go out again. Afterwards they put us on the German trains which had 
very small cars; there were too many people in those cars. There were 14 people for a 
compartment that normally seats six…can you imagine that? Four to five people sat in 
the compartment on one side and four to five others sat across from them. One person 
would be lying on their laps. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  On the floor?  
 
Andriy K:  No…not on the floor on the “lap of luxury” [jokingly]. And then two or 
maybe even four persons were up in the upper berths. And they did not give us any water. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  No water? And how long did it take you to get to your final 
destination? 
 
Andriy K:  It took us 24 hours to get to Weimar. Toilets were not available. They 
forbade us to use the toilets. It was very hard…I cannot tell you all the details. The only 
thing we were allowed to do which was actually forbidden was to go into the open areas 
near the station…At first they actually did not allow us to do anything like that at the 
stations so the Germans could not see this. But…when we were at stations where there 
were no people we could take our mugs and put snow in them. When the snow thawed 
there was a little bit of water in it and that was the only water we got.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  How long did you spend in Simferopol? Did you receive any training 
there?  
 
Andriy K:  No. We only spent one week. It was not…the training did not begin there. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  So…when did the training begin?  
 
Andriy K:  Ah…first they brought us to Weimar and that is where they distributed us to 
specific training schools. But…before that we again spent some time in open fields in 
tents and again it was very cold. I do not remember being as cold as I was that winter.   
 
Elliott Nowacky:  What was your specialty? 
 
Andriy K:  I eventually became  a driver and mechanic for a 2S-1 [a self-propelled 
122mm howitzer] and then we went to Potsdam where they had an artillery training 
school. An oochebka as we called it. It was located on a former Wehrmacht base. That is 
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where they trained us to become drivers; how to maintain our equipment etc. That is 
where I where I spent a half a year. There the order was fantastic; it was very clean. We 
kept things clean and we did it all the time; that is where we underwent training and the 
discipline was very severe…but that was needed. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  What is oochebka? 
 
Andriy K:  Oochebka is short for training school. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Where was it located? In the center of Potsdam or on the outskirts? 
 
Andriy K:  It was on the outskirts of the city near Hafel canal. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  So you were not in Wünsdorf? 
 
Andriy K:  No. So we were not very far from West Berlin and not very far from an 
airport because the PAN-AM jets flew right over our heads. The PAN-AM jets were 
landing all of the time. And we were looking at them and saying “I wish I were on one of 
those planes.” There was also the summer residence of Goebbels where he had his house. 
There was a big park there and all of the buildings were German buildings. And there 
were even eagles there with their heads cut off. It was a part of history. We were not 
allowed to go to the city. We just stayed within the confines of the unit. All we did was 
run with our automatic weapons. So…I spent a half of year there beginning in the winter 
of 1988 through the spring of 1989. While we were there we tried some products for the 
first time. All of the Eastern European products were very interesting for us; they differed 
from the Soviet products so much. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Were you able to watch some TV programs? 
 
Andriy K:  Yes, we watched ZDF. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Did you watch any western German programs? 
 
Andriy K:  Oh…there must have been some…It was not forbidden but I do not 
remember. But every day religiously at nine o’clock in the evening we watched the 
program Vremya that lasted for forty minutes with all of the latest news from the Soviet 
Union.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  What was your typical work day like?  
 
Andriy K:  Um…typical working day…We got up at six o’clock in the morning and did 
some exercises and then we ran for a long long time.  
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Elliott Nowacky:  For an hour? We also ran for an hour. 
 
Andriy K:  Maybe an hour maybe one and a half hours. It was long and we just ran and 
ran without clothes on the upper torso. And then we had to piss on command. It was a 
very loud command: “Everyone has to piss now.” That was the order and we were given 
two minutes; we were standing all in a row to do that. I personally could not do that…I 
had to wait until I went back to the barracks. I am an intelligentsia person. After that we 
washed up,  got dressed and then we had morning inspection; that’s where they looked at 
our conditions; how we were feeling and then they checked how me made our beds…The 
bed had to be perfect…perfection…next to Godliness. Believe me…there were 
instruments…special rulers to measure the angles at which the pillows and towels were 
positioned. They had to be in a perfect order…just this direct way…and our 
nightstands…they also checked our nightstands. Inside there had to be one’s comb…no 
excuse me… one’s toothbrush, toothpaste and a comb. And they also had to be put in a 
certain order. We did not have many things in our nightstands. The nightstands were 
checked every morning. We could have a notebook in there…a pen…a book that we 
studied, a textbook and letters. There were no cigarettes there because there was a lot of 
stealing. The soldiers stole from each other. People from Central Asia stole most. But 
then…everyone stole…maybe not everyone…half of the soldiers stole. I first 
encountered this when we arrived to Germany when we were sleeping in the tents or in 
the hangars. Every night one expected that even if you slept with your rucksack beneath 
your head they would steal cigarettes from it. We did not have anything more than 
cigarettes. Well, after inspection we went to breakfast and according to the rules we only 
had two minutes to eat breakfast. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Just two minutes? 
 
Andriy K:  We ate a little bit longer…But it still was very fast…We literally inhaled the 
food. After breakfast we had five minutes of personal time that we used to just stand 
there…not in formation…not in a row…and have a smoke. And after that we went to our 
classes where we studied principles of engine mechanics.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Transmissions? 
 
Andriy K:  Yes, transmissions, the other units studied how to shoot [artillery]. There 
were different specializations. So we did all of this until lunchtime which lasted for seven 
minutes. And then we had other different tasks…for instance we had to clean our 
weapons and we always had to clean up; that was constant. We did a lot of cleaning. The 
other activity was OZK (All-Army Defensive Komplex).  That is…where we trained to 
protect ourselves against biological and chemical weapons. One of the skills that we 
needed to learn was how to quickly put on our protective mask. The other task would be 
to make sure that all of the other equipment was in order…All cleaned and accounted 
for…We also had to make our own identification tags which were made from wood. You 
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actually needed to find a piece of wood and write your name on it in beautiful letters…I 
emphasize very beautifully…and then attach it to your rucksack. So we did a lot of OZK 
training and cleaning of weapons. The weapons were always dirty. You can always find 
some dirt in them. The sergeant would take a white handkerchief and put it inside the 
weapon and will find some dirt. Even if the weapons were not used there would still be 
some dust. And then we had physical training…we ran with automatic 
weapons…machine guns…in the forest. And then we had other kinds of tasks called 
nayad which is a task for one day. The worst for me was to serve in the kitchen because 
you had to clean it and peel potatoes. Very hard work for 24 hours.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  How long did this tasking last for? 
 
Andriy K: 24 hours beginning at five o’clock in the evening and ending at five o’clock 
in the evening the next day. And then there was a task to work in a pig sty. Soldiers 
usually liked it because the Army rules did not quite apply there because you could 
smoke or eat at any time you wanted. But it stank a lot and there were a lot of rats. But 
people still liked it because it was almost like it was not in the Army but outside the 
Army. I personally did not like that tasking. Those were the two taskings that I disliked 
the most. There was another type of assignment where you stood at the gates of the 
barracks and it was…you had to do it for 24 hours. The tasking  is called – dnevalnyi. If 
someone came in you saluted them. We rotated every two- three hours. 
 
Elliott Nowacky: How many soldiers were there in the unit?    
  
Andriy K: 2000 
 
Elliott Nowacky: And all of them were artillerymen? 
 
Andriy K:  Yes, they were all artillerymen of different specialties but only of the self-
propelled artillery. 
 
Elliott Nowacky: So what did you do during your time during the day and the evening?  
 
Andriy K: In the evening we had to put our uniform in order again. One of the main 
things was to was to put white cloth on the collar of our uniform. Every evening we 
would sew on a white piece of cloth on our collars. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Every day?  How long did it take?   
 
Andriy K:  Not very long… 
 
Elliott Nowacky: Depending on the person I bet.  
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Andriy K:  Yeh…it did not take a long time. The main thing was to find the white cloth 
because they only gave us a limited amount so you ran out of it very quickly. So when we 
did it we had to take the white cloth…the piece of cloth from our collar…wash it…iron it 
and reattach it again. Or we could take the used one and flip it and re-attach it again since 
the reverse side was not so dirty.  Believe me…that collar was like hard currency…that 
and also the horseshoe for your boots…it had to be a very special type of horseshoe and 
you needed to make it yourself. Again…you had to find a piece of metal and then make a 
horseshoe out of it and attach it to the heel of your boots so when you walked it would 
make a very distinct metallic noise. It was believed that they preserved the heels of boots 
from wearing off too quickly. 
 
Elliott Nowacky: Did you have free time in the evening to write letters home perhaps? 
 
Andriy K: Yeh…yeh we did write letters. Sometimes during the day if we had some free 
time. Also – rarely though – good officers reminded us to write more letters home. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Did you work every day including Sundays?  
 
Andriy K:  Sunday was a day off.  They gave us different food. They gave us one boiled 
egg and even butter…two pieces of butter one in the morning and the other the evening.  
Sometimes, if we were lucky we got some white bread. They gave us an hour of free time 
but we could not go anywhere from the barracks so we could only go to this one store, we 
all called it cheepok. There was another store that sold tea…so you could but some tea 
and drink it with honey but we had very little money. 
 
Elliott Nowacky: How much money did you receive each month? 
 
Andriy K: [laughter] It was still during the GDR so I still usually got 25 marks. And 
from that little bit of money you had to buy toothpaste and shoe polish for the boots. 
 
Elliott Nowacky: You had to buy the toothpaste yourselves?  
 
Andriy K: Yes, you had to buy that. That is why it was stolen constantly. So you had to 
buy toothpaste plus you had to give five marks to the so called platoon “fund” so when he 
demobilized and went home he could buy presents for his family. It was such a tradition.  
 
Elliott Nowacky: How many people were in the platoon? 
 
Andriy K: 30 soldiers and four sergeants. One of them had served for six months, the 
other one year and the third for a year and a half/almost two years and he was “old”; he 
was a grandfather. And you gave that money so he would be nice to you.  He was very 
nonchalant. So we all had to give money for those presents before he went back home to 
the Soviet Union. An officer would take him into the city to buy those presents. 
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Elliott Nowacky: After Potsdam you went to your regular unit? 
 
Andriy K: Yes…it was in the city of Plauen. I do not remember if it was in Thüringen or 
Saxony. That is where I served for a year and a half. My life there was even worse than in 
the artillery training school.  
 
Elliott Nowacky: Really? It was even worse?   
    
Andriy K: It was very unlucky regiment for me. It was an infantry regiment. We called it 
the Chinese regiment because there were too many soldiers from Central Asia and 
Azerbaijan. We had a lot of ethnic conflict in that unit. There is such a phenomena we 
called zemlyatchestvo. It is like…nepotism. When people come from one place they 
support each other. When you have a concentration of Uzbek soldiers, Armenians, Azeris 
etc. they start forming like…a mafia group. At those times…it was the end of the 
1980s…the ethnic conflicts that took place in the country [the Soviet Union] also 
reflected themselves in the Army. It was not a fair way of life. For instance 
Uzbeks…there were many of them…they worked as cooks in the kitchen…in the 
warehouses…in the heating plants…They had a lot of food there. They cooked for 
themselves and distributed food among their own compatriots. So they behaved like an 
elite group among us. And we had to clean up after them all the time and they very often 
behaved like jerks. For instance you go to the cafeteria to have a meal and all of the 
cooks were Uzbeks so they would give meat to the other Uzbeks and to us they would 
give a piece of boiled fat with pig hair sticking out of it. Something inedible. So I fought 
a lot. I fought back from the very beginning. The first day…you know I used to play the 
guitar and I sang some Soviet songs…And there was this Armenian guy who worked in 
the bath house [Bannya] which was the best assignment.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  In the bathhouse?  
 
Andriy K: Yes. It’s a big bath house for the regiment. The only place to wash ourselves. 
There were no showers in the barracks and once a week we went to this bania where a 
couple of hundred soldiers would strip naked, grab a washbasin and carry it to the hot 
water room where you a very limited time to get hot water waiting in line and wash.  
Armenians ran this place. It was considered a lucky job as they didn’t have to do all of 
the service routines and they didn’t have to follow the schedule. So he worked there and 
never participated in formations or other routines as cleaning,  marching drills etc. So he 
worked there and he came every evening to sleep. So one evening he comes in and he 
says…and I was already singing a song…”you…sit here next to my bed because I cannot 
hear you quite well.” So I took my guitar and I took a stool and I went towards him, put 
my guitar down and struck his head with that stool with such force that the stool actually 
broke. I was beaten severely after that. But after this incident no one touched me and no 
one came up to me and said “you do this for me and you do that for me.” So I could 
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actually stand in the formation the way I wanted. Sometimes I did not even follow the 
commands and no one gave me any hard times about that. Of course, if the commander 
came up to us I had to behave myself. By the way the commander of our unit was a 
sergeant from Siberia who was a complete idiot…a complete imbecile. But I decided that 
I would need to find a common language with him and he knew also that if he did not get 
along with me there will be difficulties because I worked with [Major] P and he is not the 
type of person who majors in a conflict but he is very principled. If there was something 
wrong with the discipline or something wrong and not working in his vehicle then there 
would be repercussions. And as a mechanic and driver I was person number one for 
[Major] P. I was not a 2S-1 driver…I drove the headquarters command vehicle which 
was similar to a 2S-1 but was a little bit more complex. It had some electronic equipment 
including a ballistic computer for doing artillery firing computations.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  And a radio? 
 
Andriy K:  Oh yes…a radio [laughter] and I could listen to the music from western radio 
stations. This is where I first learned about FM stations.      
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Ok…and now the second question. During your time in the ZGV was 
your family with you in Germany or back home? 
 
Andriy K:  Oh… they were back in Skadovsk…far away…Mom and dad were there and 
you could not see them. But… [Major] P sent me on a vacation. It was a rare thing. You 
have to be very lucky. Just two people out of 2000 a year could go on a break like that 
and only for 10 days.    
 
Elliott Nowacky: Out of 2000?  
 
Andriy K:  Yes…out of 2000. You had to go all by yourself by train from Germany. 
That was unusual. [Major] P sent me home just three months before the end of my 
service obligation. It wasn’t really necessary but since it was summer and my home was 
on the beach and all of my friends had already returned from the service elsewhere… I 
said “oh, ok…thank you.” I bought a guitar for my friends and I traveled home on a train 
all by myself across Germany and some parts of USSR. It was fun. On the way back the 
German train I took was already running across borders between the Germanies and if I 
didn’t step down from the train in Plauen I could have crossed the border and got off in 
Munich. But I carried home food and the guitar for the boys. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Question number three…Describe your usual work day in Plauen. 
You already told me about your work day in Potsdam. How many days did you spend at 
the training area? 
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Andriy K:  I must say that in 1989 we went to the training area four times; each of these 
times we spent one month there. These were long deployments. In 1990 we went only 
once in the spring. In the fall there were no deployments to the training areas anymore; 
there were no deployments to the training areas in the fall at all.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Where was your training area? Far from Plauen? How long did it take 
to get there?  
 
Andriy K:  Oh…yes…that was quite spectacle…can you imagine an Uzbek soldier who 
is driving a 2S-1 on the streets of Germany…can you imagine that churka…that 
monster…that ugly mug driving that? Look…so three times we were at Lieberose near 
Cottbus…you know Cottbus? 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Yes, I do.  
 
Andriy K:  It is a big, enormous training area and it belonged to the Soviet Union so that 
is where we conducted artillery gunnery three times. And one time we practiced near 
Dresden. We also had a local training area that was located not far from our barracks [in 
Plauen] but we did not shoot [artillery] there. We only shot [artillery] at Lieberose or near 
Dresden. That is where I had some serious practice and I worked closely with [Major] P 
and learned a lot of skills. When it came to the logistics again it was quite bad. We lived 
in tents. The tents were of very poor quality. Sometimes they just went up in flames. We 
used to have stoves in them. And again they were very cramped. There were 16 people in 
one tent and we could only sleep…we did not sleep on the ground but on this cot where 
we could only fit if we slept on our side. We slept on this…kind of a wooden 
platform…it looked like a big table…that is where we all slept. But some soldiers were 
always on taskings so it was a bit possible to sleep. I could also sleep in my vehicle. My 
favorite tasking was to guard the motor pool. That is where I would go to my vehicle and 
I used the heater which used a type of diesel fuel. Every morning the commander came 
and checked if I had used the heater…It was forbidden to switch it on to heat the vehicle. 
Every morning the commander checked if I indeed had turned it on. So how did he go 
about it? You know if you use that heater condensation will form in the windows of the 
vehicle and you have some soot in the exhaust opening and if that part was blackened it 
meant that you used the heater. But they knew about that and every morning I cleaned it 
up. I have to say that the climate was very damp. Our clothes were always damp. We dug 
a lot of holes because there was not a single toilet…can you imagine…there was not a 
single toilet…so we just had to go into the forest…can you imagine what was happening 
there? It was just unbelievably bad…not a single toilet. They just thought that we could 
solve the issue on our own somehow. As a result the nearer forest started to look like a 
dump, a smelly one. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  And so how long did you train at the training areas?  
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Andriy K:  We spent one month usually four times per year. In Lieberose twice we had 
very intensive training. I, as a driver, had an elevated status and so once in a while I 
would drive the officers into the woods and they would shoot a deer and make shish 
kebab. What else…that I still cannot explain quite well. For instance, we are in the 
process of shooting [artillery]. So look here… [Mr. K is drawing on a chalkboard] This is 
our battery’s location…here is gun #1, 2, 3 etc. They were shooting at targets that were 
10-15 kilometers away. But here…what I…look here…this place could be a regular 
civilian road and the cars were driving on it. And our artillery projectiles went over that 
road! Can you imagine if an Uzbek…an Uzbek soldier was responsible for the powder 
charge for those projectiles and took out just one bag of powder more by mistake causing 
the shell to fly a shorter distance…it could have been very tricky. For instance, [Major] P 
says use two powder charges…which I never understood…if you put some more but the 
artillery projectile actually landed closer. It is beyond my understanding. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Question number four…What was the atmosphere like in your unit? 
What was the relationship like between the officers and the soldiers especially at the 
beginning of the 1990s?   
 
Andriy K:  Different relations…Let us say there was no love lost. There was no “peace 
and understanding” [Mr. K speaks English here]. Let us say no one would go and try to 
save Private Ryan here. This situation was…I actually felt quite bad because the officers 
who were Slavic…Russians and Ukrainians…never reproached Armenians or Azeris as if 
they were afraid to do something wrong. So one had to ah…defend his rights constantly. 
The officers would rarely reprimand Uzbeks or Armenians…hardly ever…And to the 
Slavic soldiers they always knew they could say “need to do that” and they knew that we 
would fulfill the tasks. And when I was fighting…fist fighting…the officers never asked 
me the reasons for this because they did not want to get in trouble with Azerbaijani 
mafia.  I remember one time I got into a fist fight with Azeri soldiers. There were five of 
them. And the Slavic soldiers did not come to my rescue…or to help me…but I was ok. I 
was a good fighter then. At one point I started bleeding from a vein in my right brow and 
it would not stop and it lasted for some time. Not a single officer asked me what had 
happened. Even the officer responsible for political education did not ask. I know they 
were afraid of asking because then they would have to ask questions from those Azeri 
soldiers and take measures. I had to hold a handkerchief to my lip for three days…that 
way I lasted for three days and I just said that “I fell and that is how I hurt myself.” 
Frankly speaking there was not much morale in the early 1990s in the Army. Yes, some 
people like [Major] P worked hard and honestly…some junior soldiers…but all of the 
commanders would just engage in their own business. They bought the cars that the 
Germans were trying to get rid of. And this is…you have to understand…even before 
October 3
rd
 of 1990. There were no borders anymore…no borders. The Germans began to 
get rid of their Socialist times cars like Trabant, Wartburg, and Moskvichi and began to 
buy West German cars like Mercedes Benz and Audi…used ones. But anyways…in 
order to get rid of Soviet car like Moskvich you had to pay some money so it could be 
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processed as scrap metal. So…what they [the Germans] did they just put them near our 
unit…abandoned them near our unit and then you could repair it and paint it. And who do 
you think was doing all of this work? The soldiers! We did not do our military jobs but 
we were working for those commanders trying to fix their used Opel Kadett or Zhiguli. 
And then…they ah…took those cars home and they sold them and came back…so they 
began this little business. And then mafia like activity began to emerge. A commanding 
officer would go home, sell a car…come back and buy  five more cars. But this time he 
would not contribute to the commander’s fund so to speak…so what happens then the 
officer wants to go on a vacation but the commander of the regiment will not let him. He 
[the regimental commander] could actually imprison him because that activity which 
those officers were involved in was illegal.  Nevertheless, everyone was doing it in the 
open. For instance in the military workshops where the 2S-1s and the BMPs were 
supposed to be repaired and painted we had Volgas, Moskvichi, Zhiguli, Zaparozhets, 
some western made cars…if the officer had more money. The commander of the 
regiment bought himself a BMW 3 Series. [Major] P was never engaged in such activity; 
he was above that. It is hard for me actually to discuss all of this. The soldiers looking at 
the officers began to behave in a similar manner. They began to sell their badges and 
their uniforms to the Germans.  All in all, the morale was very low in the early 1990s. 
And also you have to understand that now we were paid with West Deutsche marks. The 
ratio was 1:1. As I used to get 25 East German marks I now got 25 West German 
marks…but you can buy much more…the buying capacity was much higher with 
that…Ah…also about the morale…we have such a tradition in our Army. It is called the 
celebration of 100 days, sto dney do prikazi, before the final demobilization orders. It is 
an order issued from the supreme commander of the army about demobilization and we 
were always anxiously awaiting it. We were kind of afraid that they would forget about 
that. Usually, such order came on 20
th
 or 21
st
 of September. So the 100 days before that 
moment was sometimes in the middle of the summer. It is a soldiers’ celebration…it is 
very very illegal but we had to celebrate it. And no alcohol was allowed; we usually 
never consumed alcohol but on that night we drank and the officers kind of knew about 
it. But here we can also see how the corruption started. The officers will never tell you 
about this. But what we saw at the beginning of the 1990s. So what happened was the 
officers went to Germans…to their businesses and they “rented” soldiers for instance to 
work in the meat packaging factory or local brewery and, of course, the officers got the 
money for that. The soldiers did not see a penny from it and yet we were still happy 
because we were not allowed to leave the regimental area so on any occasion that when 
we can go and be outside the base was a good thing. I personally did not go very often 
but I still did because I could speak a few words in German and I knew some English to 
talk about simple things. For instance an officer needed not an alkaline battery but an acid 
battery…and so I would be able to translate that into English. Let us say it was in my 
interest to come and say “Well, they are looking for it [the battery] but they will need two 
days to find this particular type of battery.” And I would go back and visit those Germans 
and when I arrived the Germans served us breakfast, 
Frühstuck…sausages…hotdogs…milk and coffee…oh God coffee!... a lot of 
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potatoes…potato salads. They fed us breakfast, lunch and dinner. So once I went to that 
job and this is on the eve of that 100 day celebration. Different platoons celebrated on 
different days. On that day I was a sentry at the Hauptwache which is a military prison. 
In that prison were soldiers who had been caught drunk. And the way that they were 
treated there was awful.  There was this one officer who I knew well; he was a miserable 
human being. He really humiliated and tortured them. What he would do…he would get 
excrement from the sewer…not himself…he would make soldiers do that… and then he 
would make them pour it on the soldiers…this was an outside kind of a prison cell with 
bars and we called it the monkey cage (obyeziannik)…and here…imagine all of those 
soldiers standing there outside absolutely not protected and he [the officer] did it all night 
long and in the morning they [the soldiers] had to clean it all up. I had my weapon with 
me and I was tempted to end this. 
 
Elliott Nowacky: The officer did that?   
 
Andriy K:  Yes, the officer. The next day I actually had to go to the Germans to buy 
alcohol. I needed to do that because it was our turn to celebrate; people gave me the 
money and that was a sign to do that…can you imagine how I felt after what I had 
seen?..I just witnessed how the drunk soldiers who were caught were treated…and I had 
to do that. When I came back I had a back-pack filled with alcohol…and then this 
extraordinary thing happened…Usually at the gates to the regiment there is no one from 
the officers, just a couple of young soldiers who usually ignore why you enter the 
regiment. That very day there was a group of soldiers looking at my back-pack 
suspiciously saying it looked too heavy.  And what did I do? I ran for my life and caught 
up with the car of the German guy who gave me a ride…and I jumped in…and he sped 
up. He drove a little bit further beyond the fence and that is where I got back into my unit 
over the fence. So I escaped. I did a heroic thing…I was a true hero of my soldiers.   
 
Elliott Nowacky: So…let us continue…What were relations like between Soviet soldiers 
and the German civilians especially when you were stationed in Plauen? 
 
Andriy K:  I left before the withdrawal of the Soviet forces…with the Germans I would 
say that relations were good. I would not say they were excellent.  The Germans were 
tolerant towards us. Ah…I remember once I had 10 German marks and me and my friend 
left the barracks at night…put on jogging suits that we had bought to take home with 
us…it was safer ust to walk along the street with them on. And then we went to a night 
club…there were Germans drinking beer there…A German Gasthaus. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  You were in uniform?    
 
Andriy K:  No…we were in our jogging suits. 
 
Elliott Nowacky: Oh…You went underground…you became partisans…[Laughter].  
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Andriy K:  We entered but everyone immediately understood that we were soldiers and 
everyone just stopped talking. So we kind of realized that we were not very welcome 
there…We had little money…We asked for beer but we did not have enough money so 
we stood there for a while and then we left very quietly.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Was this in Plauen? 
 
Andriy K:  Yes, this was in Plauen.  
 
Elliott Nowacky: Did you have any contact with American officers and soldiers? 
 
Andriy K:  Never…but I knew that other people did have contacts. The Americans came 
when there were no borders.  
  
Elliott Nowacky: Did the Americans come after October 3
rd
?  
 
Andriy K:  No…a year before we did not have borders. American soldiers came…they 
wanted to buy Russian coins…to look…to take pictures. 
 
Elliott Nowacky: Those were not official visits?  
 
Andriy K:  No…Soldiers just came in their own cars. In Plauen we saw some military 
vehicles…American military vehicles with American flags. We saw them but we never 
had any contact with American soldiers. 
   
Elliott Nowacky:  Where was your unit relocated to? Was it inactivated and if so where? 
 
Andriy K:  I learned that it was not inactivated.  Recently I was buying a small piece of 
land near Kiev and a real estate agent who was helping me had also served in Potsdam. I 
left before he arrived. He served there a year after I did. We got acquainted in Kiev . We 
found them through our host family search. They are hosting students for us. Turned out 
we both served in East Germany. It turns out that the piece of land he was helping me to 
buy was not far from a unit that had been in Potsdam.  Oh…wait a minute…that was not 
in Plauen but in Potsdam…I was curious so I went to see what was going on there…but it 
is [the unit near Kiev] is not very well organized or equipped.  
 
Elliott Nowacky: So the unit still exists?    
 
Andriy K:  Yes, it does. It is still an artillery training school. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  That unit was not located far from Kiev…in which town?  
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Andriy K:  It is not near a town but is located near Pereyaslav-Khmelnytski. Pereyaslav 
is 90 kilometers from here but the training school itself is only 60 kilometers from Kiev. 
Oh…It just occurred to me that I should have driven you there. 
 
Elliott Nowacky: Next time… 
 
Andriy K: Well, next time we will do it. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  You already answered this question [going through list of 
questions]…Did you have enough time during the withdrawal period to get your things in 
order when the unit was relocated to a different place? How did this process work?  
 
Andriy K: I was already gone by that time…by the time of the withdrawal. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  What was the fate of a drafted Soviet soldier during the period of the 
withdrawal? For example, if the soldier was from Kazakhstan or Lithuania and the unit 
was relocated to Ukraine…what would happen? Would he continue to serve there or do 
something else?   
  
Andriy K:  If this happened before 1992 a soldier would continue to serve with his unit 
where it was relocated to. But, for instance, if there was a lot of equipment in the unit and 
it was needed somewhere they would be moved there. Even during the Soviet time there 
were trucks that were required, for instance, in Kazakhstan during the harvesting period. 
So the trucks were put on the flatcars and sent to Kazakhstan. So the soldiers who drove 
and maintained these trucks served there. But usually as a rule the soldier remained with 
his own unit. Usually soldiers did not go back to their homelands. But…in 1992 Ukraine 
already did not send soldiers into the Soviet army which is understandable since the 
Soviet Union no longer existed.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Ah…[looking through notes}…Last question…What was your life 
like after the withdrawal of the troops and how did you end up in Kiev?   
 
Andriy K: I worked for the navy…for the merchant marine. I was a mechanic. In my 
town there was a small port where we had small ships and barges.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  What is the name of that town?  
 
Andriy K:  Skadovsk. Skadovsk is located in the south in the Kherson region not far 
from the Crimea. But after a while I decided for my own personal benefit I needed to get 
into the university and I explored different options and opportunities and finally I decided 
to go to Kiev. People said “Look at yourself…you are a nobody…how are you going to 
get into the university in Kiev?” 
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Elliott Nowacky: Schevchenko University?  
 
Andriy K: Yes.  
 
Elliott Nowacky: What did you study there?  
 
Andriy K:  I went to get into the university when you could still pay money legally and 
be admitted. So I asked the port director.  I asked him to pay so I was admitted to the prep 
school at the university. The port could only pay for one year…and I did not know 
anything…I failed all of the exams but nevertheless I was admitted only because the port 
paid for me. I just had half a year to get prepared. We were not freshman students 
yet…we were just preparing to get into the college. I studied hard during that half of year 
and learned what was needed and got admitted. This was already 1992 and I studied there 
for five years. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  What was the atmosphere like after the Soviet Union collapsed? What 
was your life like?   
 
Andriy K:  It was a simple life but very interesting. The political life was very turbulent. 
There were a lot of demonstrations. There were students on hunger strikes. During this 
time I followed the political developments in my country very closely…I followed it 
because it was very interesting for me. I was discovering Ukraine for myself. Because 
before that…as Brezhnev used to say…I was a Soviet person. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  You were a pioneer right?  
 
Andriy K:  Yes, a pioneer, a Komsomol member. During the Soviet time I was a good 
student in school. I also attended music school and thought that is how life can be…only 
this way. But once I moved to Kiev I began to change my opinions and view of the 
world…not just change…my horizons widened. I already then knew that Communism is 
a bad thing. But when I was just drafted into the Army at the very beginning  I was a 
Komsomol member and I thought I would be a communist. My father was a 
communist…that was kind of a logical development of your life…that you are a 
Komsomol member and then you become a Communist party member…we did not know 
any other way of life and it seemed to us that this is the only way it can be. By the end of 
my time in the Army and I have to tell you no one knows that…I was a Komsomol 
member. Then my friends and I actually tore up our Komsomol membership cards and 
threw them out.  In Kiev, I began to change my opinions and perspectives. I was 
interested…why would students go on strike? I began to study the history of Ukraine… a 
new one…the revised not the old history.  
 
Elliott Nowacky: Learning about Bandera?  
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Andriy K:  Yes, about Bandera as well but he is a small page in our history. There were 
people of greater significance like Mazepa, and Bogdan Khmelnitskii. We were never 
taught that Ukraine was an independent country just 300-400 years ago. Kievian Rus 
from where Russia started…it is Ukraine itself. We learned that Ukrainian language is a 
normal language. Before I spoke Ukrainian very little. I could read and understand but I 
never spoke it very much. You just heard me talking with my son in Ukrainian on the 
phone. So I began at that time to study the Ukrainian language and now at home I only 
speak Ukrainian.  I can also speak publically translating texts with political context quite 
freely. My children also know Ukrainian. They know Russian too and sometimes they do 
mix both languages. My oldest son already understands the differences between the two 
languages. So that is how I began to really discover Ukraine as if I met a long lost 
mother. You know…as if you lived without parents and all of a sudden you have this new 
country and all of a sudden there is this beautiful music, an elevated and unique ancient 
culture no one else has anywhere in the world. All of this was very interesting for me. I, 
for instance, at the time had a lot of friends who never ever spoke Ukrainian…I mean 
Russian…out of principle…And I was fine with it...when I needed to speak Russian I 
spoke Russian and vice versa. 
 
Elliott Nowacky: The last question[laughter]…Describe the process as you were 
demobilizing from the Army as you were leaving Plauen. 
 
Andriy K:  It was November of 1990. Every day they told us a date when we would go 
home. But it could change anytime. And then one day they just told us “OK, you are 
going now.”   
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Did the whole unit move? 
 
Andriy K:  No, it was just a group of people of my age. As you know people served for 
two years. They flew us to Kiev and in Kiev they gave us each 100 rubles. It was 
Gorbachev’s new initiative to give this money to soldiers returning home. It was a big 
deal. Once in Kiev you could go anywhere you wanted. You had documents…tickets that 
you would show. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  What kind of documents did you have?  
 
Andriy K:  Ah…we had some kind of tickets that we showed at the railway station. 
There was a ticket office for military personnel…we still have them…and you showed 
your military ID (voyennyi bilet)and they will give you tickets. Officers had to pay for 
just a small part of the cost of their tickets. So that is how I came. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Did you have any…ah…any possessions? 
 
Andriy K:  Nothing…In Kiev they gave us 100 Rubles and that was it. 
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Elliott Nowacky:  When you arrived from Minsk was there a special building…a 
military building or a certain place where demobilization/reintegration occurred?   
  
Andriy K:  I actually got confused…my itinerary…remember I told you I came three 
months before I left the Army to Kiev on vacation? That was my itinerary…by train. 
When we were demobilizing we actually flew to Kiev from Germany. And that is when 
we just flew into the airport and went to a special window and they gave us each 100 
Rubles and that was it. After I returned to my hometown I had to register with the 
military committee (voyenkomat)…every town has one…So after a month after I came 
back I registered there and that was it.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  To conclude…in general…tell me if there were some situations that 
were interesting…some kind of stories during your service in Germany or if you would 
like to add something.   
Andriy K:  Once we had a situation when someone hung a blue and yellow flag out of 
the window[at the barracks in Plauen].  At that time it was considered a Bandera flag and 
the whole unit had a very difficult situation.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Was this flag black and yellow?   
 
Andriy K:  No. It was blue and yellow, our national flag.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Which was banned at the time?? 
 
Andriy K:  I did not even know that such flag existed. Never had I had the least idea of 
it. But someone already knew…someone must have been there [in the unit in Plauen] 
from western Ukraine. What was also happening…people stole ammunition…rather 
weapons…and sold them illegally. 
 
Elliott Nowacky: Kalashnikovs?   
 
Andriy K:  Yes…Kalashnikovs but also machine guns from tanks. 
 
Elliott Nowacky: From the tanks?  
 
Andriy K:  Yes, the discipline was really low. In the unit the few tanks that we had were 
not secured. We did have a whole tank regiment not far from us but we had just a 
few…five…all in all. But people stole equipment and weapons…for hard currency they 
sold the Germans everything that they could steal.  
 
Elliott Nowacky: How many howitzers were in your unit? 18? 
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Andriy K: Yes, 18. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Do they still have 18?  
 
Andriy K:  Yes, we still have three batteries. 
 
Elliott Nowacky: Did you have service battery [for logistical support]? 
 
Andriy K:  Well, we did not have a whole battery [for logistical support]. We had a 
logistical platoon and a command platoon in our unit.  We also had a communications 
platoon but…I am not sure…it could have been part of the [howitzer] battery.  We had a 
lot of work…always…I repaired a lot of equipment for those Uzbeks so I had very little 
rest.   
 
Elliott Nowacky:  How many days per year did you have vacation?  
 
Andriy K:  No one had a vacation. It was just me and one other soldier were given 
vacation. 
 
Elliott Nowacky: And the officers did have vacation time?  
 
Andriy K: Oh, yeh…they had vacation…they lived in town [in Plauen]. They lived in 
flats. I visited [Major] P’s flat once. 
 
Elliott Nowacky: If you married during your service could your wife come to Germany 
to visit you?  
 
Andriy K: No it was not possible. First of all, she would not have money and second 
they would not just allow her to leave the country. If you had a wife and one child before 
you entered the army they could give you a vacation. If you were married and had two 
children before the draft you could have a deferment and that deferment…if you were 
smart enough…you could prolong until your 27th birthday…after the age of 27 they 
stopped drafting you.  
 
Elliott Nowacky: Thank you Andriy for the interview…for all of your answers. 
 
Andriy K:  It was pleasant for me. I was glad to help you.   
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 Colonel P Interview, L’viv, July 2011 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  What years did you serve in the ZGV, in what city, in what branch of 
the armed forces and in which units and if possible please give the specific names of the 
units? 
 
Colonel P:  I served in Germany 1987 – 1991….in the city of Plauen where I served in 
the division artillery of a motorized rifle regiment…the regiment - the 29th mechanized.  
It was part of the Grimma division of the Dresden Tank Army. This regiment no longer 
exists it was inactivated and relocated to the Nikoleav Oblast to the training area Shiroki 
Lan. The moved the unit there and then inactivated it.  I served in the artillery division. 
At first I was a battery commander, then I became chief of staff of the division  and then I 
commanded the division. Well…in principle it is similar to an American divisional 
artillery battalion.   
 
Elliott Nowacky:  How many battalions were in the division at that time? How many 
regiments? 
 
Colonel P:  In our division we had one artillery regiment…the remainder - mechanized. 
In the regiment there were five battalions. They planned to relocate all of the remaining 
units of the Grimma division to the USSR. They relocated our regiment to Shiroki Lan 
not far from Nikoleav. The remainder of the division was sent to Russia to Central Volga 
region; it was not inactivated and it still exists. It fought in Chechnya and is now located 
in Russia. The only regiment that they inactivated was ours in Ukraine.   
 
Elliott Nowacky:  How many times did you serve in the ZGV?   
 
Colonel P:  One time. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  During the time of your service in the ZGV was your family with you 
or did they remain in the USSR? What were the conditions of your life?  
 
Colonel P:   At first I came alone. My family followed me two to three months later. One 
needed an invitation and documents. My second daughter was born in Germany. I have 
two daughters. She was born in Plauen; this is noted on her birth certificate as well.  By 
Ukrainian or Soviet standards the conditions were very good. We lived in three different 
apartments. The first apartment was a three bedroom apt where two families lived…kind 
of like a dormitory setting. I then got an individual apartment. It had to be heated by a 
stove that required coal. We had hot water and I liked the fact that I could control the 
temperature in the flat by adding more coal. Then when I became commander of the 
division they moved me to better housing…conditions were normal. 
Elliott Nowacky:  How was it when your family joined you there?  
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Colonel P:  After three months they joined me and left with me when I was relocated to 
Ukraine as well.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Did your wife work?  
 
Colonel P:  At the beginning she worked a little bit but after the birth of our daughter she 
stayed at home. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Did you live on the base, near the base or in the center of Plauen? 
 
Colonel P:  The unit was located in Plauen.  If you want you can look on internet to see 
where this was. Practically speaking…Neundorf is what they call this area of Plauen. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  How many kilometers from the center of Plauen?  
 
Colonel P:  On the outskirts of Plauen…from the center of the city maybe two 
kilometers, part of the city. We lived the whole time in apartments  in the city located 
maybe one hundred to two hundred meters from the unit.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Did you have contact with the Germans?   
 
Colonel P:   Well…homes of the officer cadre…they were located in the city. There were 
also hotels and dormitories as well. Yes, the buildings were German but for all practical 
purposed we made maximum use of them for the Soviet forces…..Good conditions.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Please describe your typical work day…if there is such a thing as a 
typical work day.  
 
Colonel P:  You correctly answered the question…One day would differ from 
another…Probably much the same in the American Army as well…I was responsible for 
the organization of the work day. I had officers and warrant officers under me who I 
would give orders. I also had superiors who would check on me to ensure that things 
were in order.  6am wake-up following by morning exercises, personal hygiene. We had 
formation. After formation soldiers were sent to training exercises or to the motor pools 
to maintain our equipment. After that we had lunch. We also of course had breakfast. 
Before lunch we came back and washed our hands; we had to have clean hands in order 
to eat. After lunch the soldiers had one half hour of personal time. They would write 
letters home. At that time there were no cell phones. They would talk amongst 
themselves and rest. After lunch we had formations. Soldiers would fall in and be given 
tasks for the rest of the day. The schedule also included weapons cleaning, repair of 
equipment and training in specialized fields. At 1830 the work day ended; soldiers would 
return to barracks, clean up and have dinner. After supper they had  one and half hours of 
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free time. Usually they would watch TV. There was one TV Channel transmitted directly 
from USSR. They also watched German television shows as well. We took final 
accountability of the soldiers and after that it was “lights out” until morning. This was our 
day if we were at the base.    
 
Elliott Nowacky:  And what if the unit was at the training area?  
 
Colonel P:  Well…each unit had specific tasks. When I was the chief of staff I took my 
soldiers to the local  training area near Plauen-Neundorf. Soldiers would operate their 
equipment and work on it as well. Here, of course, our schedule would be different. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Did you shoot there? 
 
Colonel P:  Yes, we shot a lot. But we did not fire our artillery near Plauen but at 
Lieberose near Cottbus. We also traveled to a training area closer to Berlin. Trying to 
remember the name…We travelled to many training areas….The smaller training area is 
where we taught our soldiers but if higher brass wanted to check on us when would go to 
the  larger training areas.     
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Have you heard of our training area in Germany - Grafenwohr - not 
far from Nürnberg?  
 
Colonel P:  Yes, I have heard of it. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  This training area was located about 100km from the Czech border. 
We fired our artillery there twice per year.  
 
Colonel P:  We shot much more often. Automatic  weapons once per week at the 
shooting range. We fired grenade launchers as well and even fired weapons from BMP-1. 
But if we wanted to fire weapons from  BMP-2 we had to go to larger training area for 
safety purposes.   
 
Elliott Nowacky:  How many times per year did you go to the training area near 
Cottbus? How long did you train there? 
 
Colonel P:  Two times per year at a minimum. We stayed there for up to one month.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  For us it was the same, twice per year.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  What was the atmosphere like between the officers and soldiers in the 
ZGV especially at the beginning of the 1990s? 
Colonel P:  Especially at the beginning of the 1990s when Germany was reunified? What 
can I tell you? The relationship between officers and soldiers was better than it is here 
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now even.  Because we were far from our homeland we tried to cultivate friendship. 
Andriy is a typical example of this generation of soldiers. He and his age group served 
for two years. There were others. In my division there were 250 people. There were 35 
officers who were my subordinates. The soldiers came from every corner of the USSR. 
25 different nationalities and all of the union republics were represented plus smaller 
ethnic minorites including soldiers from Chechniya, Abhasians, Ingushi, Avarsi 
(Dagistan). There  was  a lot of comradery. I had to explain to them…well…perhaps it 
was called something different for you...we used to have political seminars. We would 
get together and I would explain why the soldiers would have to hide from each other if 
they were not good to each other.  I would say if you treat your fellow soldier badly when 
you go back to Russia you will have to hide from him because he will seek revenge for 
the mistreatment. But, if you are nice to him, he will greet you as relative and will treat 
you with food and drink and will do everything for you. So…to sum up our relationship 
was very good even excellent. You can also talk to Andriy who can give you the soldier’s 
perspective. You have to remember I was the big boss…Andriy and I still have friendly 
relationship with him and his parents. He keeps in touch with his fellow soldiers via the 
internet as well. Some of them actually left the USSR. Kirill A. lives in the US for 
example.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Where does he live…in Texas?  
 
Colonel P:  Somewhere in that area. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  What did you think of the German Reunification? And about treaties 
that Kohl and Gorbachev signed in 1990? And the withdrawal of the ZGV? Was it a 
shock or elation?    
 
Colonel P:  No…it was not a shock. Better to be united than divided. Just the fact that 
Germany was reunified meant that both sides wanted it though later some regretted that 
and even today you live at our expense.  I was actually in Germany during that period. I 
tell you what…and I am sure the same in US Army. I was a major in Soviet Army and 
my salary was less than a soldier in DDR army. Supposedly we got paid in USSR when 
funds were sent to my bank account. People in the Soviet Union thought we were earning 
a decent salary. With the Germans the level was different. Not far from our base there 
was a base for East German border guards. We often met with our German colleagues. 
One of them was a senior captain and they forced him to retire. Maybe it was the right 
thing to do. We actually greeted the unification because we used to get 800 East German 
marks and then we got 800 West German marks.  On those 800 West German marks one 
could buy three times as much but not food products. Electronics etc. The food products 
actually became more expensive. So in a way we were compensated. At that time we 
used to joke Brezhnev became the honorary citizen of Berlin which means it gives him 
the right to be buried in a German cemetery. 
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Elliott Nowacky:  You mean Gorbachev?  
 
Colonel P:  Yes, and so that means he must be buried there.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  What was the relationship between the Soviet military and civilian 
population in Plauen during the withdrawal?  
 
Colonel P:  This is a very interesting question. I even had a personal first-hand 
experience in the change of German attitude towards us. Before reunification the German 
civilians treated us and their German military personnel with respect. Anyone in uniform 
commanded respect; that is the kind of mentality they had. After the reunification all 
kinds of strange organizations popped up and I personally had a conflict situation with 
one of them. The organization official name was: Organization at Aiming for Worsening 
the Conditions of Soviet troops in Germany. As I mentioned before we trained at the 
local training area near Plauen. At the time of the incident I was the commander of a self 
propelled artillery unit. It is similar to the American howitzer M109, but caliber is 
smaller, 122mm. They look like tanks. I was given the task by my superior commander of 
bringing these howitzers to the training area. Our location was still within the city limits 
so my convoy had to drive though the city. The streets are cobblestoned like here in 
L’viv; they are not wide. At one of the road intersections a German driving a Trabant 
blocks the intersection and shouts that we cannot proceed. Well, it would have been very 
easy to drive over this plastic car and smash it but I did not want to do it so I told my 
soldiers just to pick up his car and put it aside away from our route. You see, it was very 
light. We proceeded and completed our training following orders correctly. We did have 
a verbal exchange with the German; I responded in my broken German as well. Well, a 
few days after that there were rumors in Wünsdorf of a scandalous situation. A tank 
officer, a major, threatened to shoot a German citizen because he was blocking his way.  
This was the conflict. All of the tankers had already left Plauen. We were artillery troops.  
It did not take long for them to figure out it was my unit moving about the city. My boss 
confronted me about the incident. I told him, yes, it was me. He asked me what 
happened. I explained to them what had happened. We moved the car and then proceeded 
further.  My superiors told me to go to the military police and take care of the situation. 
Once there with the help of a translator we were able to discuss this situation with the 
German citizen. It turned out he was the leader of the aforementioned organization. He 
said that in the bilateral treaty the hours in which tanks could use the roads were 
restricted. I told him that self-propelled howitzers are not tanks; they are very 
lightweight. The pressure on the ground caused by the tracks is less than that of the 
Soviet-made truck URAL. And the German said he was not aware of that. Later he tried 
to befriend me and even invited me to his butcher shop. In general the German people did 
treat us well.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Were there any other conflicts during the withdrawal? 
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Colonel P:  Yes, last year of our stay there were regulations on the times in which we 
could go to and from the training area near Cottbus via railroad.   
 
Elliott Nowacky:  We had the same regulations in West Germany. We were also 
restricted on when we could travel on the autobahns.  
 
Colonel P: We did not use autobahn. We used railroads. We put equipment on flatcars 
and went to Cottbus. We listed all items we had  in declaration. And yet we were 
confronted yet with another conflict situation. They were German…how do you 
say…verification officers. They asked: Do you have new equipment that you taking to 
the training area that you have not declared? These kinds of details… They counted all of 
the equipment leaving and counted it again and again according to the treaty. They 
confirmed what was there and what was not there.  
 
Elliott Nowacky: This was after the reunification of Germany? 
 
Colonel P:  Yes , we declared everything. We were loading the equipment.   
 
Elliott Nowacky: From where were you loading the equipment?  
 
Colonel P: We declared our equipment through the ZGV Headquarters in Wünsdorf. We 
had to report to international organizations in advance that we would be moving 
equipment. So…at our loading location these representatives are walking around and 
were very indignant. There were representatives from the FRG and I also think the 
United States  
 
Elliott Nowacky: Really, Americans were there as well?    
    
Colonel  P:  Finally I said to them please just tell me what you want. What seems to be 
wrong?  Turns out they had a photograph that they took somewhere along the rail route 
near Dresden, Leipzig or Chemnitz. What happened was that on one of the howitzers we 
loaded on the train…soldiers always forget something and leave it behind…In this case 
they left a metallic barrel which they used to boil water. I did not allow them to store it 
inside the howitzer so they tied it around the tube of the howitzer  so it looked like there 
were two tubes attached to it. So when they took this picture they thought we had a new 
weapons system which had not been declared. They demanded: why did you not declare 
this new equipment? So then I led them to the rail car with the howitzer in question and I 
showed them how the soldiers had attached the barrel to the howitzer tube. They all had a 
good laugh. But our soldiers and sergeants became indignant saying “Why did you take 
pictures secretly like that?” That created…that left a bad taste in their mouths plus it 
created suspicion.  And then my boss actually reprimanded me and said,” Again, you!, 
the Germans already hate you…why do you always get in trouble?”  
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Elliott Nowacky:  Did you have any contacts with American soldiers or officers that 
served on the territory of Germany? And if you did what kind of relations did you have? 
  
Colonel P:  After the reunification of Germany we had groups from Nürnberg and Hof. 
Usually we showed them our equipment. The communication was usually on the level of 
a smaller unit…like a battery. We showed them our equipment, the garrison and the 
barracks. We showed them how the soldiers lived. These visits occurred several times.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Did you have the opportunity to inspect the American garrisons in 
Nürnberg? 
 
Colonel P:  No. They usually came to see us. When it came to visiting them it was 
usually people of higher rank that went to see them. 
 
Elliott Nowacky: The groups/delegations that came from Nürnberg were they soldiers, 
officers, sergeants?    
  
Colonel P:  It was a mixed group. Usually they came by bus..30 or 40 of them and while 
I was there it happened twice.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  What was your impression? Did you have any translators?  
 
Colonel P:  Yes, indeed we did have translators…It was good…it was quite normal…we 
did not feel like enemies. We did not feel any animosity towards  the American soldiers.  
  
Elliott Nowacky:  The visitors from Nürnberg…were they also artillerymen?  
 
Colonel P:  Yes, we had representatives from the artillery regiment in Nürnberg. We had 
the so-called “Days of Friendship”; we had dinners together in the cafeteria. One day I 
was on duty and was absent from that meeting. And interestingly one of the American 
officers asked “Where is the commander of the artillery unit?” They told him that I was 
on duty. He then took out a beer stein that had images of Bavaria on it and said “give it to 
him.” When my boss saw that he really liked that stein. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Where was your unit relocated to when Soviet troops were withdrawn 
from East Germany? You kind of already answered this question but could you please 
answer it again? Was it inactivated or what is relocated and if so where? 
 
 
Colonel P:  Part of our division relocated to Shiroki Lan which is not far from 
Nikolaev…to the training area there…They planned to build a little town for the whole 
division. They planned or told us that we would withdrawal in ’92 or ’93 but the 
Germans who had more information than us told us that you will not be here by the end 
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of ’90. Our bosses used to scold us saying “Why do you listen to them? They are lying 
through their teeth.” But in reality we were out of East Germany by the end of 1990. The 
plan was that we will go to Shiroki Lan to secure the construction of this little town for 
the Army. But only our unit was relocated there. The rest of the division was relocated to 
Russia. They contemplated what to do with us and then finally after two years they 
decided to inactivate it.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  When the Soviet troops were withdrawn from East Germany did you 
have enough time to get your things together? How was this process? 
 
Colonel P:  This is an interesting question. Of course our commanders told us we would 
be withdrawn in  one to two years. Officially we were not preparing to leave but we 
always had a high level of preparedness as soldiers. For instance, I actually studied at the 
military academy in St. Petersburg and literally within one week of graduation I reported 
to my new unit and took my soldiers and equipment via Rostov to St. Petersburg and then 
in to Ukraine. So my wife, who stayed behind, had to take care of all of our possessions. 
Of course we had mutual aid and other officers helped her to pack.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  How long did it take to withdrawal?    
 
Colonel P:  It happened very quickly. Just within three months. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  How many soldiers did you withdrawal?  
 
Colonel P:  3000 soldiers. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  So this meant every month approximately 1000 soldiers?  
 
Colonel P:  It differed. Sometimes soldiers we flown by planes. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  What about the equipment?  
 
Colonel P:  The equipment usually went by railway to Rostock and then by sea to the 
Soviet Union. Part of the equipment went through Poland by land. So it was kind of a 
planned and well organized withdrawal.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  So you said that soldiers were flown by planes?  
Colonel P:  Yes, the soldiers, officers and families. I flew with my soldiers to Nikolaev. 
You know soldiers do not have a lot of possessions, just their necessities…their back-
packs. Everything else was sent by echelons or by railway. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  So if a soldier had a car how was he able to bring it with him?  
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Colonel P:  A soldier could not buy a car. A Soviet soldier earned only 15 marks, a 
sergeant 25. They could not buy a car; it was difficult even for officers to buy a car. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Did you buy a car?  
 
Colonel P:  Yes, I did and I took it out during my vacation. I just drove away during my 
vacation.   
 
Elliott Nowacky:  How many days of vacation did you have? In the U.S Army we have 
30 days of vacation each year. 
 
Colonel P:  No, we have a different system. It depends on your rank and how many years 
you served in the army.  If you are a lieutenant or senior lieutenant then you had 30 days. 
A captain will have 35 days. With the rank of major it is not automatic. It depends on 
how many years he served. If he served for 20 years then he would have 40 days of 
vacation. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  We have a uniform system. The rank and file get the same number of 
days as general officers. 30 days.  
 
Colonel P:  We have different system.   A soldier usually has not more than 10 days. And 
from Germany it was very difficult to go back to Russia. Some still did. Andriy, whom 
you know…He went home for ten days. But it was more like a reward. The soldiers did 
not have passports. The soldiers name was written into an officer’s passport. The officer 
personally took the soldier to Brest, to the border. And when he returned from leave he 
was again written into the passport of the officer and that is how he was able to get back 
into Germany.  Usually soldiers did not travel from Germany. It was really, really 
difficult.    
  
Elliott Nowacky:  Could a soldier spend his vacation within Germany?  
 
Colonel P:  What do you mean Germany?   
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Could he go to Berlin…to East Berlin? Could he go by train to East 
Berlin for four days? 
 
Colonel P:  No. It never happened. We did organize excursions and the Germans did 
organize excursions for us. A bus would come. There would be a translator/guide who 
would inform us. I myself participated in an excursion like that.  We once went to a place 
called Klingenthal where we viewed musical instruments. This town is on the border with 
Czechoslovakia. 
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Elliott Nowacky: What was the fate the soldiers faced when they relocated back into the 
Soviet Union? For instance, if a soldier was from Kazakhstan or Lithuania and they were 
relocated to the Ukraine. This is my first question. The second question is:  Will these 
soldiers continue to serve in the Ukraine or will they be demobilized? I am interested in 
that because in 1991, these countries… Kazakhstan and Lithuania became independent. 
So how did it work? I have not been able to find any information about that yet.  
 
Colonel P:  At the end of 1990 and the beginning of 1991 our unit was relocated to 
Ukraine. 1991: the collapse of the Soviet Union. Those there are reuniting and we are 
here falling apart. In my unit I had 25 nationalities represented. I had sergeants and 
soldiers from Russia, the Baltic Republics, and other republics. And they had a choice. 
Those who wanted to go to their own republics…they were put in groups and sent back in 
a planned manner to their own country. Soldiers would go to Kiev where they would get 
their route papers. A lot of officers in my unit were from Russia. There were some from 
Armenia, Georgia and the Baltics. And after they left we got local officers from Ukraine. 
As for the soldiers very stayed.  Most of them left for their own republics. Those who 
demobilized did it in an usual manner. As for the new soldiers we did recruit some but 
very very few because of the uncertainty of what will happen to our unit. We did not 
know what fate awaited us.  
 
Elliott Nowacky: One regiment was sent to Nikolaev. If 55% of the Soldiers in the unit 
were from Russia they would be gone to Russia and this would mean that there would be 
very few soldiers left. 
 
Colonel P:  You need to know…have a concept of the Soviet Army that was located in 
Germany, Hungary and Poland. We used to have rather large units…from 500 to upward 
of 1000 soldiers. Every position was filled. 
 
Elliott Nowacky: Thank you so much. This is the first time I was able to hear 
information about what happened to the soldiers during that period.   
 
Colonel P:  Even after so many people left we still had more personnel than other units. 
When we were in Germany we had a full staff. And even after we came here we 
redistributed the functions and were able to function quite well.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  If you have this information, what happened to the 
property/equipment that was owned by your unit? Could you possibly give me an 
estimate…a number of for the cost of the property?    
 
Colonel P:  Can a lieutenant of the American Army…can he give me a monetary 
assessment of the property of his unit?  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Our warrant officer knew. I, as a lieutenant, did not. 
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Colonel P:  I am responsible for the equipment.  I know how many things I have but how 
much it costs I do not know. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  There must have been some commissions who were assigned to do 
this assessment. For instance if you had ten houses and 20 buildings..But you did not 
know how much they cost?? 
 
Colonel P:  This is not my level. I know my equipment. I was responsible for 
withdrawing it. Bringing it here; putting it safely in the warehouse. But the financial 
assessment is not my competence.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Do you have any knowledge what kind of treaties that were signed 
between unified Germany and Russia concerning the property, the military property? 
 
Colonel P:  This is not my level.  I was responsible for my own territory. For cleaning it 
up after with withdrawal all of the equipment so there is no dirt, or spilled petroleum 
products. My duty was to leave the area clean. My commander told me that this time 
representatives of Germany will come and they will have to verify that everything is 
clean.     
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Was your commander a colonel or a lieutenant colonel?   
 
Colonel P: He was a colonel…no…he was a lieutenant colonel but his appointment was 
for a position normally held by a colonel. For instance I had an appointment for a 
position of a lieutenant colonel but my rank was major.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  We also have a similar system sometimes.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Did you have official ceremonies when the Soviet troops were 
withdrawn particularly in your own unit?   
 
Colonel P:  In our unit we had our own orchestra and when the unit was 
withdrawing…actually it never withdrew all at once but parts of it…we always had 
orchestra playing music. 
Elliott Nowacky:  Did you ever have official ceremonies with the Germans at the 
railway station? 
 
Colonel P:  Never.    
 
Elliott Nowacky:  How many people did you have in the orchestra?   
  
Colonel P:  Oh, about 20 people. Very good musicians, very good music. 
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Elliott Nowacky: I do not know if you know but there was an orchestra for the ZGV in 
Wünsdorf that made a CD and recorded music. The CD came out in 1994. Very good 
music and you can find it via the internet. 
 
Colonel P:  This is very interesting. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  What kind of problems did you encounter during the withdrawal 
period?  
 
Colonel P:  What do you mean problems?  Every unit is a self-sustaining unit and it is 
capable of fulfilling and carrying out concrete tasks. Yes, I mentioned that sometimes we 
had conflicts but mainly they were misunderstandings rather than real conflicts. Some 
people wanted to show off…that they meant something more than others. I have to tell 
you that if it had happened at a different time within a different army sometimes we 
would have put someone to the wall and you know what happens then.  Some people put 
hurdles in front of the army. But we were not aggressive. We did not engage in conflict 
with the local civilian population. Let us take for instance Iraq and Afghanistan. No one 
is really treating the locals with kid gloves. But we were quite loyal and quite tolerant 
with the locals.      
    
Elliott Nowacky:  How did you own homeland treat you when you returned? What kind 
of problems did you encounter back there? 
 
Colonel P:  You are truly interested in that? It is really interesting for you? It is really 
really disconcerting even just to recollect that experience. It is pure despair.   
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Dispair? 
 
Colonel P:  It is sad. Let us say we went to the training ground  and there was nothing 
there. But we are a self-sufficient unit so we put up our tents and started 
cooking…preparing food. And so everything seemed to be alright. Of course it does not 
mean that you can live like this as a unit all of the time.  
 
Author’s  Note:  At this point in the interview, Andriy K. the other person that I 
interviewed a few days later, called Colonel P.    
 
Colonel P:  Andriy was a mechanic and driver of my own assigned vehicle. He is very 
well educated. Loves the Beatles very much. He is well read. Always pleasant to 
communicate with and we still keep in touch. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  So let us return to the question about difficulties during that period. 
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Colonel P: Oh, well, we came to the railway station in the Nikolaev region near a small 
town. We unloaded all of the equipment. Three days passed and no one came to meet us.  
But, as a commander, I kind of thought that this might happen so I made sure that I had 
mechanics and drivers with me. I had this group: me, one sergeant and three soldiers.  So, 
after no one came to meet us, I left them at the station and began myself to relocate the 
equipment to the assigned location. I had to do this because already within three days the 
locals began to steal from our equipment. So I had to take care of things all by myself.  
Finally, after five days the people who were supposed to meet us earlier arrived and 
asked “Do you need drivers and mechanics to relocate your equipment?”  And I said “yes 
and you could have waited another week and see what would have happened.”   So I 
relocated the unit myself with a very small group of people. Once we got to the training 
area we actually dug a trench around the unit because we did not have enough personnel 
for providing security. We would not shoot the looters. They would not understand.  We 
lived in that open field until the fall. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  How many months?  
 
Colonel P:  Four or five months. When it became cold we had to relocate to unfinished 
barracks. We had to use plastic sheeting on the windows.  Then the families came from 
Germany. Some of the families lived in the little military town in a building that was not 
well equipped for living. Some officers’ wives and families took one look at that building 
and just went to live with their parents. The conditions were so bad. Within the year they 
built a small fabricated type of barracks. We lived there for a while and then of course 
they inactivated the unit.    
 
Elliott Nowacky:  How long did you serve in Nikolaev and after that where did you 
serve?  
 
Colonel P:  I served for two years in Nikolaev.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  And then you came here to L’viv? 
 
 
Colonel P:  No, I went to the Odessa region first. First of all when they inactivated our 
regiment I had to reassign all of our equipment; it went to different units. For a while I 
served in the Odessa region in a place called Shabo. Then I served in Odessa itself.  It 
was a very interesting period.  
 
Elliott Nowacky: How many years did you serve in the Soviet Army? How many in the 
Ukrainian and how many combined all together?  
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Colonel P:  I served in the Soviet Army from 1981 – 1991 when the Soviet Union 
collapsed…in the Ukrainian Army for 20. This year it will be 30 years of military 
service. I might retire.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Have you officially retired yet?  
 
Colonel P:  Here is my position. I work at the academy of ground forces. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  How many years do you still have to serve?  
 
Colonel P:  This year my contract ends.  Five years ago every Soviet officer was forced 
to sign a contract that they would serve for an additional five years. This year my contract 
expires. We did sign those contracts otherwise they could have fired us. But I do not 
intend to renew the contract.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  I found 5-6 books in German published on the ZGV and in Russian 
only three. One of the books was written by General Burlakov. 
 
Colonel P:  Who? Who? He is a very sly person. A very interesting person.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Have you met him?  
 
Colonel P:  I have seen him. He is the one who lied to us about our withdrawal schedule. 
He told us repeatedly it would be in two years and then they withdrew us just one month 
later. He organized the withdrawal from Hungary. Obviously he did a good job.  
 
Elliott Nowacky:  How many people? I heard 30,000 people?  
 
Colonel P:  So that is why they brought him to Germany to do the same thing here. He is 
not a good man. And what he writes…sometimes you have to change plus to minus and 
vice versa.  And you have to understand that not all of it is true.   
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Well, is there anything that you would like to add…something 
interesting that happened…some kind of stories? 
 
Colonel P:  In the unit where I served those documents are now all in archives. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Where do you think they are? 
 
Colonel P:  I think they are in Ukraine. By law such documents must be preserved for 
100 years because it involves fates of real people.   
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Elliott Nowacky:  I really wanted to go to the archives and I mentioned that to Andriy K. 
and he said he did not think it was possible. 
 
Colonel P:  As far as my unit is concerned it was a very distinguished unit that 
participated in many real battles. It participated in the battles of the Second World War. 
So it has a glorious battle record. It had the prestigious “Guards” distinction. They even 
took part in the events in Czechoslovakia and Hungary when they had those 
“confusions”.  I have personally met officers who participated in those events.  
 
Elliott Nowacky: Usually a unit has its own flag. Where do you think the flag of your 
unit is kept?  
 
Colonel P:  I think in the archives. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  The documents are in Kiev?     
  
Colonel P:  I think in Kiev. Theoretically you can always access them.  During Soviet 
times the archives were concentrated in a small place near Moscow. I cannot remember 
the name right now but all of the documents came to that one place. The address of our 
unit was identified by postal code PP 38868. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  We also use numbers to identify units and to specifically associate 
them to which division they are attached but we do not usually use them to identify the 
address or location.  
 
Colonel P:  Yes, these are the numbers used to identify the units that were in Dresden..In 
Grimma.  
 
Elliott Nowacky: I read that the First Tank Army went to Russia through 
Czechoslovakia because Poland refused access through their territory.  
  
Colonel P:  That is true. At first we had to go via sea. 
 
Elliott Nowacky:  I also read that about eight million soldiers have served in the ZGV 
since 1945? 
 
Colonel P:  That is possible. I can tell you that you can use this number (the postal code 
PP 38868) in Google or in a program called Odna Klassiki, schoolmates/classmates.   
 
Elliott Nowacky:  Thank you very much for the interview. 
 
Colonel P:  Do not mention it.    
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Elliott Nowacky:  I will still need to listen to this recording several times but thank you 
very much.  
 
Colonel P:  You have my e-mail address. If you have any questions even if they are 
prepared/written questions I will try to answer.   
 
End of Interview  
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Appendix F: Lieberose Training Area5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Kersten, Olaf. Garnisonen der NVA und GSTD: Zur Nutzung der militärischen Standorte von 1871 bis 
2010, Berlin: Verlag Dr. Köster, 2011, pg. 385. Modified by the author.    
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